Abstract: A global policy is applied to only select resources (e.g., certain file folders) based on property settings associated as metadata with those resources. The resource property settings correspond to a defined property set (e.g., a global taxonomy) that is consistent with the global policy. When global policy is received, the property metadata for each resource determines whether to apply the global policy to that resource. In this way, a central administrator may provide the defined property set, a policy author may provide the policy, and a local administrator may set the resource property settings.

Abstract: Booting a machine in a secure fashion in a potentially unsecure environment. The method includes a target machine beginning a boot process. The method further includes the target machine determining that it needs provisioning data to continue booting. The target machine contacts a secure infrastructure to obtain the provisioning data. The target machine provides an identity claim that can be verified by the secure infrastructure. As a result of the secure infrastructure verifying the identity claim, the target machine receives a request from the secure infrastructure to establish a key sealed to the target machine. The target machine provides the established key to the secure infrastructure. The target machine receives the provisioning data from the secure infrastructure. The provisioning data is encrypted to the established key. The target machine decrypts the encrypted provisioning data, and uses the provisioning data to finish booting.

Abstract: Resource authorization policies and resource scopes may be defined separately, thereby decoupling a set of authorization rules from the scope of resources to which those rules apply. In one example, a resource includes anything that can be used in a computing environment (e.g., a file, a device, etc.). A scope describes a set of resources (e.g., all files in folder X, all files labeled “Y”, etc.). Policies describe what can be done with a resource (e.g., “read-only,” “read/write,” “delete, if requestor is a member of the admin group,” etc.). When scopes and policies have been defined, they may be linked, thereby indicating that the policy applies to any resource within the scope. When a request for the resource is made, the request is evaluated against all policies associated with scopes that contain the resource. If the conditions specified in the policies apply, then the request may be granted.

Abstract: Managing encrypted datasets is illustrated. A method includes obtaining a first decryption key. The first decryption key is configured to be used to decrypt an encrypted dataset that has been encrypted using a first encryption mechanism. The first encryption mechanism is associated with the first decryption key that can be used to decrypt the dataset. The method further includes encrypting the first decryption key with a second encryption mechanism. The method further includes encrypting the first decryption key with a third encryption mechanism. The method further includes creating a package including at least the first decryption key encrypted with the second encryption method and the first decryption key encrypted with the third encryption method. The method further includes signing the package with a guardian signature and signing the package with a signature created from the first decryption key.

Abstract: Deploying an encrypted entity on a trusted entity is illustrated herein. A method includes, at a trusted entity, wherein the trusted entity is trusted by an authority as a result of providing a verifiable indication of certain characteristics of the trusted entity meeting certain requirements, receiving an encrypted entity from an untrusted entity. The untrusted entity is not trusted by the authority. At the trusted entity, a trust credential from the authority is used to obtain a key from a key distribution service. The key distribution service is trusted by the authority. The key is used to decrypt the encrypted entity to allow the encrypted entity to be deployed at the trusted entity.

Abstract: Described is a technology by which access to a resource is determined by evaluating a resource label of the resource against a user claim of an access request, according to policy decoupled from the resource. The resource may be a file, and the resource label may be obtained by classifying the file into classification properties, such that a change to the file may change its resource label, thereby changing which users have access to the file. The resource label-based access evaluation may be logically combined with a conventional ACL-based access evaluation to determine whether to grant or deny access to the resource.

Abstract: Described is caching classification-related metadata for a file in an alternate data stream of that file. When a file is classified (e.g., for data management), the classification properties are cached in association with the file, along with classification-related metadata that indicates the state of the file at the time of caching. The classification-related metadata in the alternate data stream is then useable in determining whether the classification properties are valid and up-to-date when next accessed, or whether the file needs to be reclassified. If the properties are valid and up-to-date, they may be used without requiring the computationally costly steps of reclassification. Also described is using more than one alternate data stream for the cache, and extending the classification-related metadata through a defined extension mechanism.

Abstract: A method for generating Bursting-messages on the window of a user's Web-terminal while browsing a Web-site. Indication related to the connection of the user to the Web-site is provided. Data that is required for generating a Burst-message on the Web-terminal is sent to the Web-terminal of the identified user and a Burst-message is generated on the Web-terminal using the data. Interaction means are provided to the user in the Burst-message, for the interaction of the user with the Burst-message and/or with the Web-site. The Burst-message may be generated by dynamically writing an HTML layer and/or JavaScript and/or VBScript.

Abstract: A policy that governs access to a resource may be tested against real-world access requests before being used to control access to the resource. In one example, access to a resource is governed by a policy, referred to as an effective policy. When the policy is to be modified or replaced, the modification or replacement may become a test policy. When a request is made to access the resource, the request may be evaluated under both the effective policy and the test policy. Whether access is granted is determined under the effective policy, but the decision that would be made under the test policy is noted, and may be logged. If the test policy is determined to behave acceptably when confronted with real-world access requests, then the current effective policy may be replaced with the test policy.

Abstract: Described is caching classification-related metadata for a file in an alternate data stream of that file. When a file is classified (e.g., for data management), the classification properties are cached in association with the file, along with classification-related metadata that indicates the state of the file at the time of caching. The classification-related metadata in the alternate data stream is then useable in determining whether the classification properties are valid and up-to-date when next accessed, or whether the file needs to be reclassified. If the properties are valid and up-to-date, they may be used without requiring the computationally costly steps of reclassification. Also described is using more than one alternate data stream for the cache, and extending the classification-related metadata through a defined extension mechanism.

Abstract: An assembly (14, 16) for securing two juxtaposed panels (64, 66) to a structure (74), each panel including a joining flange (68, 70) located at, or adjacent to, respective juxtaposed edges thereof. The assembly includes a retaining member (14) having a substantially planar surface (24) supporting at opposite edges thereof respective first flanges (26, 28) and a clamping member (16) having two spaced-apart legs (48, 40) depending from a web (36). Second flanges (46, 48) are each supported on a facing internal surface of a respective one of the legs so as to extend away from the web. Each leg engages a respective exposed surface of an adjacent joining flange, the first and second flanges being oriented in opposite directions so as to interlock when the clamping member is mounted on the retaining member and thereby limit lateral separation of the legs.

Abstract: Presented is an anti-tampering method that validates and protects specific sections of a binary file. In one embodiment, this method permits a proxy engine to execute (via emulation by a virtual machine) the protected code on behalf of the binary in kernel mode upon successful completion of an integrity check. The integrity check can optionally check only the specific parts of code that the developer wishes to validate. The integrity check can cross binary boundaries. Moreover, the integrity check can be done on a hard drive or in memory. Furthermore, since the encrypted code is executed by the proxy engine in kernel mode, hackers are further deterred from modifying the code. Additionally, a method of creating a protected binary file is described herein.

Abstract: A policy that governs access to a resource may be tested against real-world access requests before being used to control access to the resource. In one example, access to a resource is governed by a policy, referred to as an effective policy. When the policy is to be modified or replaced, the modification or replacement may become a test policy. When a request is made to access the resource, the request may be evaluated under both the effective policy and the test policy. Whether access is granted is determined under the effective policy, but the decision that would be made under the test policy is noted, and may be logged. If the test policy is determined to behave acceptably when confronted with real-world access requests, then the current effective policy may be replaced with the test policy.

Abstract: Upon a first process encountering a triggering device, a second process chooses whether to proxy-execute code corresponding to the triggering device of the first process on behalf of such first process based at least in part on whether a license evaluator of the second process has determined that the first process is to be operated in accordance with the terms and conditions of a corresponding digital license. The license evaluator at least in part performs such determination by running a script corresponding to the triggering device in the code of the first process. Thus, the first process is dependent upon the second process and the license for operation thereof.

Abstract: A panel unit (2) for constructional purposes has at least two joining flanges (10, 12) on opposite surfaces (4, 4?) located at, or adjacent to, a common edge of the panel unit, and projecting in mutually opposite directions. Two such panel units (2) may be juxtaposed end to end and secured by a two-part connector (17) having a base portion (18) that is adapted for attaching to a fixed structural element (20) and for anchoring to the flanges (12) on a first surface (4?) of the panel units 2, and a cap (19) adapted for anchoring to the flanges (10) on an opposite surface (4) of the panel units (2) and for anchoring to the base portion.

Abstract: The subject disclosure is directed towards applying global policy to only select resources (e.g., certain file folders) based on property settings associated as metadata with those resources. The resource property settings correspond to a defined property set (e.g., a global taxonomy) that is consistent with the global policy. When global policy is received, the property metadata for each resource determines whether to apply the global policy to that resource. In this way, a central administrator may provide the defined property set, a policy author may provide the policy, and a local administrator may set the resource property settings.

Abstract: A first process operating on a computer comprises code to be executed in connection therewith, where the code includes at least one triggering device. A digital license corresponds to the first process and sets forth terms and conditions for operating the first process. A second process operating on the computer proxy-executes code corresponding to each triggering device of the first process on behalf of such first process. The second process includes a selection of options to thwart reverse engineering by a debugger if a debugger is detected. The options include execution by a proxy engine of a re-routed call, crashing the first process, detection ad elimination of a debugger related interrupt a call to an arbitrary function.

Abstract: A method of validating software is disclosed. The method may include receiving, at a first function, a first hash and a first version. The first function may validate a second function according to the first hash and first version. The second function may receive a second hash and a second version, and the second function may validate a third function according to the second hash and second version. The first version and first hash may be stored within the first function, for example. The first version and first hash may be stored within a manifest, for example. In another embodiment, a method of validating software may include storing a plurality of functions and storing a version and hash for each function. Each function may be verified according to the respective version and hash, and each function may verify at least one other function.

Abstract: Resource authorization policies and resource scopes may be defined separately, thereby decoupling a set of authorization rules from the scope of resources to which those rules apply. In one example, a resource includes anything that can be used in a computing environment (e.g., a file, a device, etc.). A scope describes a set of resources (e.g., all files in folder X, all files labeled “Y”, etc.). Policies describe what can be done with a resource (e.g., “read-only,” “read/write,” “delete, if requestor is a member of the admin group,” etc.). When scopes and policies have been defined, they may be linked, thereby indicating that the policy applies to any resource within the scope. When a request for the resource is made, the request is evaluated against all policies associated with scopes that contain the resource. If the conditions specified in the policies apply, then the request may be granted.

Abstract: Upon a first process encountering a triggering device, a second process chooses whether to proxy-execute code corresponding to the triggering device of the first process on behalf of such first process based at least in part on whether a license evaluator of the second process has determined that the first process is to be operated in accordance with the terms and conditions of a corresponding digital license. The license evaluator at least in part performs such determination by running a script corresponding to the triggering device in the code of the first process. Thus, the first process is dependent upon the second process and the license for operation thereof.