Abstract: A method for attestation of Control Flow Integrity (CFI) of an application running on an end entity whereby an asymmetric key pair is generated by a Key Management Module (KMM) comprising a private key and a public key, then the public key is signed with a device key unique to the end entity thereby generating a public key certificate which attests to the private key being in possession of the end entity. The asymmetric key pair is based on the executing code of the application and the device key. The attestation claims regarding CFI of the application are signed by the private key in a dedicated signature module.

Abstract: An apparatus is configured to protect the privacy of shared objects by loading shared object into a user memory of a rich execution environment. The shared object has an encrypted segment and metadata. A request for decryption is sent to a trusted execution environment and the encrypted segment is decrypted based on the metadata and a predetermined platform key to produce a decrypted segment. The decrypted segment is written into the shared object. A request to lock the shared object is sent and a memory occupied by the shared object is locked or set to execute only. The lock of the memory region occupied by the decrypted shared object maps the memory region to be non-readable and non-writable to applications executing at a first privilege level and to the operating system kernel executing at a second privilege level.

Abstract: An electronic device and a software provisioning server are provided. The electronic device is configured to obey an Anti-Roll Back (ARB) enforcement policy, obtain an ARB exception associated with a software, wherein the ARB exception comprises a signature of the ARB exception and a revision number of the software, check the validity of the signature of the ARB exception, and execute the software having the revision number so as to overrun the ARB enforcement policy if the signature of the ARB exception is valid. The software provisioning server is configured to determine an ARB exception associated with a software for overrunning an ARB enforcement policy in an electronic device, wherein the ARB exception comprises a signature of the ARB exception and a revision number of the software, provide the ARB exception to the electronic device.

Abstract: A device with key attestation features comprises an operating system stored in its memory, the operating system comprising a secure environment including a trusted application, and two or more device certificates, each associated with a device key pair, stored in the memory of the device. The trusted application is configured to handle key pair generation requests and key pair attestation requests to read an indication of a preferred device certificate. An attestation certificate that is generated in response to the key pair attestation request is then signed using one of the two or more device certificates with its associated device key pair based on the indication of a preferred device certificate.

Abstract: A method for attestation of Control Flow Integrity (CFI) of an application running on an end entity whereby an asymmetric key pair is generated by a Key Management Module (KMM) comprising a private key and a public key, then the public key is signed with a device key unique to the end entity thereby generating a public key certificate which attests to the private key being in possession of the end entity. The asymmetric key pair is based on the executing code of the application and the device key. The attestation claims regarding CFI of the application are signed by the private key in a dedicated signature module.

Abstract: An apparatus including a processor and a memory, where the processor and the memory are configured to provide a secure execution environment and the memory stores a hardware unique key and a class key. The processor is configured to recover, in the secure execution environment, a certificate signing key based on the class key, where the certificate signing key is associated with a certificate authority. The processor is further configured to derive a device key pair based on the hardware unique key, where the device key pair includes a device public key and a device private key, and generate a device certificate based on the device public key and the certificate signing key. The generated device certificate is configured to be validated based on a public key associated with the certificate authority.

Abstract: An apparatus including a processor and a memory configured to provide an SEE and an REE. The processor is configured to provide a client application configured to execute at a user privilege level and a hypervisor configured to execute at a hypervisor privilege level. The user privilege level is more restrictive than the hypervisor privilege level. The processor is further configured to provide a trusted application configured to execute within the SEE. The trusted application provides secure services to the client application. The processor is configured to send a request for secure services from the client application to the trusted application, send a measurement request to the hypervisor, generate within the hypervisor a measured value based on the client application, return the measured value to the trusted application, and determine whether the client application is authorized to access the secure services. The authorization determination is based on the measured value.

Abstract: An apparatus includes a processor coupled to a memory wherein the processor and the memory are configured to provide a secure execution environment. The memory includes a shared secret value. The processor is configured to receive a certificate, wherein the certificate includes a device identifier and a digital signature. The processor validates the certificate based on the digital signature and the device identifier, recovers a cryptographic key based on the shared secret value and the device identifier, and performs a cryptographic operation based on the recovered cryptographic key.

Abstract: In a method for secure provisioning of data to a client device, a non-trusted manufacturing facility is equipped with a secure server device to establish a secure data provisioning channel from the secure server device to trusted hardware in client devices without the secure server device and the client devices needing to have a shared secret.

Abstract: A device with key attestation features comprises an operating system stored in its memory, the operating system comprising a secure environment including a trusted application, and two or more device certificates, each associated with a device key pair, stored in the memory of the device. The trusted application is configured to handle key pair generation requests and key pair attestation requests to read an indication of a preferred device certificate. An attestation certificate that is generated in response to the key pair attestation request is then signed using one of the two or more device certificates with its associated device key pair based on the indication of a preferred device certificate.

Abstract: An apparatus including a processor and a memory configured to provide an SEE and an REE. The processor is configured to provide a client application configured to execute at a user privilege level and a hypervisor configured to execute at a hypervisor privilege level. The user privilege level is more restrictive than the hypervisor privilege level. The processor is further configured to provide a trusted application configured to execute within the SEE. The trusted application provides secure services to the client application. The processor is configured to send a request for secure services from the client application to the trusted application, send a measurement request to the hypervisor, generate within the hypervisor a measured value based on the client application, return the measured value to the trusted application, and determine whether the client application is authorized to access the secure services. The authorization determination is based on the measured value.

Abstract: A system generating a prime number comprising a prime number generator (PNG) module and a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) module which is configured to: initialise the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) module; receive a request from the PNG module, the request containing a bit length of the pseudorandom number required; generate the required bit length of pseudorandom number; transmit a response containing the generated bit length of pseudorandom numbers to the PNG module. The PNG module is configured to: transmit the request containing the bit length of the pseudorandom numbers required; receive the response from the PRNG module; assign the pseudorandom numbers in the response to form raw data PPP; set a least significant bit (LSB) and most significant bit (MSB) of PPP as 1 to obtain a first big odd number denoted as PP; and execute an algorithm to determine a first big prime number starting from odd number PP.

Abstract: The invention relates to an electronic device and a software provisioning server. The electronic device is configured to obey an Anti-Roll Back, ARB, enforcement policy, obtain an ARB exception associated with a software, wherein the ARB exception comprises a signature of the ARB exception and a revision number of the software, check the validity of the signature of the ARB exception, and execute the software having the revision number so as to overrun the ARB enforcement policy if the signature of the ARB exception is valid. The software provisioning server is configured to determine an ARB exception associated with a software for overrunning a ARB enforcement policy in an electronic device, wherein the ARB exception comprises a signature of the ARB exception and a revision number of the software, provide the ARB exception to the electronic device.

Abstract: An apparatus including a processor and a memory, where the processor and the memory are configured to provide a secure execution environment and the memory stores a hardware unique key and a class key. The processor is configured to recover, in the secure execution environment, a certificate signing key based on the class key, where the certificate signing key is associated with a certificate authority. The processor is further configured to derive a device key pair based on the hardware unique key, where the device key pair includes a device public key and a device private key, and generate a device certificate based on the device public key and the certificate signing key. The generated device certificate is configured to be validated based on a public key associated with the certificate authority.

Abstract: An apparatus includes a processor coupled to a memory wherein the processor and the memory are configured to provide a secure execution environment. The memory includes a shared secret value. The processor is configured to receive a certificate, wherein the certificate includes a device identifier and a digital signature. The processor validates the certificate based on the digital signature and the device identifier, recovers a cryptographic key based on the shared secret value and the device identifier, and performs a cryptographic operation based on the recovered cryptographic key.

Abstract: A system for cryptographically authenticated communication, wherein an activation signal is sent from a communications device to a memory device (410). The memory device derives a random challenge from at least one physical property of the activation signal and sends it back to the communications device (420). A signature is computed using the received random challenge (440) and sent, together with a certificate, to the memory device (450).

Abstract: An approach is provided for reducing communication traffic and cost by applying recipient criteria in identity-based encryption. A recipient criterion application selects one or more recipient criteria for data, and encrypts the data using the selected one or more recipient criteria as a public key of identity-based encryption.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for enchancing pseudo random number generation to thwart various security attacks to a system that relies on digital signature security measures. For example, a random number may be bound to a message that is to be signed using a digital signature. Alternatively, a random number may be bound to a secret seed value, which may be updated subsequent to each signing. Alternatively still, a random number may be bound to both the message to be signed using a digital signature and a secret seed value.

Abstract: A system for cryptographically authenticated communication, wherein an activation signal is sent from a communications device to a memory device (410). The memory device derives a random challenge from at least one physical property of the activation signal and sends it back to the communications device (420). A signature is computed using the received random challenge (440) and sent, together with a certificate, to the memory device (450).

Abstract: An apparatus comprising a processor, the processor configured to select a first cryptographic key, encrypt a message with the first cryptographic key to produce a first encrypted message, and further encrypt the first cryptographic key and an identifier of a second apparatus with a first encryption key to form a second encrypted message.