Abstract: A fault resilient airborne network includes a plurality of aircraft system components installed within an aircraft and at least one agent in communication with the plurality of aircraft system components during in-flight operation of the aircraft. The at least one agent is configured to monitor an aircraft system component for a fault, observe a fault within the aircraft system component, and provide reconfiguration instructions to the aircraft system component in response to the observed fault. The at least one agent is further configured to predict a life expectancy of the aircraft system component using machine learning models while monitoring the aircraft system component for a fault, and provide reconfiguration instructions to the aircraft system component when the life expectancy of the aircraft system component meets a threshold. The reconfiguration instructions are configured to cause an adjustment in at least some of the plurality of aircraft system components.

Abstract: A printed circuit board (PCB) module may include a PCB with at least one internal PCB element and at least one external PCB element, a shielding layer fabricated from a tunable metamaterial absorber, and a structure housing the PCB. The at least one internal PCB element may be embedded between adjacent layers of the PCB. The at least one external PCB element may be coupled to an exterior surface of the PCB. The shielding layer may be tuned in response to the at least one measurement of the EMI emission and a determination of a frequency of the EMI emission from the at least one measurement. The tuning of the shielding layer may include adjusting a plurality of fins within a plurality of elements of the metamaterial absorber to absorb at least a portion of the EMI emission.

Abstract: A printed circuit board (PCB) module may include a PCB with at least one internal PCB element and at least one external PCB element, a shielding layer fabricated from a tunable metamaterial absorber, and a structure housing the PCB. The at least one internal PCB element may be embedded between adjacent layers of the PCB. The at least one external PCB element may be coupled to an exterior surface of the PCB. The shielding layer may be tuned in response to the at least one measurement of the EMI emission and a determination of a frequency of the EMI emission from the at least one measurement. The tuning of the shielding layer may include adjusting a plurality of fins within a plurality of elements of the metamaterial absorber to absorb at least a portion of the EMI emission.

Abstract: An electroluminescent paint indicator for a fault or failure may include at least one layer of electrically conductive paint disposed on a surface within a system including the electroluminescent paint indicator, at least one dielectric layer disposed on the at least one layer of electrically conductive paint, at least one layer including an electroluminescent phosphor compound disposed on the at least one dielectric layer, and at least one layer of conductive coating disposed on the at least one layer including the electroluminescent phosphor compound. The electroluminescent paint indicator may be configured to activate following a determination of a fault or failure with the at least one layer of electrically conductive paint receiving power, the at least one layer including the electroluminescent phosphor compound being excited by the at least one layer of electrically conductive paint, and the least one layer including the electroluminescent phosphor compound generating an illuminated light.

Abstract: A laser angle measuring device has a concave detection surface with a plurality of light sensors and an opaque light shield. One or more multi-axis gravity sense potentiometers determine the orientation of the laser angle measuring device, and a GPS receiver determines the location of the laser angle measuring device. The laser angle measuring device is part of a system including one or more laser emitters, each with one or more selectable laser sources. Each laser emitter may also include location and orientation measuring mechanisms.

Abstract: Disclosed herein are systems and methods for distributed key management. A first communications node may join a network. The first communications node may receive a white list generated by a central authority. The white list may include criteria for selecting a master communications node that may generate and distribute a cryptographic key for the network. The white list may also identify one or more communications nodes authorized to receive the generated cryptographic key. Responsive to detecting a second communications node joining the network, the first communications node may determine whether the second communications node is to be the master communications node for the network.

Abstract: Systems and methods for providing input using movement of a vehicle or other platform are provided. One method includes obtaining, by a processing circuit, movement data indicating movement of the vehicle, comparing, by the processing circuit, the movement data to a predefined movement pattern stored in a memory coupled to the processing circuit, and determining, by the processing circuit, whether the movement data matches the predefined movement pattern. The method further includes, in response to determining the movement data matches the predefined movement pattern, initiating, by the processing circuit, an action of the vehicle defined in the memory as corresponding to the predefined movement pattern.

Abstract: The present disclosure is directed to a system and method for remotely initializing at least one device in communication with a local host device utilizing an asymmetric cryptographic authorization scheme. According to various embodiments, at least one remote device sends an authorization request including a random value to the local host device. The local host device returns an approval response to the remote device, where the approval response includes the random value encoded utilizing a private key. The remote device is then initialized (e.g. powered on or placed in an active state) upon verification of the encoded random value utilizing a public key that is paired with the private key.