Abstract: An instance secrets management isolated runtime environment is launched at a virtualization server, and utilizes a subset of memory assigned to a compute instance. The subset of memory is inaccessible from entities external to the runtime environment. A secrets manager of the runtime environment provides a security artifact to an application, running at the compute instance, which has requested access to a resource. The artifact is generated by the secrets manager using a security secret associated with the compute instance; the secret is not accessible to programs external to the runtime environment. In response to a determination that the artifact is valid, the application obtains access to the resource.

Abstract: A pair of virtualized security device initialization data sets are received at a first virtualization server from respective sources prior to a launch of a compute instance at the server. A first virtualized security device is initialized using the data sets, and used to generate cryptographic artifacts used by the compute instance. A data item which was included in one of the data sets is modified after the cryptographic artifacts are generated. Additional cryptographic artifacts are generated by a second virtualized security device at a second virtualization server to which the compute instance has been migrated. The second virtualized security device is initialized using at least the modified data item.