Abstract: A digital certificate identifies an entity as having authority over the certificate to revoke same as delegated by the issuer. The certificate also has at least one revocation condition relating to possible revocation of the certificate. To authenticate the certificate, the identification of the delegated revocation authority, a location from which a revocation list is to be obtained, and any freshness requirement to be applied to the revocation list are determined from the certificate. It is then ensured that the revocation list from the location is present and that the present revocation list satisfies the freshness requirement, that the revocation list is promulgated by the delegated revocation authority identified in the certificate, and that the certificate is not identified in the revocation list as being revoked.

Abstract: A system debugs a computer application that employs rights-managed (RM) content. A first, non-isolated process has the application and a shell version of the trusted component, where such shell version receives each request by the application for RM services. The shell version is unconcerned whether a debugger is monitoring the first process. A second, isolated process is separate from the first process and has a debugging version of the trusted component. The shell version in the first process forwards the received request to the debugging version in the second process, and such debugging version acts upon same. The debugging version ensures that the debugger is not monitoring the second process, but is unconcerned whether the debugger is monitoring the first process.

Abstract: In order to allow for security beyond revocation lists, a policy regarding when permissions may be granted (in the form of a rights document, e.g. a use license or a certificate) is enforced. When a request is made for a rights document, the requester submits an account certificate which includes certain metadata regarding the requester. This metadata is analyzed to determine whether it meets a specific policy before the request is granted. If the request is not granted, the cause of the rejection may be overcome, for example by updating or upgrading some system component (hardware or software) in the requesting system. In certain cases, such an update to overcome a policy-based rejection may be performed transparently to the user.

Abstract: Content revocation is achieved by disabling licenses issued to a computing device for the content. A content revocation is delivered within a license to the computing device. Upon license storage the content revocation is recognized, validated, and stored in a secure state store under the public key of the content server (PU-CS) that issued the content. Each license has a (PU-CS) therein, and each license evaluation considers each content revocation stored in the state store and having the same (PU-CS). The license is disabled or otherwise affected based on the considered content revocation. A content revocation is one form of a license modification that may be delivered within a license.

Abstract: Content revocation is achieved by disabling licenses issued to a computing device for the content. A content revocation is delivered within a license to the computing device. Upon license storage the content revocation is recognized, validated, and stored in a secure state store under the public key of the content server (PU-CS) that issued the content. Each license has a (PU-CS) therein, and each license evaluation considers each content revocation stored in the state store and having the same (PU-CS). The license is disabled or otherwise affected based on the considered content revocation. A content revocation is one form of a license modification that may be delivered within a license.

Abstract: Dynamic run-time verification of a module which is loaded in memory (in whole or in part) for execution is enabled by using pre-computed portion-level verification data for portions of the module smaller than the whole (e.g. at the page-level). A portion of the module as loaded into memory for execution can be verified. Pre-computed portion-level verification data is retrieved from storage and used to verify the loaded portions of the executable. Verification data may be, for example, a digitally signed hash of the portion. Where the operating system loader has modified the portion for execution, the modifications are reversed, removing any changes performed by the operating system. If the portion has not been tampered, this will return the portion to its original pre-loaded state. This version is then used to determine validity using the pre-computed portion-level verification.

Abstract: In order to allow for security beyond revocation lists, a policy regarding when permissions may be granted (in the form of a rights document, e.g. a use license or a certificate) is enforced. When a request is made for a rights document, the requester submits an account certificate which includes certain metadata regarding the requester. This metadata is analyzed to determine whether it meets a specific policy before the request is granted. If the request is not granted, the cause of the rejection may be overcome, for example by updating or upgrading some system component (hardware or software) in the requesting system. In certain cases, such an update to overcome a policy-based rejection may be performed transparently to the user.

Abstract: The import address table of a software module is verified in order to prevent detouring attacks. A determination is made regarding which entries in the IAT must be verified; all of the entries may be verified or some subset of the entries that are critical may be verified. For each external function, the external module containing the external function is loaded, if it is not already loaded. The function address in the exported function table is found. That address is compared to the address for the function in the IAT. Additionally, the external module, in one embodiment, is verified to ensure that it has not been modified. For a delay load IAT, a similar procedure is followed; however the delay load IAT may be periodically checked to ensure that the delay load IAT entries are either valid (indicating that the external function has been bound) or in their initial state (indicating that no binding has yet occurred).

Abstract: A system debugs a computer application that employs rights-managed (RM) content. A first, non-isolated process has the application and a shell version of the trusted component, where such shell version receives each request by the application for RM services. The shell version is unconcerned whether a debugger is monitoring the first process. A second, isolated process is separate from the first process and has a debugging version of the trusted component. The shell version in the first process forwards the received request to the debugging version in the second process, and such debugging version acts upon same. The debugging version ensures that the debugger is not monitoring the second process, but is unconcerned whether the debugger is monitoring the first process.

Abstract: A digital certificate identifies an entity as having authority over the certificate to revoke same as delegated by the issuer. The certificate also has at least one revocation condition relating to possible revocation of the certificate. To authenticate the certificate, the identification of the delegated revocation authority, a location from which a revocation list is to be obtained, and any freshness requirement to be applied to the revocation list are determined from the certificate. It is then ensured that the revocation list from the location is present and that the present revocation list satisfies the freshness requirement, that the revocation list is promulgated by the delegated revocation authority identified in the certificate, and that the certificate is not identified in the revocation list as being revoked.