Abstract: Hardware mechanisms are provided for performing hardware based access control of instructions to data. These hardware mechanisms associate an instruction access policy label with an instruction to be processed by a processor and associate an operand access policy label with data to be processed by the processor. The instruction access policy label is passed along with the instruction through one or more hardware functional units of the processor. The operand access policy label is passed along with the data through the one or more hardware functional units of the processor. One or more hardware implemented policy engines associated with the one or more hardware functional units of the processor are utilized to control access by the instruction to the data based on the instruction access policy label and the operand access policy label.

Abstract: A secure computer architecture is provided. With this architecture, data is received, in a component of an integrated circuit chip implementing the secure computer architecture, for transmission across a data communication link. The data is converted, by the component, to one or more first fixed length frames. The one or more first fixed length frames are then transmitted, by the component, on the data communication link in a continuous stream of frames. The continuous stream of frames includes one or more second fixed length frames generated when no data is available for inclusion in the frames of the continuous stream.

Abstract: A secure computer architecture is provided. With this architecture, data is received, in a component of an integrated circuit chip implementing the secure computer architecture, for transmission across a data communication link. The data is converted, by the component, to one or more first fixed length frames. The one or more first fixed length frames are then transmitted, by the component, on the data communication link in a continuous stream of frames. The continuous stream of frames includes one or more second fixed length frames generated when no data is available for inclusion in the frames of the continuous stream.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for performing secure recursive virtualization of a computer system. A portion of memory is allocated by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or an operating system (OS) to a new domain. An initial program for the new domain is loaded into the portion of memory. Secure recursive virtualization firmware (SVF) in the data processing system is called to request that the new domain be generated. A determination is made as to whether the call is from a privileged domain or a non-privileged domain. Responsive to the request being from a privileged domain, all access to the new domain is removed from any other domain in the data processing system. Responsive to receiving an indication that the new domain has been generated, an execution of the initial program is scheduled.

Abstract: A secure computer architecture is provided. With this architecture, data is received, in a component of an integrated circuit chip implementing the secure computer architecture, for transmission across a data communication link. The data is converted, by the component, to one or more first fixed length frames. The one or more first fixed length frames are then transmitted, by the component, on the data communication link in a continuous stream of frames. The continuous stream of frames includes one or more second fixed length frames generated when no data is available for inclusion in the frames of the continuous stream.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for performing secure recursive virtualization of a computer system. A portion of memory is allocated by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or an operating system (OS) to a new domain. An initial program for the new domain is loaded into the portion of memory. Secure recursive virtualization firmware (SVF) in the data processing system is called to request that the new domain be generated. A determination is made as to whether the call is from a privileged domain or a non-privileged domain. Responsive to the request being from a privileged domain, all access to the new domain is removed from any other domain in the data processing system. Responsive to receiving an indication that the new domain has been generated, an execution of the initial program is scheduled.

Abstract: A recursive logical partition real memory map mechanism is provided for use in address translation. The mechanism, which is provided in a data processing system, receives a first address based on an address submitted from a process of a currently active logical partition. The first address is translated into a second address using a recursive logical partition real memory (RLPRM) map data structure for the currently active logical partition. The memory is accessed using the second address. The RLPRM map data structure provides a plurality of translation table pointers, each translation table pointer pointing to a separate page table for a separate level of virtualization in the data processing system with the data processing system supporting multiple levels of virtualization.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for performing secure recursive virtualization of a computer system. A portion of memory is allocated by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or an operating system (OS) to a new domain. An initial program for the new domain is loaded into the portion of memory. Secure recursive virtualization firmware (SVF) in the data processing system is called to request that the new domain be generated. A determination is made as to whether the call is from a privileged domain or a non-privileged domain. Responsive to the request being from a privileged domain, all access to the new domain is removed from any other domain in the data processing system. Responsive to receiving an indication that the new domain has been generated, an execution of the initial program is scheduled.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided, in a data processing system, for accessing memory based on an effective address submitted by a process of a partition. The mechanism may translate the effective address into a virtual address using a segment look-aside buffer. The mechanism may further translate the virtual address into a partition real address using a page table. Moreover, the mechanism may translate the partition real address into a system real address using a logical partition real memory map for the partition. The system real address may then be used to access the memory.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for performing secure recursive virtualization of a computer system. A portion of memory is allocated by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or an operating system (OS) to a new domain. An initial program for the new domain is loaded into the portion of memory. Secure recursive virtualization firmware (SVF) in the data processing system is called to request that the new domain be generated. A determination is made as to whether the call is from a privileged domain or a non-privileged domain. Responsive to the request being from a privileged domain, all access to the new domain is removed from any other domain in the data processing system. Responsive to receiving an indication that the new domain has been generated, an execution of the initial program is scheduled.

Abstract: A method for malware detection, wherein the method includes: utilizing a hardware based program flow monitor (PFM) for embedded software that employs a static analysis of program code; marrying the program code to addresses, while considering which central processing unit (CPU) is executing the program code; capturing an expected control flow of the program code, and storing the control flow as physical address pairs of leaders and followers (LEAD-FOLL pair) in a Metadata Store (MDS) within the PFM; monitoring control flow at runtime by the PFM; and comparing runtime control flow with the expected control flow.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided, in a data processing system, for accessing memory based on an effective address submitted by a process of a partition. The mechanism may translate the effective address into a virtual address using a segment look-aside buffer. The mechanism may further translate the virtual address into a partition real address using a page table. Moreover, the mechanism may translate the partition real address into a system real address using a logical partition real memory map for the partition. The system real address may then be used to access the memory.

Abstract: A secure computer architecture is provided. With this architecture, data is received, in a component of an integrated circuit chip implementing the secure computer architecture, for transmission across a data communication link. The data is converted, by the component, to one or more first fixed length frames. The one or more first fixed length frames are then transmitted, by the component, on the data communication link in a continuous stream of frames. The continuous stream of frames includes one or more second fixed length frames generated when no data is available for inclusion in the frames of the continuous stream.

Abstract: A recursive logical partition real memory map mechanism is provided for use in address translation. The mechanism, which is provided in a data processing system, receives a first address based on an address submitted from a process of a currently active logical partition. The first address is translated into a second address using a recursive logical partition real memory (RLPRM) map data structure for the currently active logical partition. The memory is accessed using the second address. The RLPRM map data structure provides a plurality of translation table pointers, each translation table pointer pointing to a separate page table for a separate level of virtualization in the data processing system with the data processing system supporting multiple levels of virtualization.

Abstract: Hardware mechanisms are provided for performing hardware based access control of instructions to data. These hardware mechanisms associate an instruction access policy label with an instruction to be processed by a processor and associate an operand access policy label with data to be processed by the processor. The instruction access policy label is passed along with the instruction through one or more hardware functional units of the processor. The operand access policy label is passed along with the data through the one or more hardware functional units of the processor. One or more hardware implemented policy engines associated with the one or more hardware functional units of the processor are utilized to control access by the instruction to the data based on the instruction access policy label and the operand access policy label.

Abstract: A method for malware detection, wherein the method includes: utilizing a hardware based program flow monitor (PFM) for embedded software that employs a static analysis of program code; marrying the program code to addresses, while considering which central processing unit (CPU) is executing the program code; capturing an expected control flow of the program code, and storing the control flow as physical address pairs of leaders and followers (LEAD-FOLL pair) in a Metadata Store (MDS) within the PFM; monitoring control flow at runtime by the PFM; and comparing runtime control flow with the expected control flow

Abstract: An exemplary method is provided for managing and mitigating security risks through planning. A first security-related information of a requested product is received. A second security-related information of resources that are available for producing the requested product is received. A multi-stage process with security risks managed by the first security-related information and the second security-related information is performed to produce the requested product.

Abstract: An access control system and method includes a risk index module which computes a risk index for a dimension contributing to risk. A boundary range defined for a parameter representing each risk index such that the parameter above the range is unacceptable, below the range is acceptable and in the range is acceptable with mitigation measures. A mitigation module determines the mitigation measures which reduce the parameter within the range.

Abstract: A random number generator (RNG) resistant to side channel attacks includes an activation pseudo random number generator (APRNG) having an activation output connected to an activation seed input to provide a next seed to the activation seed input. A second random number generator includes a second seed input, which receives the next seed and a random data output, which outputs random data in accordance with the next seed. An input seed memory is connected to the activation seed input and a feedback connection from the activation output so that the next seed is stored in the input seed memory to be used by the APRNG as the activation seed input at a next startup cycle.

Abstract: A digital computer system includes at least one process, an input/output subsystem, and an input/output interface. The process which input/output requests and receives input/output responses. The input/output system perform input/output operations and generates completion notifications in response thereto. The input/output interface generates input/output responses for the process in the order in which the process issued the input/output requests, to reduce the possibility of the process obtaining information from the order in which the input/output system processed input/output requests.