Abstract: A method is disclosed. The method includes receiving, by a processing network computer from a relying party computer associated with a relying party, a request for data associated with a user operating a user device. The processing network computer may retrieve first encrypted data of the user having a user-layer of encryption. The processing computer can then generate a second symmetric key to add a relying party-layer of encryption to the first encrypted data using a stream cipher. The doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to a user device that removes the user-layer of encryption on the first doubly encrypted data, and then adds a second relying party-layer of encryption to form second doubly encrypted data. The second doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to the relying party computer, which can remove both relying party-layers of encryption to gain access to the data associated with the user.

Abstract: Methods and systems are disclosed for managing access to encrypted data and encryption keys. The system stores, by a key management server, a first encryption key associated with a first service and a second encryption key associated with a second service. The system prevents, by the key management server, the second service from accessing the second encryption key while the first service is performing a first function using the first encryption key and determines that a first threshold period of time associated with the first function has elapsed. The system, in response to determining that the first threshold period of time associated with the first function has elapsed, prevents, by the key management server, the first service from accessing the first encryption key while the second service is performing a second function using the second encryption key.

Abstract: Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. Once enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

Abstract: A method is disclosed. The method includes receiving, by a processing network computer from a relying party computer associated with a relying party, a request for data associated with a user operating a user device. The processing network computer may retrieve first encrypted data of the user having a user-layer of encryption. The processing computer can then generate a second symmetric key to add a relying party-layer of encryption to the first encrypted data using a stream cipher. The doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to a user device that removes the user-layer of encryption on the first doubly encrypted data, and then adds a second relying party-layer of encryption to form second doubly encrypted data. The second doubly encrypted data may be transmitted to the relying party computer, which can remove both relying party-layers of encryption to gain access to the data associated with the user.

Abstract: A method is disclosed. The method comprises receiving, by a digital identity computer, a request for personal data associated with a user. The digital identity computer may retrieve encrypted personal data, wherein the personal data is encrypted with a public key associated with the user. The digital identity computer may encrypt the encrypted personal data with a first public key associated with a relying party or derivative thereof to form subsequently encrypted personal data. The method may then proceed to transmit the subsequently encrypted personal data or derivative thereof to a relying party computer, or a user device. If the user device receives the subsequently encrypted personal data, the user device may thereafter transmit the subsequently encrypted personal data or derivative thereof to the relying party computer. Then, the relying party computer obtains the personal data from the subsequently encrypted personal data or derivative thereof.

Abstract: Several round-efficient solitary multi-party computation protocols with guaranteed output delivery are disclosed. A plurality of input devices and an output device can collectively perform a computation using methods such as fully homomorphic encryption. The output of the computation is only known to the output device. Some number of these devices may be corrupt. However, even in the presence of corrupt devices, the output device can still either generate a correct output or identify that the computation was compromised. These protocols operate under different assumptions regarding the communication infrastructure (e.g., broadcast vs point-to-point), the number of participating devices, and the number of corrupt devices. These protocols are round-efficient in that they require a minimal number of communication rounds to calculate the result of the multi-party computation.

Abstract: Techniques of authenticating a first device of a user to a second device are disclosed. The method enables the second device to perform authentication using a biometric template stored on the first device and a biometric measurement. Homomorphic encryption may be used by the first device to encrypt the biometric template and the second device to determine an encrypted similarity metric between the biometric template and the biometric measurement. The second device can also determine an encrypted code using an authentication function and the encrypted similarity metric. The second device sends the encrypted code and the encrypted similarity metric to be decrypted by the first device. The second device can receive a response from the first device, indicating whether a decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold; and whether the decrypted code matches a test code. The second device can then authenticate the user based on the response.

Abstract: Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. Once enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

Abstract: “Updatable” private set intersection (PSI) protocols allow parties that each have an updatable private set to determine the intersection of their sets after an update without the need to compare each element of each set and without compromising privacy. In some protocols, a first party can determine an update to the intersection by determining an intersection of elements that were previously in the first party's set with elements that were added to the second party's set and determining an intersection of elements that were added to the first party's set with elements that are in the second party's (updated) set. In some protocols, both parties can determine the updated intersection.

Abstract: Several round-efficient solitary multi-party computation protocols with guaranteed output delivery are disclosed. A plurality of input devices and an output device can collectively perform a computation using methods such as fully homomorphic encryption. The output of the computation is only known to the output device. Some number of these devices may be corrupt. However, even in the presence of corrupt devices, the output device can still either generate a correct output or identify that the computation was compromised. These protocols operate under different assumptions regarding the communication infrastructure (e.g., broadcast vs point-to-point), the number of participating devices, and the number of corrupt devices. These protocols are round-efficient in that they require a minimal number of communication rounds to calculate the result of the multi-party computation.

Abstract: Techniques of authenticating a first device of a user to a second device are disclosed. The method enables the second device to perform authentication using a biometric template stored on the first device and a biometric measurement. Homomorphic encryption may be used by the first device to encrypt the biometric template and the second device to determine an encrypted similarity metric between the biometric template and the biometric measurement. The second device can also determine an encrypted code using an authentication function and the encrypted similarity metric. The second device sends the encrypted code and the encrypted similarity metric to be decrypted by the first device. The second device can receive a response from the first device, indicating whether a decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold; and whether the decrypted code matches a test code. The second device can then authenticate the user based on the response.

Abstract: A method is disclosed. The method comprises receiving, by an identity network computer, a query set including a plurality of test identity attributes. After receiving the query set, the identity network computer may retrieve derivatives of identity attributes associated with a user, and an encrypted trapdoor, then compute an obscured query set using the query set, and optionally the derivatives of identity attributes. The identity network computer may transmit the obscured query set (i) and the encrypted trapdoor to a user device associated with the user, which generates and transmits a first modified trapdoor and the obscured query set to a relying party computer, or (ii) and a second modified trapdoor to the relying party computer. The relying party computer may thereafter use the obscured query set, and the first modified trapdoor or the second modified trapdoor, to determine if the identity attributes is a member of the query set.

Abstract: A user device generates an initiate interaction request message comprising a state commitment. The user device provides the initiate interaction request message to a first server computer, which creates a verify state request message comprising an interaction index, an interaction index commitment, and a first commitment signature formed from the state commitment and the interaction index commitment. The user device receives the verify state request message, then generates a modified verify state request message comprising a user device public key, the state commitment, the interaction index commitment, and the first commitment signature. The user device provides the modified verify state request message to a second server computer. The second server computer verifies the state commitment, verifies the first commitment signature, and creates a second commitment signature formed from the state commitment and the interaction index commitment.

Abstract: Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. One enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

Abstract: A method performed by a user device is disclosed. The method comprising generating a secret and measuring a biometric template of a user operating the user device. The method then generates a plurality of secret shares of the secret and of the biometric template. The user device then transmits the secret shares of the secret and of the biometric template to a plurality of recovery devices. After, the user device may then initiate a recovery of the secret and measure a biometric measurement of the user. Data of the biometric measurement may be transmitted to the plurality of recovery devices, where the recovery devices perform a partial computation. The user device use the plurality of partial computations to determine a match between the biometric template and the biometric measurement. If the two biometrics match, the user device can reconstruct the secret using shares of the secret from the recovery devices.

Abstract: Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. One enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and apparatuses of using biometric information to authenticate a first device of a user to a second device are described herein. A method includes storing, by the first device, a first key share of a private key and a first template share of a biometric template of the user. The second device stores a public key, and one or more other devices of the user store other key shares and other template shares. The first device receives a challenge message from the second device, measures biometric features of the user to obtain a measurement vector, and sends the measurement vector and the challenge message to the other devices. The first device receives partial computations, generated using a respective template share, key share, and the challenge message, from the other devices, uses them to generate a signature of the challenge message and send the signature to the second device.

Abstract: Techniques of authenticating a first device of a user to a second device are disclosed. The method enables the second device to perform authentication using a biometric template stored on the first device and a biometric measurement. Homomorphic encryption may be used by the first device to encrypt the biometric template and the second device to determine an encrypted similarity metric between the biometric template and the biometric measurement. The second device can also determine an encrypted code using an authentication function and the encrypted similarity metric. The second device sends the encrypted code and the encrypted similarity metric to be decrypted by the first device. The second device can receive a response from the first device, indicating whether a decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold; and whether the decrypted code matches a test code. The second device can then authenticate the user based on the response.

Abstract: Systems, methods, and apparatuses of using biometric information to authenticate a first device of a user to a second device are described herein. A method includes storing, by the first device, a first key share of a private key and a first template share of a biometric template of the user. The second device stores a public key, and one or more other devices of the user store other key shares and other template shares. The first device receives a challenge message from the second device, measures biometric features of the user to obtain a measurement vector, and sends the measurement vector and the challenge message to the other devices. The first device receives partial computations, generated using a respective template share, key share, and the challenge message, from the other devices, uses them to generate a signature of the challenge message and send the signature to the second device.

Abstract: Techniques of authenticating a first device of a user to a second device are disclosed. The method enables the second device to perform authentication using a biometric template stored on the first device and a biometric measurement. Homomorphic encryption may be used by the first device to encrypt the biometric template and the second device to determine an encrypted similarity metric between the biometric template and the biometric measurement. The second device can also determine an encrypted code using an authentication function and the encrypted similarity metric. The second device sends the encrypted code and the encrypted similarity metric to be decrypted by the first device. The second device can receive a response from the first device, indicating whether a decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold; and whether the decrypted code matches a test code. The second device can then authenticate the user based on the response.