Abstract: An example method includes receiving an input via a computing device indicative of a request to display a plurality of visual identifiers, each visual identifier corresponding to a different respective version of a document stored in at least one remote document management system. The method also includes receiving information from the document management system, determining a chronological sequence associated with displaying the plurality of visual identifiers; and generating a respective visual identifier representative of each version of the document. The method also includes displaying the visual identifiers on a display of the computing device according to the chronological sequence.

Abstract: An example peer-to-peer file sharing and collaboration method includes providing a user of a computing device with access to an electronic file via a sharing application, the electronic file being stored in a memory of the computing device. The method also includes receiving an input from the user indicative of a desire to share the electronic file using the sharing application and via a peer-to-peer communication protocol. The method further includes providing, via the communication protocol, a first transformed file generated by the first computing device based on the electronic file, and receiving, via the communication protocol, a second transformed file generated based on the electronic file. In such a method, the second transformed file is different from the first transformed file.

Abstract: An approach that smoothes a cryptographic function's timing footprint is presented. A processor includes a “function timing smoother” that smoothes out spikes in the amount of time that a particular cryptographic function requires to execute. When a cryptographic function executes, the function timing smoother tracks the amount of time that the cryptographic function executes (current execution time) and compares the time with the amount of time that the same cryptographic function took for a previous execution (previous execution time). When the current execution time is less than the previous execution time, the function timing smoother adds instructions or varies an execution unit's clock speed in order to increase the cryptographic function's current execution time. Using this approach, a malicious user is not able to decipher sensitive information from the cryptographic function's timing footprint.

Abstract: An approach that smoothes a cryptographic function's timing footprint is presented. A processor includes a “function timing smoother” that smoothes out spikes in the amount of time that a particular cryptographic function requires to execute. When a cryptographic function executes, the function timing smoother tracks the amount of time that the cryptographic function executes (current execution time) and compares the time with the amount of time that the same cryptographic function took for a previous execution (previous execution time). When the current execution time is less than the previous execution time, the function timing smoother adds instructions or varies an execution unit's clock speed in order to increase the cryptographic function's current execution time. Using this approach, a malicious user is not able to decipher sensitive information from the cryptographic function's timing footprint.

Abstract: A system and method to smooth a cryptographic function's timing footprint is presented. A processor includes a “function timing smoother” that smoothes out spikes in the amount of time that a particular cryptographic function requires to execute. When a cryptographic function executes, the function timing smoother tracks the amount of time that the cryptographic function executes (current execution time) and compares the time with the amount of time that the same cryptographic function took for a previous execution (previous execution time). When the current execution time is less than the previous execution time, the function timing smoother adds instructions or varies an execution unit's clock speed in order to increase the cryptographic function's current execution time. Using this approach, a malicious user is not able to decipher sensitive information from the cryptographic function's timing footprint.