Abstract: The attack vectors for some denial-of-service cyber attacks on the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) are bad, bogus, or unregistered domain name DNS requests to resolve domain names that are not registered in the DNS. Some other cyber attacks steal sensitive data by encoding the data in bogus domain names, or domain names otherwise not registered in the DNS, that are transferred across networks in bogus DNS requests. A DNS gatekeeper may filter in-transit packets containing DNS requests and may efficiently determine if a request's domain name is registered in the DNS. When the domain name is not registered in the DNS, the DNS gatekeeper may take one of a plurality of protective actions. The DNS gatekeeper drops requests determined not to be legitimate, which may prevent an attack.

Abstract: A method of forming a buried implanted region in a silicon carbide semiconductor layer includes implanting first dopant ions into the silicon carbide semiconductor layer at a first dose and first implant energy to form a first channelized doping profile having a first de-channeled peak at a first depth in the silicon carbide semiconductor layer and a first channeled peak at a second depth that is greater than the first depth. Second dopant ions are implanted into the silicon carbide semiconductor layer at a second dose and second implant energy to form a second channelized doping profile. The second channelized doping profile has a second channeled peak at a third depth in the silicon carbide semiconductor layer that is between the first depth and the second depth. The first channelized doping profile and the second channelized doping profile form a combined doping profile that defines the buried implanted region.

Abstract: Eyewear, such as a goggle, includes a movable unitary lens and a chassis. The movable unitary lens includes an interior surface. The chassis includes a body that defines a central opening, and the body is configured to be worn on the face of a wearer. The chassis further includes a barrier that is integrally formed with the body, and the barrier includes an exterior surface that contacts the interior surface of the lens along a perimeter of the lens so as to form a seal with the lens.

Abstract: Disclosed is a ceramic sintered body comprising magnesium aluminate spinel of composition MgAl2O4 having from 90 to 100% by volume of a cubic crystallographic structure and a density of from 3.47 to 3.58 g/cc, wherein the ceramic sintered body is free of sintering aids. A method of making the ceramic sintered body comprising spinel is also disclosed.

Abstract: In some variations, first and second rule sets may be received by a network protection device. The first and second rule sets may be preprocessed. The network protection device may be configured to process packets in accordance with the first rule set. Packets may be received by the network protection device. A first portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the first rule set. The network protection device may be reconfigured to process packets in accordance with the second rule set. A second portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the second rule set.

Abstract: Disclosed is a cordierite sintered body comprising from 90 to 98% by volume of a cordierite crystal phase as measured using x ray diffraction, SEM and image processing methods wherein the cordierite sintered body has at least one surface comprising pores having a diameter of from 0.1 to 5 um as measured using SEM and image processing methods. The cordierite sintered body has a Young's modulus of about 125 GPa or greater, and volumetric porosity of less than about 4%. Methods of making the cordierite sintered body are also disclosed.

Abstract: Packets may be received by a packet security gateway. Responsive to a determination that an overload condition has occurred in one or more networks associated with the packet security gateway, a first group of packet filtering rules may be applied to at least some of the packets. Applying the first group of packet filtering rules may include allowing at least a first portion of the packets to continue toward their respective destinations. Responsive to a determination that the overload condition has been mitigated, a second group of packet filtering rules may be applied to at least some of the packets. Applying the second group of packet filtering rules may include allowing at least a second portion of the packets to continue toward their respective destinations.

Abstract: A coding apparatus is mounted on a jumper cable. The coding apparatus includes a plurality of coding symbols. A selection mechanism is part of the coding apparatus and is operable to reveal a selected plurality of coding symbols of the plurality of coding symbols. The selected plurality of coding symbols, in combination, provide a code identifying a connection location for the jumper cable.

Abstract: A mechanical tilt mounting system for a base station antenna includes a fixed pivot that connects the antenna to a support structure. The antenna is rotatable about the fixed pivot. An adjustable control arm has a first end connected to the antenna and a second end connected to the support structure. Extension and contraction of the adjustable arm rotates the antenna about the fixed pivot to change the angle of inclination of the antenna.

Abstract: In some variations, first and second rule sets may be received by a network protection device. The first and second rule sets may be preprocessed. The network protection device may be configured to process packets in accordance with the first rule set. Packets may be received by the network protection device. A first portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the first rule set. The network protection device may be reconfigured to process packets in accordance with the second rule set. A second portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the second rule set.

Abstract: Disclosed herein is a sintered ceramic body comprising from 90% to 99.9% by volume of polycrystalline yttrium aluminum garnet (YAG) as measured using XRD and image processing methods and a volumetric porosity of from 0.1 to 4% as calculated from density measurements performed in accordance with ASTM B962-17. The sintered ceramic body may have a total purity of 99.99% and greater and a grain size of from 0.3 to 8 ?m. A method of making the sintered ceramic body is also disclosed.

Abstract: In some variations, first and second rule sets may be received by a network protection device. The first and second rule sets may be preprocessed. The network protection device may be configured to process packets in accordance with the first rule set. Packets may be received by the network protection device. A first portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the first rule set. The network protection device may be reconfigured to process packets in accordance with the second rule set. A second portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the second rule set.

Abstract: Packets may be received by a packet security gateway. Responsive to a determination that an overload condition has occurred in one or more networks associated with the packet security gateway, a first group of packet filtering rules may be applied to at least some of the packets. Applying the first group of packet filtering rules may include allowing at least a first portion of the packets to continue toward their respective destinations. Responsive to a determination that the overload condition has been mitigated, a second group of packet filtering rules may be applied to at least some of the packets. Applying the second group of packet filtering rules may include allowing at least a second portion of the packets to continue toward their respective destinations.

Abstract: In some variations, first and second rule sets may be received by a network protection device. The first and second rule sets may be preprocessed. The network protection device may be configured to process packets in accordance with the first rule set. Packets may be received by the network protection device. A first portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the first rule set. The network protection device may be reconfigured to process packets in accordance with the second rule set. A second portion of the packets may be processed in accordance with the second rule set.

Abstract: Methods and systems for protecting a secured network are presented. For example, one or more packet security gateways may be associated with a security policy management server. At each packet security gateway, a dynamic security policy may be received from the security policy management server, packets associated with a network protected by the packet security gateway may be received, and at least one of multiple packet transformation functions specified by the dynamic security policy may be performed on the packets.

Abstract: A connector assembly includes a connector body with an elongated shape and a longitudinal axis. The connector body defines a port at a first end configured to receive a proximal portion of a lead or lead extension. Contact assemblies are axially spaced-apart within the connector body and collectively form a lumen that extends from the port along the longitudinal axis of the connector body. Each contact assembly includes a spring contact disposed within a contact housing. The spring contact has a contact region that extends diagonally with respect to the longitudinal axis of the connector body. The contact region is positioned within the contact housing so that insertion of the proximal portion of the lead or lead extension into the contact housing results in a bending deflection of the contact region of the spring contact while maintaining contact between the contact region and the lead or lead extension.

Abstract: Methods and systems for protecting a secured network are presented. For example, one or more packet security gateways may be associated with a security policy management server. At each packet security gateway, a dynamic security policy may be received from the security policy management server, packets associated with a network protected by the packet security gateway may be received, and at least one of multiple packet transformation functions specified by the dynamic security policy may be performed on the packets.

Abstract: A system is described that includes a transmitter for generating a magnetic field comprising a first detection region and a second detection region, wherein the first detection region is different than the second detection region. The system comprises a receiver configured to detect at a location of the receiver in the magnetic field a magnetic field vector, a polarity, and at least one additional vector. The system comprises the receiver configured to use the magnetic field vector, the polarity, and the at least one additional vector to determine a position of the receiver in the magnetic field.

Abstract: A packet gateway may protect TCP/IP networks by enforcing security policies on in-transit packets that are crossing network boundaries. The policies may include packet filtering rules derived from cyber threat intelligence (CTI). The rapid growth in the volume of CTI and in the size of associated CTI-derived policies, coupled with ever-increasing network link speeds and network traffic volume, may cause the costs of sufficient computational resources to be prohibitive. To efficiently process packets, a packet gateway may be provided with at least one probabilistic data structure, such as a Bloom filter, for testing packets to determine if packet data may match a packet filtering rule. Packet filtering rules may be grouped into subsets of rules, and a data structure may be provided for determining a matching subset of rules associated with a particular packet.

Abstract: The attack vectors for some denial-of-service cyber attacks on the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) are bad, bogus, or unregistered domain name DNS requests to resolve domain names that are not registered in the DNS. Some other cyber attacks steal sensitive data by encoding the data in bogus domain names, or domain names otherwise not registered in the DNS, that are transferred across networks in bogus DNS requests. A DNS gatekeeper may filter in-transit packets containing DNS requests and may efficiently determine if a request's domain name is registered in the DNS. When the domain name is not registered in the DNS, the DNS gatekeeper may take one of a plurality of protective actions. The DNS gatekeeper drops requests determined not to be legitimate, which may prevent an attack.