Abstract: A security management service for Internet-of-things devices can obtain, from an Internet-of-things device and via a cellular network, a request by the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network, the Internet-of-things device including a universal integrated circuit card that stores a unique identifier for the Internet-of-things device and a cellular transceiver. The security management service can obtain behavioral data describing activity associated with the Internet-of-things device and can determine, based on the identity data and the behavioral data, if the Internet-of-things device is operating normally and as expected and if the Internet-of-things device is under the control of any unauthorized entity before allowing the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network.

Abstract: A security management service for Internet-of-things devices can obtain, from an Internet-of-things device and via a cellular network, a request by the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network, the Internet-of-things device including a universal integrated circuit card that stores a unique identifier for the Internet-of-things device and a cellular transceiver. The security management service can obtain behavioral data describing activity associated with the Internet-of-things device and can determine, based on the identity data and the behavioral data, if the Internet-of-things device is operating normally and as expected and if the Internet-of-things device is under the control of any unauthorized entity before allowing the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network.

Abstract: A security management service for Internet-of-things devices can obtain, from an Internet-of-things device and via a cellular network, a request by the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network, the Internet-of-things device including a universal integrated circuit card that stores a unique identifier for the Internet-of-things device and a cellular transceiver. The security management service can obtain behavioral data describing activity associated with the Internet-of-things device and can determine, based on the identity data and the behavioral data, if the Internet-of-things device is operating normally and as expected and if the Internet-of-things device is under the control of any unauthorized entity before allowing the Internet-of-things device to register with the cellular network.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies are disclosed herein for multifactor authentication for Internet-of-things devices. An access request can be received from an Internet-of-things device. The access request can include identifying information associated with the Internet-of-things device and a certificate. The certificate can be validated and a stored version of the identifying information can be obtained. If the stored version of the identifying information is determined to match the identifying information included with the access request, access to a resource can be allowed.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies are disclosed herein for multifactor authentication for Internet-of-things devices. An access request can be received from an Internet-of-things device. The access request can include identifying information associated with the Internet-of-things device and a certificate. The certificate can be validated and a stored version of the identifying information can be obtained. If the stored version of the identifying information is determined to match the identifying information included with the access request, access to a resource can be allowed.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies disclosed herein are directed to vehicle-to-everything (“V2X”) certificate management. According to one aspect of the concepts and technologies disclosed herein, a system can receive a CRL from a security credential management (“SCM”) system. The CRL can identify one or more certificates that have been determined to be invalid, such as when the certificate(s) has expired. The certificate(s) can be utilized by a vehicle for secure communications, including vehicle-to-vehicle (“V2V”) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (“V2I”) (collectively V2X). The system can format the CRL as a cell broadcast message. The system can then create a cell broadcast request directed to a cell broadcast center (“CBC”). The cell broadcast request can include the CRL formatted as the cell broadcast message. The system can send the cell broadcast request to the CBC to instruct the CBC to broadcast the CRL as the cell broadcast message.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies of latency sensitive tactile network security interfaces are provided herein. In an embodiment, a method can include identifying, by a tactile network interface controller, encrypted command packets that are being sent as a data stream to a tactile application. The method can include obtaining a command sequence model based on the encrypted command packets being sent to the tactile application, and decrypting at least some of the encrypted command packets based on the command sequence model, where decrypting the encrypted command packets identifies non-sequential command instructions. The method can include determining, based on the command sequence model, that at least some of the non-sequential command instructions do not conform to the command sequence model, and dropping, by the tactile network interface controller, the non-sequential command instructions that do not conform to the command sequence model from the data stream.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies of latency sensitive tactile network security interfaces are provided herein. In an embodiment, a method can include identifying, by a tactile network interface controller, encrypted command packets that are being sent as a data stream to a tactile application. The method can include obtaining a command sequence model based on the encrypted command packets being sent to the tactile application, and decrypting at least some of the encrypted command packets based on the command sequence model, where decrypting the encrypted command packets identifies non-sequential command instructions. The method can include determining, based on the command sequence model, that at least some of the non-sequential command instructions do not conform to the command sequence model, and dropping, by the tactile network interface controller, the non-sequential command instructions that do not conform to the command sequence model from the data stream.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies of latency sensitive tactile network security interfaces are provided herein. In an embodiment, a method can include identifying, by a tactile network interface controller, encrypted command packets that are being sent as a data stream to a tactile application. The method can include obtaining a command sequence model based on the encrypted command packets being sent to the tactile application, and decrypting at least some of the encrypted command packets based on the command sequence model, where decrypting the encrypted command packets identifies non-sequential command instructions. The method can include determining, based on the command sequence model, that at least some of the non-sequential command instructions do not conform to the command sequence model, and dropping, by the tactile network interface controller, the non-sequential command instructions that do not conform to the command sequence model from the data stream.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies are disclosed herein for multifactor authentication for Internet-of-things devices. An access request can be received from an Internet-of-things device. The access request can include identifying information associated with the Internet-of-things device and a certificate. The certificate can be validated and a stored version of the identifying information can be obtained. If the stored version of the identifying information is determined to match the identifying information included with the access request, access to a resource can be allowed.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies of latency sensitive tactile network security interfaces are provided herein. In an embodiment, a method can include identifying, by a tactile network interface controller, encrypted command packets that are being sent as a data stream to a tactile application. The method can include obtaining a command sequence model based on the encrypted command packets being sent to the tactile application, and decrypting at least some of the encrypted command packets based on the command sequence model, where decrypting the encrypted command packets identifies non-sequential command instructions. The method can include determining, based on the command sequence model, that at least some of the non-sequential command instructions do not conform to the command sequence model, and dropping, by the tactile network interface controller, the non-sequential command instructions that do not conform to the command sequence model from the data stream.

Abstract: Concepts and technologies disclosed herein are directed to vehicle-to-everything (“V2X”) certificate management. According to one aspect of the concepts and technologies disclosed herein, a system can receive a CRL from a security credential management (“SCM”) system. The CRL can identify one or more certificates that have been determined to be invalid, such as when the certificate(s) has expired. The certificate(s) can be utilized by a vehicle for secure communications, including vehicle-to-vehicle (“V2V”) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (“V2I”) (collectively V2X). The system can format the CRL as a cell broadcast message. The system can then create a cell broadcast request directed to a cell broadcast center (“CBC”). The cell broadcast request can include the CRL formatted as the cell broadcast message. The system can send the cell broadcast request to the CBC to instruct the CBC to broadcast the CRL as the cell broadcast message.