Abstract: A combination of hardware monitoring and binary translation software allow detection of return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits with low overhead and low false positive rates. Embodiments may use various forms of hardware to detect ROP exploits and indicate the presence of an anomaly to a device driver, which may collect data and pass the indication of the anomaly to the binary translation software to instrument the application code and determine whether an ROP exploit has been detected. Upon detection of the ROP exploit, the binary translation software may indicate the ROP exploit to an anti-malware software, which may take further remedial action as desired.

Abstract: After a heuristic event counter in a processor has triggered a performance monitoring interrupt (PMI) when the processor was executing a target program in user mode, and after the processor has switched to kernel mode in response to the PMI, a heuristic event handler automatically performs preliminary analysis in kernel mode, without switching back to user mode, to determine whether heavyweight code analysis is warranted. The preliminary analysis comprises (a) obtaining an instruction pointer (IP) for the target program from a last branch record (LBR) buffer in the processor, (b) using transaction hardware in the processor to determine whether the IP from LBR buffer points to a readable page in memory, and (c) determining that heavyweight code analysis is not warranted in response to a determination that the page pointed to by the IP from LBR buffer is not readable. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: A combination of hardware monitoring and binary translation software allow detection of return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits with low overhead and low false positive rates. Embodiments may use various forms of hardware to detect ROP exploits and indicate the presence of an anomaly to a device driver, which may collect data and pass the indication of the anomaly to the binary translation software to instrument the application code and determine whether an ROP exploit has been detected. Upon detection of the ROP exploit, the binary translation software may indicate the ROP exploit to an anti-malware software, which may take further remedial action as desired.

Abstract: A combination of hardware monitoring and binary translation software allow detection of return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits with low overhead and low false positive rates. Embodiments may use various forms of hardware to detect ROP exploits and indicate the presence of an anomaly to a device driver, which may collect data and pass the indication of the anomaly to the binary translation software to instrument the application code and determine whether an ROP exploit has been detected. Upon detection of the ROP exploit, the binary translation software may indicate the ROP exploit to an anti-malware software, which may take further remedial action as desired.

Abstract: After a heuristic event counter in a processor has triggered a performance monitoring interrupt (PMI) when the processor was executing a target program in user mode, and after the processor has switched to kernel mode in response to the PMI, a heuristic event handler automatically performs preliminary analysis in kernel mode, without switching back to user mode, to determine whether heavyweight code analysis is warranted. The preliminary analysis comprises (a) obtaining an instruction pointer (IP) for the target program from a last branch record (LBR) buffer in the processor, (b) using transaction hardware in the processor to determine whether the IP from LBR buffer points to a readable page in memory, and (c) determining that heavyweight code analysis is not warranted in response to a determination that the page pointed to by the IP from LBR buffer is not readable. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: A combination of hardware monitoring and binary translation software allow detection of return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits with low overhead and low false positive rates. Embodiments may use various forms of hardware to detect ROP exploits and indicate the presence of an anomaly to a device driver, which may collect data and pass the indication of the anomaly to the binary translation software to instrument the application code and determine whether an ROP exploit has been detected. Upon detection of the ROP exploit, the binary translation software may indicate the ROP exploit to an anti-malware software, which may take further remedial action as desired.