Abstract: An integrated circuit includes, in part, a key management unit configured to generate a seeding key during a start-up phase, an encryption module configured to encrypt data using the seeding key and deliver the encrypted data to a second integrated circuit, and an encoder configured to encode the seeding key and deliver the encoded seeding key to the second IC. The second integrated circuit includes, in part, a decoder configured to decode the seeding key. Each of the integrated circuits further includes, in part, a linear-feedback shift register that receives the same clock signals and loads the seeding key.

Abstract: Methods and systems are directed to creating a physical unclonable function (PUF) on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and generating a unique signature for a device. The method includes, in part, designing a PUF by taking advantages of programmable logic elements on the FPGA, and extracting uninitialized values associated with one or more storage elements comprised in the PUF when the FPGA is powered up. The extracted uninitialized values can be combined to generate the unique signature for the device. The one or more storage elements can be bi-stable memory cells that are mapped to look up tables (LUTs) on the FPGA. The coordinates of these LUTs can be determined based on hamming distance analysis. Alternatively, the one or more storage elements can be memory cells associated with boundary scan cells of a boundary scan chain.

Abstract: The present disclosure describes exemplary methods and systems that are applicable for hardware authentication, counterfeit detection, and in-field tamper detection in both printed circuit board and/or integrated circuit levels by utilizing random variations in boundary-scan path delay and/or current in the industry-standard JTAG-based design-for-test structure to generate unique device identifiers.

Abstract: Methods and systems are directed to creating a physical unclonable function (PUF) on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and generating a unique signature for a device. The method includes, in part, designing a PUF by taking advantages of programmable logic elements on the FPGA, and extracting uninitialized values associated with one or more storage elements comprised in the PUF when the FPGA is powered up. The extracted uninitialized values can be combined to generate the unique signature for the device. The one or more storage elements can be bi-stable memory cells that are mapped to look up tables (LUTs) on the FPGA. The coordinates of these LUTs can be determined based on hamming distance analysis. Alternatively, the one or more storage elements can be memory cells associated with boundary scan cells of a boundary scan chain.

Abstract: An integrated circuit includes, in part, a key management unit configured to generate a seeding key during a start-up phase, an encryption module configured to encrypt data using the seeding key and deliver the encrypted data to a second integrated circuit, and an encoder configured to encode the seeding key and deliver the encoded seeding key to the second IC. The second integrated circuit includes, in part, a decoder configured to decode the seeding key. Each of the integrated circuits further includes, in part, a linear-feedback shift register that receives the same clock signals and loads the seeding key.

Abstract: The present disclosure describes exemplary methods and systems that are applicable for hardware authentication, counterfeit detection, and in-field tamper detection in both printed circuit board and/or integrated circuit levels by utilizing random variations in boundary-scan path delay and/or current in the industry-standard JTAG-based design-for-test structure to generate unique device identifiers.