Abstract: A set of AP radios in a wireless network deployment for which configurations are to be deployed is identified. Those configurations deemed to be likely to cause a coverage hole are flagged as high-risk. A candidate deployment order for deploying configurations to the set of AP radios is determined based on deployment ordering criteria. The ordered APs are grouped into candidate deployment batches and a batch refinement process is performed to ensure that no neighbor AP radio is in a same deployment batch as an AP designated to receive a high-risk configuration deployment. The configurations are then deployed to the AP radios in accordance with the refined deployment batches. For any candidate deployment batch that includes a flagged AP radio and a neighbor AP radio, one of the radios is removed from the deployment batch and placed in a re-order list, which is separately subjected to ordering and batching processes.

Abstract: An example method for adjusting transmit powers of radios in a wireless networking device is presented. For the wireless networking device, a network management device may determine a difference between a first free-space path loss corresponding to a first Wireless-Fidelity (Wi-Fi) band and a second free-space path loss corresponding to a second Wi-Fi band. The network management device may then set transmit powers of a first radio dedicated to the first Wi-Fi band and a second radio dedicated to the second Wi-Fi band respectively to a first transmit power and a second transmit power based on the difference. Accordingly, the wireless networking device communicates via the first radio at the first transmit power and the second radio at the second transmit power.

Abstract: An example method for managing transmit powers of a networking device is presented. A network management device is configured to determine an expected path loss value at a receiver of a first networking device based at least on the distance between the first networking device and the second networking device. Further, the network management device receives a measured path loss value relative to the second networking device from the first networking device. The network management device then determines a target transmit power for the transmitter of the second networking device based on the measured path loss value and an offset value. The offset value is determined based on the expected path loss value and the measured path loss value. After determining the target transmit power, the network management device sends an instruction to the second networking device to operate the transmitter at the target transmit power.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for dynamic power allocation across a network deployment through a power consumption credits system that can balance a power budget throughout the network deployment by allocating credits to high power consuming network devices and generating credits by low-power consumption network devices. An example of the systems and methods associate a credit pool with a network deployment and map a number of credits to the credit pool based on a power budget. Credits can be allocated from the credit pool to network devices on the network deployment and/or accumulated into the credit pool from the network devices based on power consumption requirements of the network devices relative to a baseline.

Abstract: A set of AP radios to which configurations are to be deployed is identified. A candidate deployment order for deploying configurations to the set of AP radios is determined by an order-deploy algorithm. The algorithm seeks to spread out configuration deployments to AP radios both spatially and temporally such that APs that are located close to one another in the network receive their configuration updates as part of different deployment batches with delay periods introduced between consecutive batch deployments. The algorithm orders the set of APs by iterating through a network factor hierarchy to place APs that share certain network factors such as the same band or channel close to one another in the candidate deployment order and place APs that share certain other network factors (e.g., same switch, RF domain, and/or RF partition) far from one another in the order.

Abstract: Examples of techniques for handling unsolicited probe responses are disclosed. In an example, occurrence of an attack on an access point (AP) in an enterprise Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is detected based on an unsolicited probe response and Robust Security Network Information Element (RSN IE). Responsive to detecting the attack, unsolicited probe responses at the AP is disabled. Further, Fast initial Link Setup (FILS) discovery at the AP is enabled.

Abstract: An example method for providing enhanced wireless connectivity to client devices is presented. In one example, an access point is configured to monitor management frames it receives and determines if any neighbor AP advertises an unexpected regulatory setting (e.g., country code), and take corrective action if it is determined that the neighbor AP advertises an unexpected regulatory setting. In another example, a network device may be configured to manage a mobile country code (MCC) of the client device by transmitting an executable application. The executable application may ensure that the client device implements the right regulatory configuration. The proposed techniques may prevent the client device from switching to an incorrect regulatory configuration, thereby enhancing the wireless connectivity for the client device.

Abstract: In a computer network, communication connections may be established between client devices and network devices. An algorithm may be generated and used as a method to identify and resolve issues with Uplink communications between client devices and network devices. When an issue with an Uplink communication is identified, a total number of issues with the communication may be determined. Determining that the total number of issues with a communication is greater than a threshold, the client device associated with the communication may be deauthenticated from the respective network device. After a client device is deauthenticated from a network device, the total number of deauthentications may be determined with the network device. Determining the total number of deauthentications with a network device is greater than a threshold, the radio of the network device may be disabled to deauthenticate all connected client devices. Solutions may be implemented according to the issues identified.

Abstract: An example method of allocating channels to access points (AP) is presented. A network manager may determine weights of the APs based on a channel metric and a location metric for APs. Further, the network manager may identify a first set of APs based on the weights and allocate a dedicated first channel to each of the first set of APs for its sole use. Accordingly, each of the first set of APs may use a respective dedicated first channel thereby reducing the performance impact on other APs. Further, the network manager may identify a second set of APs based on the weights and allocate second channels for sharing among the second set of APs. Since the second set of APs does not share any channel with the first set of APs, the performance of the second set of APs may not be impacted due to the first set of APs.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for ensuring client device connectivity in a deployment pursuant to regulatory updates impacting channel usage or availability. An access point (AP) or AP controller may obtain a client-supported channel list, and detect existence of a regulatory update impacting channel usage in the network device. An AP-supported channel list is compared to the client-supported channel list, and a determination is made regarding which client devices associated to an AP do not support channel usage changes resulting from the regulatory update. Distribution of channels of the AP-supported channel list is controlled among one or more radios of APs in a deployment based on AP density of the deployment, and the determination regarding which client devices do not support the channel usage changes.

Abstract: Examples described herein relate to an investigator device and a method for determining a condition of an antenna of an access point (AP). At least one investigator device may receive one or more antenna condition test frames transmitted via a plurality of antennas of the AP Further, the at least one investigator device may determine an average received signal strength indicator (RSSI) value corresponding to each of the plurality of antennas based on the one or more antenna condition test frames. A condition of the plurality of antennas of the AP may be determined based on a relative comparison between the average RSSI value corresponding to each of the plurality of antennas of the AP. Moreover, in some examples, the at least one investigator device may send a notification to an administrator of the AP based on the condition of the plurality of antennas.

Abstract: Examples described herein relate to a method for managing association of a client device with a virtual access point (VAP) hosted on an access point (AP). The method includes monitoring, by the AP, data traffic corresponding to the client device associated with a first VAP. The first VAP is mapped to a first Multiple Basic Service Set Identifier (MBSSID) set configured with a first quality of service (QoS) parameter. The AP also hosts a second VAP mapped to a second MBSSID set configured with a second QoS parameter. Further, the AP determines a communication demand of the client device based on the data traffic. Furthermore, the AP steers the client device to the second VAP based on the communication demand and the second QoS parameter, and communicates with the client device through the second VAP.

Abstract: Examples of techniques for handling unsolicited probe responses are disclosed. In an example, occurrence of an attack on an access point (AP) in an enterprise Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is detected based on an unsolicited probe response and Robust Security Network Information Element (RSN IE). Responsive to detecting the attack, unsolicited probe responses at the AP is disabled. Further, Fast initial Link Setup (FILS) discovery at the AP is enabled.

Abstract: An access point (AP) in a deployment may be attacked by a rogue AP. The rogue AP may transmit fake beacons that include a fake/incorrect basic service set (BSS) color that does not match the BSS color assigned to/used by the AP under attack. Due to this BSS color mismatch, stations associated to the AP under attack may switch to the fake/incorrect BSS color, and communications between the AP under attack and the stations may be disrupted, and can eventually lead to service denial. Systems and methods are provided for leveraging the BSS color feature to identify when a rogue AP is attacking another AP. Upon detecting an attack, the BSS color feature may be disabled to mitigate the level of service disruption to the AP under attack and the stations associated to that AP.

Abstract: Examples described herein relate to an investigator device and a method for determining a condition of an antenna of an access point (AP). At least one investigator device may receive one or more antenna condition test frames transmitted via a plurality of antennas of the AP Further, the at least one investigator device may determine an average received signal strength indicator (RSSI) value corresponding to each of the plurality of antennas based on the one or more antenna condition test frames. A condition of the plurality of antennas of the AP may be determined based on a relative comparison between the average RSSI value corresponding to each of the plurality of antennas of the AP. Moreover, in some examples, the at least one investigator device may send a notification to an administrator of the AP based on the condition of the plurality of antennas.

Abstract: Systems and methods are provided for leveraging uplink (U)L scheduling information obtained by way of Quality of Service (QoS) Null/QoS Data frames and Media Access Control (MAC) headers transmitted by any station (STA). This UL scheduling information can be read by any access point (AP) in an extended service set (ESS), and used to improve network performance. For example, an AP may use such UL scheduling information (from STAs associated to co-channel APs in the same ESS) to minimize the latency for UL latency-sensitive traffic in that ESS. Additionally, an AP may use such UL scheduling information to minimize contention amongst STAs connected to different APs on the same channel in the same ESS, thereby improving system capacity.

Abstract: An access point (AP) in a deployment may be attacked by a rogue AP. The rogue AP may transmit fake beacons that include a fake/incorrect basic service set (BSS) color that does not match the BSS color assigned to/used by the AP under attack. Due to this BSS color mismatch, stations associated to the AP under attack may switch to the fake/incorrect BSS color, and communications between the AP under attack and the stations may be disrupted, and can eventually lead to service denial. Systems and methods are provided for leveraging the BSS color feature to identify when a rogue AP is attacking another AP. Upon detecting an attack, the BSS color feature may be disabled to mitigate the level of service disruption to the AP under attack and the stations associated to that AP.

Abstract: A method for protecting 802.11 ax networks includes receiving, by an access point, a plurality of Single User (SU) Quality of Service (QOS) NULL frames from a station, tracking, by the access point as the plurality of SU QOS NULL frames are received, a variable in one or more of the plurality of SU QOS NULL frames, determining, by the access point and based on tracking the variable, the station is suspicious, sending, by the access point and in response to determining the station is suspicious, a request to check a status of the variable, determining, by the access point and based on a response to the request, the station is under attack, and flagging, by the access point, the station as under an attack.

Abstract: Operation of a wireless network access point (AP) to communicate with a first set of one or more wireless client devices using a wireless protocol in which spatial reuse of channels is supported via at least a dynamically configurable basic service set (BSS) identifier of the wireless AP. The BSS identifier is utilized to identify overlapping BSSs (OBSSs). A first set of one or more wireless client devices communicate using a wireless protocol in which spatial reuse of channels is supported via at least a dynamically configurable BSS identifier of the wireless AP. The BSS identifier is utilized to identify OBSSs. Unauthorized network activity is detected based on the BSS identifier and a received BSS identifier associated with the received transmissions. A dynamic adjustment is made to one of the BSS identifiers of the AP or the received BSS identifier in response to detected unauthorized network activity.

Abstract: A method for processing a denial of service (DOS) includes: receiving a de-authentication/disassociation (D/D) frame by an access point (AP), determining by the AP a state of security association establishment between the AP and a client device, maintaining a connection between the AP and the client device if the security association is incomplete, sending a probe packet from the AP to the client device if security association is complete and the connection between the AP and the client device is in a non-PMF (protected management frames) setting, maintaining the connection if the client device responds to the probe packet, and terminating the connection if the client device does not respond to the probe packet.