Abstract: In a method and a system for providing secure communication in a cellular radio system radio base station key is generated by determining a set of data bits known to both the UE and the radio base station, and creating the radio base station key in response to the determined set of data.

Abstract: There is disclosed a system for authentication of a device in a network by establishing a second security context between the device and a serving network node when a first security context has previously been established, assisted by an authentication server, based on a random value and a secret shared between an identity module associated with the device and the authentication server. First re-use information from the establishment of the first security context is stored at the authentication server and at the device, the first re-use information enabling secure generation of the second security context from the random value and the secret. Second re-use information may be generated or stored at the device. A context regeneration request is generated at the device, the context regeneration request authenticated at least partly based on the secret. The context regeneration request is sent to the serving network node.

Abstract: A mobile device and an authentication server are configured to re-establish a security context that was previously established using an Authentication Key Agreement (AKA) procedure. The re-establishment advantageously uses re-use information saved from the preceding AKA procedure, including using synchronization information for each such re-establishment that occurs between AKA procedures. The synchronization information particularly identifies each instance of re-establishment and depends on a sequence number assigned to the preceding AKA procedure and on any previous instances of re-establishing the security context.

Abstract: A Terminal Identity Token is created for identifying a User Equipment (UE) connected to a radio base station in a radio system. The UE communicates with the radio base station via a secure communication associated with an existing cryptographic key. The Terminal Identity Token is created based on a physical cell identity of a target cell known to both the UE and the radio base station, the terminal identity, and the existing key. By using the Terminal Identity Token, a secure communication can be established and enhanced without having to provide for additional security network components or additional signaling.

Abstract: A method and arrangement is disclosed for managing session keys for secure communication between a first and at least a second user device in a communications network. The method is characterized being independent of what type of credential each user device implements for security operations. A first user receives from a first key management server keying information and a voucher and generates a first session key. The voucher is forwarded to at least a responding user device that, with support from a second key management server communicating with the first key management server, resolves the voucher and determines a second session keys. First and second session keys are, thereafter, used for secure communication. In one embodiment the communication traverses an intermediary whereby first and second session keys protect communication with respective leg to intermediary.

Abstract: Aspects of the present invention provide a mechanism to utilize IMS media security mechanisms in a CS network and, thereby, provide end-to-end media security in the case where the media traffic travels across both a CS network and a PS network.

Abstract: According to an aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of operating a communication device, the communication device being part of a group comprising two or more communication devices that share a subscription to a communication network. The method comprises receiving a group authentication challenge from the network, at least part of the group authentication challenge having been generated using group authentication information that is associated with the shared subscription. The device then generates a device specific response to the group authentication challenge using the group authentication information and device specific authentication information and sends the device specific response to the network. The device is for example a member of a machine-type communication device group.

Abstract: A method and apparatus to establish trust between two nodes in a communications network. A first node receives from a network node authentication data unique to the first node, which can be used to derive a compact representation of verification data for the first node. The first node also receives a certified compact representation of verification data of all nodes in the network. The first node derives trust information from the authentication data for the node, and sends to a second node a message that includes the trust information and part of the authentication data. The second node has its own copy of the certified compact representation of verification data of all nodes in the network, and verifies the authenticity of the message from the first node using the compact representation of verification data of all nodes in the network and the received trust information and authentication data.

Abstract: In a method and a system for providing secure communication in a cellular radio system radio base station key is generated by determining a set of data bits known to both the UE and the radio base station, and creating the radio base station key in response to the determined set of data.

Abstract: A method for protecting a wireless communications device against unauthorized use of functionality provided by the wireless communications device, the method comprising: receiving a binding command to bind the wireless communications device to a subscription identification module operationally coupled to the wireless communications device and associated with a subscription to a communications service; responsive to the received command, storing a module identifier identifying the subscription identification module; and storing a device identifier identifying the wireless communications device; obtaining an unbind code and storing the obtained unbind code; performing a module verification verifying that a subscription identification module identified by a stored module identifier is operationally coupled to the wireless communications device, performing a device verification verifying whether a wireless communications device identified by a stored device identifier is operationally coupled to the subscription

Abstract: When setting up communication from a user equipment UE (1), such as for providing IP access for the UE in order to allow it to use some service, information or an indication of at least one network property relating to a first network, e.g. the current access network (3, 3?), is sent to the UE from a node (13) in a second network such as the home network (5) of the subscriber of the UE. The information or indication can be sent in a first stage of an authentication procedure being part of the setting up of a connection from the UE. In particular, the network property can indicate whether the access network (3, 3?) is trusted or not.

Abstract: A method and arrangement is disclosed for managing session keys for secure communication between a first and at least a second user device in a communications network. The method is characterized being independent of what type of credential each user device implements for security operations. A first user receives from a first key management server keying information and a voucher and generates a first session key. The voucher is forwarded to at least a responding user device that, with support from a second key management server communicating with the first key management server, resolves the voucher and determines a second session keys. First and second session keys are, thereafter, used for secure communication. In one embodiment the communication traverses an intermediary whereby first and second session keys protect communication with respective leg to intermediary.

Abstract: A method and an arrangement for providing keys for protecting communication between a terminal (300) and service points in a communication network. A basic key (Ik) is first established with a service control node (304) when the terminal has entered the network. An initial modified key (Ik1) is then created in both the service control node and the terminal, by applying a predetermined first function (f) to at least the basic key and an initial value of a key version parameter (v). The initial modified key is sent to a first service point (302), such that it can be used to protect communication between the terminal and the first service point. When the terminal switches to a second service point (306), the first service point and the terminal both create a second modified key (Ik2) by applying a predetermined second function (g) to the initial modified key, and the first service point sends the second modified key to the second service point.

Abstract: When setting up communication from a user equipment UE (1), such as for providing IP access for the UE in order to allow it to use some service, information or an indication of at least one network property relating to a first network, e.g. the current access network (3, 3?), is sent to the UE from a node (13) in a second network such as the home network (5) of the subscriber of the UE. The information or indication can be sent in a first stage of an authentication procedure being part of the setting up of a connection from the UE. In particular, the network property can indicate whether the access network (3, 3?) is trusted or not.

Abstract: A method and an arrangement for providing keys for protecting communication between a terminal (300) and service points in a communication network. A basic key (Ik) is first established with a service control node (304) when the terminal has entered the network. An initial modified key (Ik1) is then created in both the service control node and the terminal, by applying a predetermined first function (f) to at least the basic key and an initial value of a key version parameter (v). The initial modified key is sent to a first service point (302), such that it can be used to protect communication between the terminal and the first service point. When the terminal switches to a second service point (306), the first service point and the terminal both create a second modified key (Ik2) by applying a predetermined second function (g) to the initial modified key, and the first service point sends the second modified key to the second service point.

Abstract: A method of and arrangement for detecting a manipulated or defect base station of a communication network is disclosed, wherein a target base station, having selected one or more algorithms on the basis of a prioritized algorithm list (PAL) and a UBE security capabilities (SCAP), reports UE SCAP related information to a core network node. The core network node having knowledge of the UE SCAP compares this information or parts of this information with the retrieved UE SCAP related information in order to be able to identify a manipulated or defect base station when a comparison fails to match.

Abstract: A method in a User Equipment (UE) of an Evolved Packet System (EPS) establishes a security key (K_eNB) for protecting Radio Resource Control/User Plane (RRC/UP) traffic exchanged with a serving eNodeB. The method comprises sending a Non-Access Stratum (NAS) Service Request to a Mobility Management Entity (MME), the request indicating a NAS uplink sequence number (NAS_U_SEQ). The method further comprises receiving an indication of the NAS_U_SEQ of the NAS Service Request sent to the MME, back from the MME via the eNodeB. The method further comprises deriving the K_eNB from at least the received indication of the NAS_U_SEQ and from a stored Access Security Management Entity-key (K_ASME) shared with said MME.

Abstract: A method for establishing a security association between a client and a service node for the purpose of pushing information from the service node to the client, where the client and a key server share a base secret. The method comprises sending a request for generation and provision of a service key from the service node to a key server, the request identifying the client and the service node, generating a service key at the key server using the identities of the client and the service node, the base secret, and additional information, and sending the service key to the service node together with said additional information, forwarding said additional information from the service node to the client, and at the client, generating said service key using the received additional information and the base key. A similar approach may be used to provide p2p key management.

Abstract: Aspects of the present invention provide a mechanism to utilize IMS media security mechanisms in a CS network and, thereby, provide end-to-end media security in the case where the media traffic travels across both a CS network and a PS network.

Abstract: Aspects of the present invention provide a mechanism to utilize IMS media security mechanisms in a CS network and, thereby, provide end-to-end media security in the case where the media traffic travels across both a CS network and a PS network.