Abstract: Various embodiments relate to a tamper-proof vehicle sensor system and a related method for sending secure packets between components. A sensing unit may include an angular sensor, such as an anisotropic magnetoresistive (AMR) sensor, which determines the angular position of a magnetic field and produces related angle sensor data. The sensing unit may place the angle sensor data in a packet and may encrypt the packet using a selected encryption key. The sensor may append an encryption key identifier (ID) associated with the selected encryption key onto the packet and send the secure, unidirectional packet to an electrical control unit (ECU). The ECU may then use the appended encryption key ID to retrieve the selected encryption key to decrypt the packet. The ECU may then extract the angle sensor data from the packet to modify the configuration of the vehicle.

Abstract: The application of braking force to drive components that move a vehicle is controlled. As consistent with one or more example embodiments, an integrated circuit chip is located at each of two or more drive components (e.g., wheels) of a vehicle for controlling the application of a braking force to the drive component independently of the application of braking force to other drive components. Each of the integrated circuit chips communicate with one another over a vehicle network, with brake control (e.g., using an algorithm to limit wheel slip) being carried out separately at each drive component.

Abstract: Various embodiments relate to a tamper-proof vehicle sensor system and a related method for sending secure packets between components. A sensing unit may include an angular sensor, such as an anisotropic magnetoresistive (AMR) sensor, which determines the angular position of a magnetic field and produces related angle sensor data. The sensing unit may place the angle sensor data in a packet and may encrypt the packet using a selected encryption key. The sensor may append an encryption key identifier (ID) associated with the selected encryption key onto the packet and send the secure, unidirectional packet to an electrical control unit (ECU). The ECU may then use the appended encryption key ID to retrieve the selected encryption key to decrypt the packet. The ECU may then extract the angle sensor data from the packet to modify the configuration of the vehicle.

Abstract: Various embodiments relate to a system and related method of validating a distance based on a plurality of sensor measurements in a vehicle. A tamper-proof odometer system may comprise an odometer and a tamper-proof sensor that independently determine distances based on measurements of vehicle components. The tamper-proof sensor may maintain a non-modifiable count based on the angular rotation of a target wheel from which to calculate a vehicle's distance traveled. An odometer may maintain a count based on the rotation of a wheel mounted to the transmission. An electronic control unit (ECU) or dashboard control unit (DCU) may compare the distance derived from the odometer with the distance derived from the tamper-proof sensor by comparing the error to a defined threshold. When the error value is above the defined threshold, this may indicate that one or more of the components of the odometer system have been manipulated.

Abstract: The application of braking force to drive components that move a vehicle is controlled. As consistent with one or more example embodiments, an integrated circuit chip is located at each of two or more drive components (e.g., wheels) of a vehicle for controlling the application of a braking force to the drive component independently of the application of braking force to other drive components. Each of the integrated circuit chips communicate with one another over a vehicle network, with brake control (e.g., using an algorithm to limit wheel slip) being carried out separately at each drive component.