Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: Methods, computer code products and systems for authenticating user equipment for access to a trusted network can include receiving a user identity uniquely identifying the user equipment. A proxying entity in the trusted network can generate a network-trusted header including the user identity and forward it to a serving entity in the network. The serving entity performs verification on the received carrier header and can compare the user identity with a list of approved user IDs and if a match is found, the user equipment can be authenticated for access to the network. IBCF that performs optional hiding for the proxying entity toward the Home IMS network can extract the proxying entity-generated parameter out of the encrypted token making it readable to the serving entity if it is encrypted in the carrier header. The proxying entity can also provide verification of the utilized header when processing the registration request from the user equipment.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: Methods, computer code products and systems for authenticating user equipment for access to a trusted network can include receiving a user identity uniquely identifying the user equipment. A proxying entity in the trusted network can generate a network-trusted header including the user identity and forward it to a serving entity in the network. The serving entity performs verification on the received carrier header and can compare the user identity with a list of approved user IDs and if a match is found, the user equipment can be authenticated for access to the network. IBCF that performs optional hiding for the proxying entity toward the Home IMS network can extract the proxying entity-generated parameter out of the encrypted token making it readable to the serving entity if it is encrypted in the carrier header. The proxying entity can also provide verification of the utilized header when processing the registration request from the user equipment.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed. A User Mobility Server (UMS) receives a first query from a first call state control function (CSCF). The UMS transmits a call setup and a subscriber identity to a servicing-call state control function (S-CSCF). The S-CSCF may have no record of the subscriber identity due to a restart are some other event. The UMS receives a second query from the S-CSCF based in part of the subscriber identity. The UMS transmits a home address of a mobile station to the S-CSCF. The UMS may also transmit a profile download to the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed which forwards a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS including the subscriber's TA. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the HSS. The HSS may store data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive. The technique may also include forwarding a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS and storing data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive in the S-CSCF so as to be protected against loss. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data including the subscriber's TA may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed which forwards a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS including the subscriber's TA. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the HSS. The HSS may store data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive. The technique may also include forwarding a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS and storing data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive in the S-CSCF so as to be protected against loss. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data including the subscriber's TA may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A technique for protecting location information of a subscriber in a mobile network is disclosed which forwards a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS including the subscriber's TA. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the HSS. The HSS may store data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive. The technique may also include forwarding a registration request from the subscriber to an S-CSCF including the subscriber's TA and then forwarding a location update from the S-CSCF to an HSS and storing data in a non-volatile memory such as a hard disk drive in the S-CSCF so as to be protected against loss. Upon the S-CSCF losing data, lost data including the subscriber's TA may be restored to the S-CSCF from the data stored in the S-CSCF.

Abstract: A method for registering a session initiation protocol (SIP) client to an internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS), in which a SIP client having a given IP address, public identity and private identity sends a registration request to a session border controller (SBC) for registering the public identity to the IMS, the SBC responsively causes an authorization request to be sent to another network entity in the IMS, the authorization request indicating the IP address of the SIP client and a private identity, the another network entity obtaining from an LDAP/AAA server a reference address based on the private identity and deciding whether to allow the authorization of the public identity to the IMS based on the correspondence between the reference address and the IP address of the SIP client.

Abstract: Methods, computer code products and systems for authenticating user equipment for access to a trusted network can include receiving a user identity uniquely identifying the user equipment. A proxying entity in the trusted network can generate a network-trusted header including the user identity and forward it to a serving entity in the network. The serving entity performs verification on the received carrier header and can compare the user identity with a list of approved user IDs and if a match is found, the user equipment can be authenticated for access to the network. IBCF that performs optional hiding for the proxying entity toward the Home IMS network can extract the proxying entity-generated parameter out of the encrypted token making it readable to the serving entity if it is encrypted in the carrier header. The proxying entity can also provide verification of the utilized header when processing the registration request from the user equipment.

Abstract: Authentication of a user of a communication system includes a proxy server interfacing with a plurality of access networks, a session control server and an authentication server. Authentication includes detecting, at the proxy server, an access network from the plurality of access networks, to which a user to be authenticated is attached; determining, at the proxy server, a security-related attribute of the detected access network, and notifying the determined security-related attribute from the proxy server to the session control server.

Abstract: A method and a system for providing access to an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) for a subscriber roaming in a visited communication network are described. A subscriber equipment determines that a visited network IMS is not accessible and sends a register message for registering to an IMS to a control entity in the home communication network of the subscriber. The control entity recognizes that the register message is received directly from a subscriber equipment, and an access entity for accessing the IMS of the home network is assigned. Then, the control entity sends a message to the subscriber equipment which message comprises the address of the access entity.