Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for agentless attestation. Agentless attestation can measure the integrity of customer servers without requiring an agent software program to be downloaded to each of the enterprise computer devices. In particular, the system can integrate several standalone components to measure the integrity of monitored devices. This also allows the data center to authenticate, verify, audit, and update any hardware change, including a Platform Certificate.

Abstract: A technique includes an operating system agent of a computer system monitoring a process to detect whether an integrity of the process has been compromised. The monitoring includes the operating system agent scanning a data structure. The process executes in a user space, and the data structure is part of an operating system kernel space. The technique includes a hardware controller of the computer system listening for a heartbeat that is generated by the operating system agent. The hardware controller takes a corrective action in response to at least one of the hardware controller detecting an interruption of the heartbeat, or the operating system agent communicating to the hardware controller a security alert for the process.

Abstract: In some examples, a bus device includes a device controller to perform input/output (I/O) virtualization to provide a virtualized instance of the bus device. The device controller establishes a channel between the virtualized instance of the bus device and a guest operating system (OS) of a virtual machine (VM). The device controller receives, from the VM, address information relating to a portion of a memory containing information associated with a kernel of the guest OS, and obtains, for integrity inspection, the information associated with the kernel from the memory based on the address information.

Abstract: In some examples, a system receives information from electronic devices comprising network devices and computing devices in a computing environment that are subject to attestations of interfaces of the network devices and the computing devices. For each interface of a given computing device being attested, the system verifies that the interface of the given computing device is connected to an interface of a corresponding network device that is being attested. For each interface of a given network device being attested, the system verifies that the interface of the given network device is connected to an interface of a corresponding computing device that is being attested or an interface of another network device that is being attested.

Abstract: In some examples, a system receives first measurements of data items used by a build server in building an executable program, the data items copied from a data repository to a storage partition that is separate from the data repository, and the storage partition to store the data items relating to building the executable program by the build server. The system determines, based on the first measurements and according to a policy specified for the storage partition, whether a corruption of the data items used by the build server in building the executable program has occurred.

Abstract: In some examples, a system receives information from electronic devices comprising network devices and computing devices in a computing environment that are subject to attestations of interfaces of the network devices and the computing devices. For each interface of a given computing device being attested, the system verifies that the interface of the given computing device is connected to an interface of a corresponding network device that is being attested. For each interface of a given network device being attested, the system verifies that the interface of the given network device is connected to an interface of a corresponding computing device that is being attested or an interface of another network device that is being attested.

Abstract: A process includes, in a computer system, acquiring a first measurement that corresponds to a software container. Acquiring the measurement includes a hardware processor of the computer system measuring a given layer of a plurality of layers of layered file system structure corresponding to the software container. The given layer includes a plurality of files, and the first measurement includes a measurement of the plurality of files. The process includes storing the first measurement in a secure memory of the computer system. A content of the secure memory is used to verify an integrity of the software container.

Abstract: A process includes, in a computer system, acquiring a first measurement that corresponds to a software container. Acquiring the measurement includes a hardware processor of the computer system measuring a given layer of a plurality of layers of layered file system structure corresponding to the software container. The given layer includes a plurality of files, and the first measurement includes a measurement of the plurality of files. The process includes storing the first measurement in a secure memory of the computer system. A content of the secure memory is used to verify an integrity of the software container.

Abstract: Examples disclosed herein relate to using an integrity manifest certificate to verify the state of a platform. A device identity of a device that has the device identity provisioned and stored in a security co-processor to retrieve an integrity proof from the security co-processor. The device includes at least one processing element, at least one memory device, and a bus including at least one bus device, and wherein the device identity is associated with a device identity certificate signed by a first authority. The integrity proof includes a representation of each of a plurality of hardware components including the at least one processing element, the at least one memory device, the at least one bus device, and a system board and a representation of plurality of firmware components included in the device. The integrity proof is provided to a certification station.

Abstract: A technique includes an operating system agent of a computer system monitoring a process to detect whether an integrity of the process has been compromised. The monitoring includes the operating system agent scanning a data structure. The process executes in a user space, and the data structure is part of an operating system kernel space. The technique includes a hardware controller of the computer system listening for a heartbeat that is generated by the operating system agent. The hardware controller takes a corrective action in response to at least one of the hardware controller detecting an interruption of the heartbeat, or the operating system agent communicating to the hardware controller a security alert for the process.

Abstract: A technique includes an operating system agent of a computer system monitoring a process to detect whether an integrity of the process has been compromised. The monitoring includes the operating system agent scanning a data structure. The process executes in a user space, and the data structure is part of an operating system kernel space. The technique includes a hardware controller of the computer system listening for a heartbeat that is generated by the operating system agent. The hardware controller takes a corrective action in response to at least one of the hardware controller detecting an interruption of the heartbeat, or the operating system agent communicating to the hardware controller a security alert for the process.

Abstract: In some examples, a system receives first measurements of data items used by a build server in building an executable program, the data items copied from a data repository to a storage partition that is separate from the data repository, and the storage partition to store the data items relating to building the executable program by the build server. The system determines, based on the first measurements and according to a policy specified for the storage partition, whether a corruption of the data items used by the build server in building the executable program has occurred.

Abstract: Example implementations relate to a method and system for provisioning an identity certificate for a BMC of a platform. Based on the certificate signing request (CSR) received from the BMC, a certificate authority (CA) associated with the platform manufacturer may verify the identity of the security processor and private key of BMC. A cryptographic audit session log between a provisioning service of the platform and the security coprocessor of the platform is received along with the CSR at the CA implemented in a cloud system. The CA verifies the signature on the received cryptographic audit session log. After verification, validation tools at the cloud system determine a first time and second time associated with the security coprocessor. When the difference between the first time and the second time is below an expected time of cryptographic communication, the CSR is considered as a valid request and an identity certificate for the BMC is generated and transmitted to the platform.

Abstract: Examples disclosed herein relate to using an integrity manifest certificate to verify the state of a platform. A device identity of a device that has the device identity provisioned and stored in a security co-processor to retrieve an integrity proof from the security co-processor. The device includes at least one processing element, at least one memory device, and a bus including at least one bus device, and wherein the device identity is associated with a device identity certificate signed by a first authority. The integrity proof includes a representation of each of a plurality of hardware components including the at least one processing element, the at least one memory device, the at least one bus device, and a system board and a representation of plurality of firmware components included in the device. The integrity proof is provided to a certification station.

Abstract: Example implementations relate to a method and system for provisioning an identity certificate for a BMC of a platform. Based on the certificate signing request (CSR) received from the BMC, a certificate authority (CA) associated with the platform manufacturer may verify the identity of the security processor and private key of BMC. A cryptographic audit session log between a provisioning service of the platform and the security coprocessor of the platform is received along with the CSR at the CA implemented in a cloud system. The CA verifies the signature on the received cryptographic audit session log. After verification, validation tools at the cloud system determine a first time and second time associated with the security coprocessor. When the difference between the first time and the second time is below an expected time of cryptographic communication, the CSR is considered as a valid request and an identity certificate for the BMC is generated and transmitted to the platform.

Abstract: A technique includes an operating system agent of a computer system monitoring a process to detect whether an integrity of the process has been compromised. The monitoring includes the operating system agent scanning a data structure. The process executes in a user space, and the data structure is part of an operating system kernel space. The technique includes a hardware controller of the computer system listening for a heartbeat that is generated by the operating system agent. The hardware controller takes a corrective action in response to at least one of the hardware controller detecting an interruption of the heartbeat, or the operating system agent communicating to the hardware controller a security alert for the process.

Abstract: A process includes, in a computer system, acquiring a first measurement that corresponds to a software container. Acquiring the measurement includes a hardware processor of the computer system measuring a given layer of a plurality of layers of layered file system structure corresponding to the software container. The given layer includes a plurality of files, and the first measurement includes a measurement of the plurality of files. The process includes storing the first measurement in a secure memory of the computer system. A content of the secure memory is used to verify an integrity of the software container.

Abstract: A system has a virtual overlay infrastructure mapped onto physical resources for processing, storage and network communications, the virtual infrastructure having virtual entities for processing, storage and network communications. Virtual infrastructures of different users share physical resources but are isolated and have their own management entities. An interface between infrastructures allows controlled relaxation of the isolation, using a gateway between virtual nets, or shared virtual storage devices. This can allow businesses to share data or applications, while maintaining control of security.

Abstract: A system has a virtual overlay infrastructure mapped onto physical resources for processing, storage and network communications, the virtual infrastructure having virtual entities for processing, storage and network communications. Each virtual infrastructure can be passivated by suspending applications, stopping operating systems, and storing state, to enable later reactivation. This is simpler for a complete virtual infrastructure than for groups of virtual entities and physical entities. It enables cloned virtual infrastructure to be created for testing, upgrading or sharing without risk to the parent. On failure, reversion to a previous working clone is feasible.

Abstract: A system has a virtual overlay infrastructure mapped onto physical resources for processing, storage and network communications, the virtual infrastructure having virtual entities for processing, storage and network communications. Virtual infrastructures of different users share physical resources but are isolated. Each infrastructure has its own infrastructure controller to create and configure the infrastructure. It has a user accessible part (CFC) for configuration of that user's infrastructure, and a user inaccessible part (UFC) able to access the mapping and the physical resources. This increases user control to ease system administration, while maintaining security by limiting access to the mapping.