Abstract: Technologies for USB device policy enforcement include a computing device having a USB controller and secure enclave support. On boot, a firmware enclave randomly generates a binding identity and then securely provisions the binding identity to the USB controller. The firmware enclave also seals the binding identity to a policy enforcement enclave. At runtime, the policy enforcement enclave unseals the binding identity and includes the binding identity in a policy enforcement command sent to the USB controller. The USB controller verifies that the binding identity included in the command matches the binding identity that was previously provisioned. If the binding identities are successfully verified, the USB controller enforces the command. The USB controller may block data transfers or device configuration changes for one or more specified devices. Each of the firmware enclave and the policy enforcement enclave are trusted execution environments. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Technologies for secure I/O with MIPI camera devices include a computing device having a camera controller coupled to a camera and a channel identifier filter. The channel identifier filter detects DMA transactions issued by the camera controller and related to the camera. The channel identifier filter determines whether a DMA transaction includes a secure channel identifier or a non-secure channel identifier. If the DMA transaction includes the non-secure channel identifier, the channel identifier filter allows the DMA transaction. If the DMA transaction includes the secure channel identifier, the channel identifier filter determines whether the DMA transaction is targeted to a memory address in a protected memory range associated with the secure channel identifier. If so, the channel identifier filter allows the DMA transaction. If not, the channel identifier filter blocks the DMA transaction. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Technologies for secure enumeration of USB devices include a computing device having a USB controller and a trusted execution environment (TEE). The TEE may be a secure enclave protected secure enclave support of the processor. In response to a USB device connecting to the USB controller, the TEE sends a secure command to the USB controller to protect a device descriptor for the USB device. The secure command may be sent over a secure channel to a static USB device. A driver sends a get device descriptor request to the USB device, and the USB device responds with the device descriptor. The USB controller redirects the device descriptor to a secure memory buffer, which may be located in a trusted I/O processor reserved memory region. The TEE retrieves and validates the device descriptor. If validated, the TEE may enable the USB device for use. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Technologies for USB controller state integrity protection are disclosed. A computing device reserves an isolated memory region in system memory and programs a base address register of a USB controller with the address of the isolated memory region. The computing device locks the base address register from further chances. The USB controller may store controller state data in a scratchpad buffer located within the isolated memory region. Software executed by a processor may read controller state data from the scratchpad buffer. Secure routing hardware of the computing device controls access to the isolated memory region. The secure routing hardware may allow read and write access by the USB controller and read-only access by software executed by the processor. After storing the controller state data, the computing device may power down the I/O controller. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Technologies for USB controller state integrity protection with trusted I/O are disclosed. A computing device includes an I/O controller, a channel identifier filter, and a memory. The I/O controller generates a memory access to controller state data in a scratchpad buffer in the memory. The memory access includes a channel identifier associated with the I/O controller. The channel identifier filter determines whether a memory address of the memory access is included in a range of a processor reserved memory region associated with the channel identifier. A processor of the computing device may copy the controller state data to a memory buffer outside of the processor reserved memory region. The computing device may reserve an isolated memory region in the memory that includes the processor reserved memory region. Secure routing hardware of the computing device may control access to the isolated memory region. Other embodiments are described and claimed.