Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A method performed by a processor of an aspect includes accessing an encrypted copy of a protected container page stored in a regular memory. A determination is made whether the protected container page was live stored out, while able to remain useable in, protected container memory. The method also includes either performing a given security check, before determining to store the protected container page to a destination page in a first protected container memory, if it was determined that the protected container page was live stored out, or not performing the given security check, if it was determined that the protected container page was not live stored out. Other methods, as well as processors, computer systems, and machine-readable medium providing instructions are also disclosed.

Abstract: A computer system for executing one or more software applications includes a host computer device configured to execute the one or more software applications. The computer system further includes one or more memory devices configured to cryptographically protect volatile memory of the one or more memory devices. The one or more memory devices are configured to provide access to the cryptographically protected volatile memory for the one or more software applications. The host computer device is configured to execute the one or more software applications by executing a portion of the one or more software applications associated with the cryptographically protected volatile memory using a processor of the one or more memory devices.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for extending packet processing to trusted programmable and fixed-function accelerators. Secure enclaves are created in system memory of a compute platform, wherein software code external from a secure enclave cannot access code or data within a secure enclave, and software code in a secure enclave can access code and data both within the secure enclave and external to the secure enclave. Software code for implementing packet processing operations is installed in the secure enclaves. The compute platform further includes one or more hardware-based accelerators that are used by the software to offload packet processing operations. The accelerators are configured to read packet data from input queues, process the data, and output processed data to output queues, wherein the input and output queues are located in encrypted portions of memory that may be in a secure enclave or external to the secure enclaves.

Abstract: A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Abstract: A secure enclave circuit stores an enclave page cache map to track contents of a secure enclave in system memory that stores secure data containing a page having a virtual address. An execution unit is to, in response to a request to evict the page from the secure enclave: block creation of translations of the virtual address; record one or more hardware threads currently accessing the secure data in the secure enclave; send an inter-processor interrupt to one or more cores associated with the one or more hardware threads, to cause the one or more hardware threads to exit the secure enclave and to flush translation lookaside buffers of the one or more cores; and in response to detection of a page fault associated with the virtual address for the page in the secure enclave, unblock the creation of translations of the virtual address.

Abstract: Translation lookaside buffer (TLB) tracking and managing technologies are described. A processing device comprises a translation lookaside buffer (TLB) and a processing core to execute a virtual machine monitor (VMM), the VMM to manage a virtual machine (VM) including virtual processors. The processing core to execute, via the VM, a plurality of conversion instructions on at least one of the virtual processors to convert a plurality of non-secure pages to a plurality of secure pages. The processing core also to execute, via the VM, one or more allocation instructions on the at least one of the virtual processors to allocate at least one secure page of the plurality of secure pages, execution of the one or more allocation instructions to include determining whether the TLB is cleared of mappings to the at least one secure page prior to allocating the at least one secure page.

Abstract: Instructions and logic support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure enclave page cache (EPC). An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A second processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory. A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes.

Abstract: Methods and apparatus for implemented trusted packet processing for multi-domain separatization and security. Secure enclaves are created in system memory of a compute platform configured to support a virtualized execution environment including a plurality of virtual machines (VMs) or containers, each secure enclave occupying a respective protected portion of the system memory, wherein software code external from a secure enclave cannot access code or data within a secure enclave, and software code in a secure enclave can access code and data both within the secure enclave and external to the secure enclave. Software code for implementing packet processing operations is installed in the secure enclaves. The software in the secure enclaves is then executed to perform the packet processing operations.

Abstract: A method performed by a processor of an aspect includes accessing an encrypted copy of a protected container page stored in a regular memory. A determination is made whether the protected container page was live stored out, while able to remain useable in, protected container memory. The method also includes either performing a given security check, before determining to store the protected container page to a destination page in a first protected container memory, if it was determined that the protected container page was live stored out, or not performing the given security check, if it was determined that the protected container page was not live stored out. Other methods, as well as processors, computer systems, and machine-readable medium providing instructions are also disclosed.

Abstract: A method performed by a processor of an aspect includes accessing an encrypted copy of a protected container page stored in a regular memory. A determination is made whether the protected container page was live stored out, while able to remain useable in, protected container memory. The method also includes either performing a given security check, before determining to store the protected container page to a destination page in a first protected container memory, if it was determined that the protected container page was live stored out, or not performing the given security check, if it was determined that the protected container page was not live stored out. Other methods, as well as processors, computer systems, and machine-readable medium providing instructions are also disclosed.

Abstract: A secure migration enclave is provided to identify a launch of a particular virtual machine on a host computing system, where the particular virtual machine is launched to include a secure quoting enclave to perform an attestation of one or more aspects of the virtual machine. A root key for the particular virtual machine is generated using the secure migration enclave hosted on the host computing system for use in association with provisioning the secure quoting enclave with an attestation key to be used in the attestation. The migration enclave registers the root key with a virtual machine registration service.

Abstract: A secure enclave circuit stores an enclave page cache map to track contents of a secure enclave in system memory that stores secure data containing a page having a virtual address. An execution unit is to, in response to a request to evict the page from the secure enclave: block creation of translations of the virtual address; record one or more hardware threads currently accessing the secure data in the secure enclave; send an inter-processor interrupt to one or more cores associated with the one or more hardware threads, to cause the one or more hardware threads to exit the secure enclave and to flush translation lookaside buffers of the one or more cores; and in response to detection of a page fault associated with the virtual address for the page in the secure enclave, unblock the creation of translations of the virtual address.

Abstract: Implementations of the disclosure provide for supporting oversubscription of guest enclave memory pages. In one implementation, a processing device comprising a memory controller unit to access a secure enclave and a processor core, operatively coupled to the memory controller unit. The processing device is to identify a target memory page in memory. The target memory page is associated with a secure enclave of a virtual machine (VM). A data structure comprising context information corresponding to the target memory page is received. A state of the target memory page is determined based on the received data structure. The state indicating whether the target memory page is associated with at least one of: a child memory page or a parent memory page of the VM. Thereupon, an instruction to evict the target memory page from the secure enclave is generated based on the determined state.

Abstract: A processor of an aspect includes a decode unit to decode an instruction. The instruction to indicate a first structure in a protected container memory and to indicate a second structure in the protected container memory. The processor also includes an execution unit coupled with the decode unit. The execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to determine whether a status indicator is configured to allow at least one key to be exchanged between the first and second structures, and is to exchange the at least one key between the first and second structures when the status indicator is configured to allow the at least one key to be exchanged between the first and second structures.

Abstract: In a method for protecting extra-enclave communications, a data processing system allocates a portion of random access memory (RAM) to a server application that is to execute at a low privilege level, and the data processing system creates an enclave comprising the portion of RAM allocated to the server application. The enclave protects the RAM in the enclave from access by software that executes at a high privilege level. The server application obtains a platform attestation report (PAR) for the enclave from the processor. The PAR includes attestation data from the processor attesting to integrity of the enclave. The server application also generates a public key certificate for the server application. The public key certificate comprises the attestation data. The server application utilizes the public key certificate to establish a transport layer security (TLS) communication channel with a client application outside of the enclave. Other embodiments are described and claimed.