Abstract: Methods, storage systems and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention for protecting a computer by first deploying in a memory of the computer a hooked version of a syscall used by an operating system kernel of the computer A notification of a call to the hooked version of the syscall from a user mode of the computer is received from the hooked version of the syscall, the notification including a return address in the memory and a set of features extracted from the call. The return address and the received features are analyzed so as to classify the call as benign or malicious, and an alert is generated for the computer upon classifying the new call as malicious.

Abstract: Methods, storage systems and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention for protecting a computer by first deploying in a memory of the computer a hooked version of a syscall used by an operating system kernel of the computer A notification of a call to the hooked version of the syscall from a user mode of the computer is received from the hooked version of the syscall, the notification including a return address in the memory and a set of features extracted from the call. The return address and the received features are analyzed so as to classify the call as benign or malicious, and an alert is generated for the computer upon classifying the new call as malicious.

Abstract: A method for detecting malicious code, including, in a computer, intercepting a call to an operating-system (OS) function, the call requesting an execution privilege for a memory region. In response to intercepting the call, the execution privilege requested by the call is removed. Upon detecting an exception that occurs due to an executable code in the memory region starting to run without the execution privilege, a check is made for determining whether the executable code in the memory region is malicious or benign.

Abstract: Methods, storage systems and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention that include deploying, in a memory used by an operating system kernel of a computer, a hooked version of a syscall that is configured to modify an execution status of processes executing on the computer. Subsequent to one or more protected processes being specified, a notification of a call to the syscall from the hooked version of the syscall is received, the call requesting to change the execution status of a given process executing on the computer. Finally, upon ascertaining that the given process is one of the protected processes, execution of the syscall is inhibited.

Abstract: Methods, storage systems and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention for protecting a computing device, which includes a processor and a memory and is coupled to a storage device storing a set of one or more files. In embodiments of the present invention, a call to a specified function for execution by the processor is detected, and a stack trace for the call to the specified function is generated in the memory. Upon detecting, in the stack trace, a stack frame including a return address referencing a shellcode region in the memory, wherein the shellcode region includes executable code that was not loaded from any given file on the storage device, then the referenced executable code is compared to a list of malicious shellcode. Finally, a preventive action is initiated upon detecting a match between the referenced executable code and one of malicious shellcodes in the list.

Abstract: Methods, storage systems and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention for protecting a computing device, which includes a processor and a memory and is coupled to a storage device storing a set of one or more files. In embodiments of the present invention, a call to a specified function for execution by the processor is detected, and a stack trace for the call to the specified function is generated in the memory. Upon detecting, in the stack trace, a stack frame including a return address referencing a shellcode region in the memory, wherein the shellcode region includes executable code that was not loaded from any given file on the storage device, then the referenced executable code is compared to a list of malicious shellcode. Finally, a preventive action is initiated upon detecting a match between the referenced executable code and one of malicious shellcodes in the list.

Abstract: Methods, apparatuses and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention that include protecting a computer system coupled to a storage device by detecting an executing process that performed a specific type of modification to a number of files stored on the storage device. A processor compares the detected number to a specified threshold and initiates, on the executing process, a preventive action in response to determining that the detected number exceeds the specified threshold.

Abstract: Methods, apparatuses and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention that include protecting a computer system coupled to a storage device by storing, to the storage device, a set of protected files and one or more decoy files, wherein any modification to the decoy file indicates a cyber-attack on the computer system. Upon receiving a request from a process executing on the computing device to enumerate files stored on the storage device, the process is analyzed so as to classify the process as benign or suspicious. The protected files are enumerated to the process whether the process was classified as benign or suspicious. However, the one or more decoy files are enumerated to the process only upon process being classified as suspicious.

Abstract: Methods, apparatuses and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention that include protecting a computer system coupled to a storage device by storing, to the storage device, a set of protected files and one or more decoy files, wherein any modification to the decoy file indicates a cyber-attack on the computer system. Upon receiving a request from a process executing on the computing device to enumerate files stored on the storage device, the process is analyzed so as to classify the process as benign or suspicious. The protected files are enumerated to the process whether the process was classified as benign or suspicious. However, the one or more decoy files are enumerated to the process only upon process being classified as suspicious.