Abstract: A communication system mitigating the risk of an incoming spoofed caller. The method involves issuing a token or a digital certificate to each network connection of a user, such as to each member of a social media platform to which the user is connected. The method includes determining a validity of the token or certificate of the network connection with a receiving party, which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party. The method includes transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate. A message is transmitted that includes a calling identifier to be displayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of the intended call. The message may provide connection details, mutual connections, and historical events with the calling party.

Abstract: A communication system and method mitigates the risk of connecting to undesirable social media contacts. The system and method may involve identifying trusted contacts of a user and saving them in a trusted contacts database, wherein the trusted members can be one or more of (a) work contacts, (b) contacts from other social media sites, (c) friends and family, and (d) others. When a potential contact on a social media platform attempts to connect to the user, the identity of the potential contact is compared to the trusted contacts in the trusted contacts database. The user is then alerted as to whether the potential contact is in the trusted contacts database and the user can utilize that information to determine whether or not to connect to the potential contact. Alternatively, the proposed connection may be (1) automatically rejected is the potential contact is not in the trusted contacts database, or (2) automatically accepted if the potential contact is in the trusted contacts database.

Abstract: A communication system mitigating the risk of an incoming spoofed caller. The method involves issuing a token or a digital certificate to each network connection of a user, such as to each member of a social media platform to which the user is connected. The method includes determining a validity of the token or certificate of the network connection with a receiving party, which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party. The method includes transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate. A message is transmitted that includes a calling identifier to be displayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of the intended call. The message may provide connection details, mutual connections, and historical events with the calling party.

Abstract: A communication system mitigating the risk of an incoming spoofed caller. The method involves issuing a token or a digital certificate to each network connection of a user, such as to each member of a social media platform to which the user is connected. The method includes determining a validity of the token or certificate of the network connection with a receiving party, which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party. The method includes transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate. A message is transmitted that includes a calling identifier to be displayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of the intended call. The message may provide connection details, mutual connections, and historical events with the calling party.

Abstract: A communication system mitigating the risk of an incoming spoofed caller. The method involves issuing a token or a digital certificate to each network connection of a user, such as to each member of a social media platform to which the user is connected. The method includes determining a validity of the token or certificate of the network connection with a receiving party, which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party. The method includes transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate. A message is transmitted that includes a calling identifier to be displayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of the intended call. The message may provide connection details, mutual connections, and historical events with the calling party.

Abstract: A T2P (TDM to packet) delay buffer is provided. The delay buffer can prevent double digit detections caused by in-band DTMF leak when out-of-band DTMF is used. The T2P delay buffer is initialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. When a DTMF digit is detected, the system can stop taking the voice payload from the T2P delay buffer and start injecting RFC4733 RTP packets into the RTP stream at a pre-configured rate. The RFC4733 DTMF RTP packets continue to be injected into the RTP stream until the DTMF digit stops. Once the end of the DTMF digit is detected, the content of the T2P delay buffer can be discarded and the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. After the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized, the voice packetization can be continued.

Abstract: A T2P (TDM to packet) delay buffer is provided. The delay buffer can prevent double digit detections caused by in-band DTMF leak when out-of-band DTMF is used. The T2P delay buffer is initialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. When a DTMF digit is detected, the system can stop taking the voice payload from the T2P delay buffer and start injecting RFC4733 RTP packets into the RTP stream at a pre-configured rate. The RFC4733 DTMF RTP packets continue to be injected into the RTP stream until the DTMF digit stops. Once the end of the DTMF digit is detected, the content of the T2P delay buffer can be discarded and the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. After the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized, the voice packetisation can be continued.

Abstract: A T2P (TDM to packet) delay buffer is provided. The delay buffer can prevent double digit detections caused by in-band DTMF leak when out-of-band DTMF is used. The T2P delay buffer is initialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. When a DTMF digit is detected, the system can stop taking the voice payload from the T2P delay buffer and start injecting RFC4733 RTP packets into the RTP stream at a pre-configured rate. The RFC4733 DTMF RTP packets continue to be injected into the RTP stream until the DTMF digit stops. Once the end of the DTMF digit is detected, the content of the T2P delay buffer can be discarded and the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. After the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized, the voice packetisation can be continued.

Abstract: A T2P (TDM to packet) delay buffer is provided. The delay buffer can prevent double digit detections caused by in-band DTMF leak when out-of-band DTMF is used. The T2P delay buffer is initialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. When a DTMF digit is detected, the system can stop taking the voice payload from the T2P delay buffer and start injecting RFC4733 RTP packets into the RTP stream at a pre-configured rate. The RFC4733 DTMF RTP packets continue to be injected into the RTP stream until the DTMF digit stops. Once the end of the DTMF digit is detected, the content of the T2P delay buffer can be discarded and the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized with an audio pattern that represents silence in a configurable amount of delay. After the T2P delay buffer is reinitialized, the voice packetization can be continued.

Abstract: A system and method for providing early detection of encrypted signals within a secure connection for voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). The system and method includes a non-complex, in-band, and early encryption detector within the voice path. A transmitter sends out a known pattern. Based upon the received pattern, the receiver decides whether its encryption capabilities match up with those of the transmitter. If the capabilities do not match, then the receiver waits for the signalling message for the correct mode of operation. No packets are utilized until the receiver and transmitter encryption capabilities are matched.

Abstract: A system and method for providing early detection of encrypted signals within a secure connection for voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). The system and method includes a non-complex, in-band, and early encryption detector within the voice path. A transmitter sends out a known pattern. Based upon the received pattern, the receiver decides whether its encryption capabilities match up with those of the transmitter. If the capabilities do not match, then the receiver waits for the signalling message for the correct mode of operation. No packets are utilized until the receiver and transmitter encryption capabilities are matched.