Abstract: A method is presented for implementing a trusted computing environment within a data processing system. A hypervisor is initialized within the data processing system, and the hypervisor supervises a plurality of logical, partitionable, runtime environments within the data processing system. The hypervisor reserves a logical partition for a hypervisor-based trusted platform module (TPM) and presents the hypervisor-based trusted platform module to other logical partitions as a virtual device via a device interface. Each time that the hypervisor creates a logical partition within the data processing system, the hypervisor also instantiates a logical TPM within the reserved partition such that the logical TPM is anchored to the hypervisor-based TPM. The hypervisor manages multiple logical TPM's within the reserved partition such that each logical TPM is uniquely associated with a logical partition.

Abstract: A method and system for remotely storing a user's admin key to gain access to an intranet is presented. The user's admin key and intranet user identification (ID) are encrypted using an enterprise's public key, and together they are concatenated into a single backup admin file, which is stored in the user's client computer. If the user needs his admin file and is unable to access it in a backup client computer, he sends the encrypted backup admin file to a backup server and his unencrypted intranet user ID to an intranet authentication server. The backup server decrypts the user's single backup admin file to obtain the user's admin key and intranet user ID. If the unencrypted intranet user ID in the authentication server matches the decrypted intranet user ID in the backup server, then the backup server sends the backup client computer the decrypted admin key.

Abstract: A method, computer program, and system for paging platform configuration registers in and out of a trusted platform module. In a trusted computing platform, an unlimited number of platform configuration registers can be obtained through paging. The trust platform module encrypts and decrypts platform configuration registers for storage outside the trusted platform module.

Abstract: A Method and system for ensuring security-compliant creation and signing of endorsement keys of manufactured trusted platform modules. The endorsement keys are generated for the trusted platform module (TPM). The TPM vendor selects an N-byte secret and stores the N-type secret in the trusted platform module along with the endorsement keys. The secret number cannot be read outside of the trusted platform module. The secret number is also provided to the credential server of the original equipment manufacturer. During the endorsement key (EK) credential process, the trusted platform module generates an endorsement key, which comprises both the public key and a hash of the secret and the public key. The credential server matches the hash within the endorsement key withy a second hash of the received public key (from the endorsement key) and the vendor provided secret. The EK certificate is generated and inserted into the trusted platform module only when a match is confirmed.

Abstract: A computer system is presented which provides a trusted platform by which operations can be performed with an increased level trust and confidence. The basis of trust for the computer system is established by an encryption coprocessor and by code which interfaces with the encryption coprocessor and establishes root of trust metrics for the platform. The encryption coprocessor is built such that certain critical operations are allowed only if physical presence of an operator has been detected. Physical presence is determined by inference based upon the status of registers in the core chipset.

Abstract: A method for a plurality of key cache managers for a plurality of localities to share cryptographic key storage resources of a security chip, includes: loading an application key into the key storage; and saving a restoration data for the application key by a key cache manager, where the restoration data can be used by the key cache manager to re-load the application key into the key storage if the application key is evicted from the key storage by another key cache manager. The method allows each of a plurality of key cache managers to recognize that its key had been removed from the security chip and to restore its key. The method also allows each key cache manager to evict or destroy any key currently loaded on the security chip without affecting the functionality of other localities.

Abstract: An apparatus, system and method of secure communications from a human interface device are provided. The apparatus, system, and method receive input data and calculate encrypted data from the input data using a secure credential. In one embodiment the apparatus, system, and method request and receive a single instance credential and calculate the encrypted data using the secure credential and the single instance credential. The encrypted data may be a secure authorization that may be valid for one use. Communication of the encrypted data through networks and communicating devices is secure. The encrypted data may not be decrypted even if intercepted without the secure credential. The apparatus, system, and method enable secure communications from the human interface device.

Abstract: A method and system for ensuring security-compliant creation and signing of endorsement keys of manufactured TPMs. The endorsement keys are generated for the TPM. The TPM vendor selects an N-byte secret and stores the N-byte secret in the TPM along with the endorsement keys. The secret number cannot be read outside of the TPM. The secret number is also provided to the OEM's credential server. During the endorsement key (EK) credential process, the TPM generates an endorsement key, which comprises both the public key and a hash of the secret and the public key. The credential server matches the hash within the endorsement key with a second hash of the received public key (from the endorsement key) and the vendor provided secret. The EK certificate is generated and inserted into the TPM only when a match is confirmed.

Abstract: A method is presented for implementing a trusted computing environment within a data processing system. A hypervisor is initialized within the data processing system, and the hypervisor supervises a plurality of logical, partitionable, runtime environments within the data processing system. The hypervisor reserves a logical partition for a hypervisor-based trusted platform module (TPM) and presents the hypervisor-based trusted platform module to other logical partitions as a virtual device via a device interface. Each time that the hypervisor creates a logical partition within the data processing system, the hypervisor also instantiates a logical TPM within the reserved partition such that the logical TPM is anchored to the hypervisor-based TPM. The hypervisor manages multiple logical TPM's within the reserved partition such that each logical TPM is uniquely associated with a logical partition.

Abstract: An architecture for a distributed data processing system comprises a system-level service processor along with one or more node-level service processors; each are uniquely associated with a node, and each is extended to comprise any components that are necessary for operating the nodes as trusted platforms, such as a TPM and a CRTM in accordance with the security model of the Trusted Computing Group. These node-level service processors then inter-operate with the system-level service processor, which also contains any components that are necessary for operating the system as a whole as a trusted platform. A TPM within the system-level service processor aggregates integrity metrics that are gathered by the node-level service processors, thereafter reporting integrity metrics as requested, e.g., to a hypervisor, thereby allowing a large distributed data processing system to be validated as a trusted computing environment while allowing its highly parallelized initialization process to proceed.

Abstract: A method, apparatus, and computer program product are described for asserting physical presence in a trusted computing environment included within a data processing system. The trusted computing environment includes a trusted platform module (TPM). The data processing system is coupled to a hardware management console. The trusted platform module determines whether the hardware management console is a trusted entity. The trusted platform module also determines whether the hardware management console has knowledge of a secret key that is possessed by the TPM. If the TPM determines that the hardware management console is a trusted entity and has knowledge of the secret key, the TPM determines that physical presence has been asserted.

Abstract: Methods and arrangements are disclosed for secure single sign on to an operating system using only a power-on password. In many embodiments modified BIOS code prompts for, receives and verifies the power-on password. The power-on password is hashed and stored in a Platform Configuration Register of the Trusted Platform Module. In a setup mode, the trusted platform module encrypts the operating system password using the hashed power-on password. In a logon mode, the trusted platform module decrypts the operating system password using the hashed power-on password.

Abstract: A method is presented for implementing a trusted computing environment within a data processing system. A hypervisor is initialized within the data processing system, and the hypervisor supervises a plurality of logical, partitionable, runtime environments within the data processing system. The hypervisor reserves a logical partition for a hypervisor-based trusted platform module (TPM) and presents the hypervisor-based trusted platform module to other logical partitions as a virtual device via a device interface. Each time that the hypervisor creates a logical partition within the data processing system, the hypervisor also instantiates a logical TPM within the reserved partition such that the logical TPM is anchored to the hypervisor-based TPM. The hypervisor manages multiple logical TPM's within the reserved partition such that each logical TPM is uniquely associated with a logical partition.

Abstract: An update utility requests a signature verification of the utility's signature along with a request to unlock the flash memory stored in the utility. A trusted platform module (“TPM”) performs a signature verification of the utility using a previously stored public key. Upon verification of the signature, the TPM unlocks the flash memory to permit update of the utility. Upon completion of the update, the flash utility issues a lock request to the TPM to relock the flash memory.

Abstract: An architecture for a distributed data processing system comprises a system-level service processor along with one or more node-level service processors; each are uniquely associated with a node, and each is extended to comprise any components that are necessary for operating the nodes as trusted platforms, such as a TPM and a CRTM in accordance with the security model of the Trusted Computing Group. These node-level service processors then inter-operate with the system-level service processor, which also contains any components that are necessary for operating the system as a whole as a trusted platform. A TPM within the system-level service processor aggregates integrity metrics that are gathered by the node-level service processors, thereafter reporting integrity metrics as requested, e.g., to a hypervisor, thereby allowing a large distributed data processing system to be validated as a trusted computing environment while allowing its highly parallelized initialization process to proceed.

Abstract: A method is presented for implementing a trusted computing environment within a data processing system. A hypervisor is initialized within the data processing system, and the hypervisor supervises a plurality of logical, partitionable, runtime environments within the data processing system. The hypervisor reserves a logical partition for a hypervisor-based trusted platform module (TPM) and presents the hypervisor-based trusted platform module to other logical partitions as a virtual device via a device interface. Each time that the hypervisor creates a logical partition within the data processing system, the hypervisor also instantiates a logical TPM within the reserved partition such that the logical TPM is anchored to the hypervisor-based TPM. The hypervisor manages multiple logical TPM's within the reserved partition such that each logical TPM is uniquely associated with a logical partition.

Abstract: A method and system for enabling security attestation for a computing device during a return from an S4 sleep state. When the computing device enters into the S4 state following a successful boot up, the attestation log is appended to the TPM tick count and the log is signed (with a security signature). When the device is awaken from S4 state, the BIOS obtains and verifies the log created during the previous boot. The CRTM maintains a set of virtual PCRs and references these virtual PCRs against the log. If the values do not match, the return from S4 state fails and the device is rebooted.

Abstract: A trusted platform module (TPM) key is assigned a numerical limit for the number of times the key can be used, and once the key has been used the assigned number of times, it is rendered unusable.

Abstract: A computer system is presented which provides a trusted platform by which operations can be performed with an increased level trust and confidence. The basis of trust for the computer system is established by an encryption coprocessor and by code which interfaces with the encryption coprocessor and establishes root of trust metrics for the platform. The encryption coprocessor is built such that certain critical operations are allowed only if physical presence of an operator has been detected. Physical presence is determined by inference based upon the status of registers in the core chipset.

Abstract: A Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) endorsement certificate is provided by comparing a trusted platform module (TPM) public key transmitted by an owner of the computing device to which the TPM belongs to a copy of the key as originally stored in a remote database prior to vending the device. If a match is found the certificate is created using the public key, and then sent to the owner of the computing device.