Abstract: A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP.

Abstract: A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A user provides a communication to the trusted device via the secure interface. A processor of the isolated environment encrypts the communication and transmits the encrypted communication to a read file of the host interface. A host device connected to the trusted device via the host interface receives the encrypted communication. The host device transmits the encrypted communication to a second host device that is connected to a second trusted device via a second host interface. The second host device transmits the encrypted communication to a write file of the second host interface. A processor in an isolated environment of the second trusted device decrypts the communication and provides the decrypted communication to a second user via a secure interface of the second trusted device.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A trusted source provisions the trusted device via the secure interface to include private information, such as private user information and cryptographic data. When the trusted device is connected to an untrusted host device via the host interface, the untrusted host device transmits a request regarding the private information to a write file of the host interface. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the request and generates an output, such as an encrypted output, that is responsive to the request from the untrusted host device. The trusted device transmits the output to a read file of the host interface, thus making the output available to the untrusted host device via the host interface. The untrusted host device then receives the output via the host interface.

Abstract: A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A user provides a communication to the trusted device via the secure interface. A processor of the isolated environment encrypts the communication and transmits the encrypted communication to a read file of the host interface. A host device connected to the trusted device via the host interface receives the encrypted communication. The host device transmits the encrypted communication to a second host device that is connected to a second trusted device via a second host interface. The second host device transmits the encrypted communication to a write file of the second host interface. A processor in an isolated environment of the second trusted device decrypts the communication and provides the decrypted communication to a second user via a secure interface of the second trusted device.

Abstract: A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A write file of the host interface receives an entry from an untrusted host device connected to the trusted device. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the entry and determines log data associated with the entry, such as the date and time of the entry. Using the log data, the processor records an event log entry in a secure storage of the isolated environment. Once recorded, the entry cannot be deleted or altered. An authorized user, however, can then access the event log entry from the secure storage, such as by providing a request for the event log entry via the secure interface of the trusted device and/or the host interface of the trusted device.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A user provides a communication to the trusted device via the secure interface. A processor of the isolated environment encrypts the communication and transmits the encrypted communication to a read file of the host interface. A host device connected to the trusted device via the host interface receives the encrypted communication. The host device transmits the encrypted communication to a second host device that is connected to a second trusted device via a second host interface. The second host device transmits the encrypted communication to a write file of the second host interface. A processor in an isolated environment of the second trusted device decrypts the communication and provides the decrypted communication to a second user via a secure interface of the second trusted device.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A user provides a communication to the trusted device via the secure interface. A processor of the isolated environment encrypts the communication and transmits the encrypted communication to a read file of the host interface. A host device connected to the trusted device via the host interface receives the encrypted communication. The host device transmits the encrypted communication to a second host device that is connected to a second trusted device via a second host interface. The second host device transmits the encrypted communication to a write file of the second host interface. A processor in an isolated environment of the second trusted device decrypts the communication and provides the decrypted communication to a second user via a secure interface of the second trusted device.

Abstract: A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A trusted source provisions the trusted device via the secure interface to include private information, such as private user information and cryptographic data. When the trusted device is connected to an untrusted host device via the host interface, the untrusted host device transmits a request regarding the private information to a write file of the host interface. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the request and generates an output, such as an encrypted output, that is responsive to the request from the untrusted host device. The trusted device transmits the output to a read file of the host interface, thus making the output available to the untrusted host device via the host interface. The untrusted host device then receives the output via the host interface.

Abstract: A trusted device includes a secure interface and a host interface, the secure interface being isolated from the host interface by an isolated environment. A write file of the host interface receives an entry from an untrusted host device connected to the trusted device. A processor of the isolated environment retrieves the entry and determines log data associated with the entry, such as the date and time of the entry. Using the log data, the processor records an event log entry in a secure storage of the isolated environment. Once recorded, the entry cannot be deleted or altered. An authorized user, however, can then access the event log entry from the secure storage, such as by providing a request for the event log entry via the secure interface of the trusted device and/or the host interface of the trusted device.

Abstract: A system processes data communications traffic by detecting data communications traffic arriving at a network device for an intended recipient device and determining if the data communications traffic is at least one of initial data communications traffic for a new data communications session, or continuing data communications traffic for an existing data communications session. If the data communications traffic is initial data communications traffic, the system proxy responds to a source of the initial data communications traffic with an expected response that provides an appearance of the existence of an intended recipient device of the initial data communications traffic, regardless if the intended recipient device of the initial data communications traffic actually exists. The system prevents effective use of network probes or scans to identify network devices.