Abstract: A processing service of a provider network may protect media content from being tampered with when it is transmitted from the provider network/transcoder to untrusted networks (e.g., third-party networks/CDNs) and to a media player. The processing service (e.g., the transcoder) generates a public and a private key. The service uses the private key to digitally sign content portions (e.g., video frames) before distribution to untrusted CDNs. The provider network creates a manifest that includes the public key. To play the media content, the media player obtains a manifest that includes the public key (via a secure/trusted connection with the provider network). The media player may then obtain the media content from an untrusted edge server/CDN and validate it using the public key that was separately obtained from the manifest (to verify the content was not tampered with).

Abstract: Dynamically re-locating transcoding processes of live content data is described herein. In an example, a computer system causes a first server to execute a first transcode process on a first portion of live stream content. A first output of executing the first transcode process includes first transcoded content. The computer system determines a transcode capacity of one or more servers. The computer system determines that transcoding the live stream content is to be moved to a second server based at least in part on the transcode capacity and a transcode optimization parameter. The computer system causes the second server to execute a second transcode process on a second portion of the live stream content. The second transcode process is equivalent to the first transcode process. A second output of executing the second transcode process includes second transcoded content.

Abstract: A first portion of a video item is transmitted using a first encoding profile. The first encoding profile is a first set of one or more first video representations of the video item having first image quality characteristics. Viewer information including at least one of a viewer quantity for the video item or a viewer playback platform distribution for the video item is receiving during transmitting the video item. A second encoding profile is determined based on the at least one of the viewer quantity or the viewer playback platform distribution. The second encoding profile is a second set of one or more second video representations of the video item having second image quality characteristics. The second image quality characteristics include a selected image quality characteristic that is not included in the first image quality characteristics. A second portion of the video item is transmitted using the second encoding profile.

Abstract: Techniques for migrating live broadcast streams from one data center to another data center are described herein. A data center from a plurality of data centers may be determined to transfer live streaming video content from a first data center to the data center. A separate live streaming session for each live streaming session being broadcast by the first data center may be generated by communicating with an ingest service server that receives media content used to generate each separate live streaming session and the live streaming session. Each separate live streaming session may be routed to the candidate data center. A determination that each separate live streaming session of the candidate data center is synchronized with each live streaming session of the first data center may be made. An update to a mapping of IP addresses to redirect requests from the first data center to the candidate data center.

Abstract: A processing service of a provider network may protect media content from being tampered with when it is transmitted from the provider network/transcoder to untrusted networks (e.g., third-party networks/CDNs) and to a media player. The processing service (e.g., the transcoder) generates a public and a private key. The service uses the private key to digitally sign content portions (e.g., video frames) before distribution to untrusted CDNs. The provider network creates a manifest that includes the public key. To play the media content, the media player obtains a manifest that includes the public key (via a secure/trusted connection with the provider network). The media player may then obtain the media content from an untrusted edge server/CDN and validate it using the public key that was separately obtained from the manifest (to verify the content was not tampered with).

Abstract: A video streaming service may include a segmentation component that provides segment metadata that indicates starting locations for a plurality of segments of video content that are produced during transcoding of the video content. The segment metadata may be sent to a first transcode server and a second transcode server to allow alignment of segmentations between the first transcode server and the second transcode server. This may allow transcoding of the video content to be seamlessly switched from the first transcode server to the second transcode server, during transmission of the video content, without causing interruption of playback. The first transcode server and the second transcode server may also operate in parallel to produce different versions of the video content, such as versions encoded using different codecs. A video player may seamlessly switch between these different codec versions without causing interruption of playback.

Abstract: A processing service of a provider network may protect media content from being tampered with when it is transmitted from the provider network/transcoder to untrusted networks (e.g., third-party networks/CDNs) and to a media player. The processing service (e.g., the transcoder) generates a public and a private key. The service uses the private key to digitally sign content portions (e.g., video frames) before distribution to untrusted CDNs. The provider network creates a manifest that includes the public key. To play the media content, the media player obtains a manifest that includes the public key (via a secure/trusted connection with the provider network). The media player may then obtain the media content from an untrusted edge server/CDN and validate it using the public key that was separately obtained from the manifest (to verify the content was not tampered with).

Abstract: A processing service of a provider network may protect media content from being tampered with when it is transmitted from the provider network/transcoder to untrusted networks (e.g., third-party networks/CDNs) and to a media player. The processing service (e.g., the transcoder) generates a public and a private key. The service uses the private key to digitally sign content portions (e.g., video frames) before distribution to untrusted CDNs. The provider network creates a manifest that includes the public key. To play the media content, the media player obtains a manifest that includes the public key (via a secure/trusted connection with the provider network). The media player may then obtain the media content from an untrusted edge server/CDN and validate it using the public key that was separately obtained from the manifest (to verify the content was not tampered with).