Abstract: The invention discloses a calculation method and device for elliptic curve digital signature to resist memory disclosure attacks aiming signing private keys, which belongs to the field of cryptography technology. The method described in the invention includes the following steps. During initialization phase happened in a trusted environment, the key of symmetric cryptographic algorithm is used to encrypt the random number k1 and the private key used for signing, the scalar multiplication k1×G is calculated. At each signing phase, the plaintext data used to calculate s is calculated based on the selected signature algorithm and the value of scalar multiplication k1×G. The plaintext data used to calculate s include r or the data calculated based on r. Inside registers, s is calculated based on the above plaintext data and the ciphertext of random number k1 and the ciphertext of the private key. The signature of the message is (r, s).

Abstract: An embodiment of the present disclosure provide a key protection method, via setting that each core of the multi-core process may have one symmetric master key, dynamically obtaining the plaintext private key of the asymmetric algorithm via a decryption operation and using the Intel TSX, it may be ensured that the private key and the intermediate variables used in the computation process may be stored in the cache occupied by the operation core only in terms of the hardware level, which may prevent the attackers from stealing the private key from the physical memory and ensure the security of the implementation of the public-key cryptographic algorithm in the computer system.

Abstract: A multi-core processor based key protection method and system is described. An Operating System (OS) supporting Symmetric Multi-Processing (SMP) is set up on a multi-core processor. One core of the multi-core processor is configured as a cryptographic operation core, which is prohibited from running other processes of the OS and dedicated to perform a public-key cryptographic operation. The private key and an intermediate variable in a process of the public-key cryptographic operation are stored in a cache exclusively occupied by the cryptographic operation core.

Abstract: An embodiment of the present disclosure provide a key protection method, via setting that each core of the multi-core process may have one symmetric master key, dynamically obtaining the plaintext private key of the asymmetric algorithm via a decryption operation and using the Intel TSX, it may be ensured that the private key and the intermediate variables used in the computation process may be stored in the cache occupied by the operation core only in terms of the hardware level, which may prevent the attackers from stealing the private key from the physical memory and ensure the security of the implementation of the public-key cryptographic algorithm in the computer system.

Abstract: A multi-core processor based key protection method and system is described. An Operating System (OS) supporting Symmetric Multi-Processing (SMP) is set up on a multi-core processor. One core of the multi-core processor is configured as a cryptographic operation core, which is prohibited from running other processes of the OS and dedicated to perform a public-key cryptographic operation. The private key and an intermediate variable in a process of the public-key cryptographic operation are stored in a cache exclusively occupied by the cryptographic operation core.