Abstract: A Multiple Protocol Signal Detector, MPSD (320, 500) has a mixer (406) that receives signal energy from a multi-band antenna system (324) via a low noise amplifier (402) and from a variable frequency synthesizer (408) via a first variable band pass filter (410). The output of the mixer (406) passes through a second variable band pass filter (416) to an envelope detector (418) a power detector (419) and a low resolution A/D (420) that inputs digitized samples to a binary modulation detector, BMD (422). A controller (424) configures the aforementioned devices of the MPSD (320) to detect communications using different protocols based on a scan Look Up Table (426).

Abstract: A Multiple Protocol Signal Detector, MPSD (320, 500) has a mixer (406) that receives signal energy from a multi-band antenna system (324) via a low noise amplifier (402) and from a variable frequency synthesizer (408) via a first variable band pass filter (410). The output of the mixer (406) passes through a second variable band pass filter (416) to an envelope detector (418) a power detector (419) and a low resolution A/D (420) that inputs digitized samples to a binary modulation detector, BMD (422). A controller (424) configures the aforementioned devices of the MPSD (320) to detect communications using different protocols based on a scan Look Up Table (426).

Abstract: A method and device for using a partial public key in a cryptosystem. The cryptosystem may be based on a group, such as an elliptic curve over a finite field. The device includes a first memory for storing system parameters of the cryptosystem and a second memory for storing a portion of a public key of the cryptosystem. The device receives the complete public key, or the remainder of the public key, via communication with another device. The received portion of the public key is used to form a validated public key. A processor of the device uses the validated public key for encrypting messages and/or verifying signatures. The size of the second memory is reduced since only part of the public key is stored.

Abstract: Communication and validation of information transfer from a transmitter to a receiver is achieved by generating a cipher (400) from a message m (410) using parameters of an elliptic curve, a generator point P (406) on the elliptic curve and a public key Q (416) of the receiver. The cipher includes a first element that is the product kP of a random number k (404) with the generator point P and a second element that is the product of m and the x-coordinate of the product kQ. The message m is generated from two mathematically independent representations of the information and, optionally, a random number. The cipher is communicated to the receiver and decoded to recover a message m? (502). A validation token (500) is generated by the receiver and passed to the transmitter, which validates communication of the information to the receiver if the product mkQ is equal to the validation token.

Abstract: A method and device for using a partial public key in a cryptosystem. The cryptosystem may be based on a group, such as an elliptic curve over a finite field. The device includes a first memory for storing system parameters of the cryptosystem and a second memory for storing a portion of a public key of the cryptosystem. The device receives the complete public key, or the remainder of the public key, via communication with another device. The received portion of the public key is used to form a validated public key. A processor of the device uses the validated public key for encrypting messages and/or verifying signatures. The size of the second memory is reduced since only part of the public key is stored.

Abstract: A system and method for controlling access by a user to an embedded device. A protected access port, integral with the embedded device, includes an access manager and a level controller. The access manager issues a challenge phrase using a public key of the embedded device in response to a request by a user device to access the embedded device and determines the veracity of the user's response to the challenge phrase. A secure server stores a private key corresponding to the public encryption key of the embedded device and is operable to authenticate the user credentials and issues the response to the challenge phrase dependent upon the private key of the embedded device.

Abstract: A method and apparatus is provided for authenticating a component (450) for use in a device (100). The device (100) has a predetermined challenge and a predetermined response associated with the predetermined challenge stored in a memory (122). The method detects whether the component (450) has been coupled to the device (100). If the component (450) has been detected (206), the predetermined challenge is provided to the component (208). The device (450) then determines whether a component response has been received from the component within a predetermined response time (210). If a component response is received within the predetermined response time (210), it is compared to the predetermined response (212). The component is disabled (214) if either the component response is not received within the predetermined response time (210) or the component response is received within the predetermined response time (210) but the component response is not equivalent to the predetermined response (212).

Abstract: A server, e.g., a client (105, 107, 109), receives a request for a digital signature to be applied to digital information, obtains a representation of the information, determines a designation of key pair(s) to be applied thereto; and transmits a request for the digital signature to a front end server (103a, 103b). The front end server determines one or more of whether the client is authentic and authorized, the user identifier is authentic, and the user identifier is permitted to make the request. If so, the front end server transmits a request to generate a digital signature to a back end server (101). The back end server determines one or more of whether the front end server is authentic and the designated key pair correspond to the requesting front end server. If so, the back end server generates the digital signature based on the information and the key pair(s).

Abstract: Logic circuitry (301) determines that digital content (317) needs to be accessed or obtained and then determines a DRM core (307), or protocol necessary to obtain/access the digital content. If the DRM core (307) is not resident in memory, the core is downloaded from a DRM solution center (103). An application (305) will utilize the DRM core to access or obtain the digital content.