Abstract: A method to detect at a GNSS receiver whether the received GNSS signals and navigation messages are the product of an attack. If there is evidence, as provided by the method described here, that the received signals and messages originate from adversarial devices, then receiver equipped with an instantiation of the method notifies the user or the computing platform that integrates the GNSS receiver that the calculated via the GNSS functionality position and time correction are not trustworthy. In other words, our method enables any GNSS receiver, for example, GPS, GLONASS, or Galileo, or any other GNSS system, to detect if the received navigation messages are the legitimate ones (from the satellites) or not (e.g., from attacker devices that generate fake messages that overwrite the legitimate messages). Based on this detection, neither the user and nor any application running in the computing platform is misled to utilize erroneous position information.

Abstract: A method to detect at a GNSS receiver whether the received GNSS signals and navigation messages are the product of an attack. If there is evidence, as provided by the method described here, that the received signals and messages originate from adversarial devices, then receiver equipped with an instantiation of the method notifies the user or the computing platform that integrates the GNSS receiver that the calculated via the GNSS functionality position and time correction are not trustworthy. In other words, our method enables any GNSS receiver, for example, GPS, GLONAS, or Galileo, or any other GNSS system, to detect if the received navigation messages are the legitimate ones (from the satellites) or not (e.g., from attacker devices that generate fake messages that overwrite the legitimate messages). Based on this detection, neither the user and nor any application running in the computing platform is misled to utilize erroneous position information.

Abstract: A secure routing protocol for an ad hoc network requires only that the communicating end nodes have a security association. The protocol combines a secure route discovery protocol and a secure message transmission (SMT) protocol to provide comprehensive security. The secure routing protocol provides connectivity information through the discovery of one or more routes in the presence of adversaries that actively disrupt the routing operation. A route discovery request is sent from a source node to a destination node, which responds by sending a reply over the same route taken by the request. The source and destination nodes use a shared secret key to verify the authenticity of the request, reply and determined route. Using a discovered plurality of routes, The SMT protocol separates messages to be transmitted into multiple segments and routes the segments across the set of routes simultaneously. The destination node sends feedback to the source which identities which segments were received.