Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for establishing a shared secret-key for secure communication between nodes in a wireless network. A first node in the wireless network provides a spreading code to a second node of the wireless network. The second node provides a first input for the key establishment to the first node using communication encoded with the spreading code. Responsive to obtaining the first input from the second node, the first node provides a second input for the key establishment to the second node using communication encoded with the spreading code. Then, the first node and the second node establish the shared secret-key using the first input and the second input.

Abstract: A pairwise key-agreement scheme is provided for creating key agreements non-interactively between pairs of nodes disposed in a hierarchy of nodes. The scheme is non-interactive so that any two nodes can agree on a shared secret key without interaction. In addition, the scheme is identity-based so that any given node only needs to know the identity of peer nodes to compute the shared secret key. All of the nodes are arranged in a hierarchy where an intermediate node in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for each of its children from its own secret key and the identity of the child. Accordingly, the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of any number of leaves in the hierarchy and of a threshold number of nodes in the upper levels of the hierarchy. The scheme is well-suited for environments such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), which are very dynamic, have acute bandwidth-constraints and have many nodes are vulnerable to compromise.

Abstract: A random number generator (RNG) resistant to side channel attacks includes an activation pseudo random number generator (APRNG) having an activation output connected to an activation seed input to provide a next seed to the activation seed input. A second random number generator includes a second seed input, which receives the next seed and a random data output, which outputs random data in accordance with the next seed. An input seed memory is connected to the activation seed input and a feedback connection from the activation output so that the next seed is stored in the input seed memory to be used by the APRNG as the activation seed input at a next startup cycle.

Abstract: A mechanism is provided for establishing a shared secret-key for secure communication between nodes in a wireless network. A first node in the wireless network provides a spreading code to a second node of the wireless network. The second node provides a first input for the key establishment to the first node using communication encoded with the spreading code. Responsive to obtaining the first input from the second node, the first node provides a second input for the key establishment to the second node using communication encoded with the spreading code. Then, the first node and the second node establish the shared secret-key using the first input and the second input.

Abstract: A method, system and computer program product are disclosed for compressing encrypted data, wherein the data is encrypted by using a block encryption algorithm in a chained mode of operation, and the encrypted data is comprised of a set of N encrypted blocks, C1 . . . CN. In one embodiment, the method comprises leaving block CN uncompressed, and compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN in a defined sequence using a Slepian-Wolf code. In an embodiment, the data is encrypted using an encryption key K, and the compressing includes compressing all of the blocks C1 . . . CN without using the encryption key. In one embodiment, the compressing includes outputting the blocks C1 . . . CN as a set of compressed blocks CmprC1 . . . CmprCN-1, and the method further comprises decrypting CN to generate a reconstructed block {tilde over (X)}n, and decrypting and decompressing the set of compressed blocks using {tilde over (X)}n.

Abstract: A pairwise key-agreement scheme is provided for creating key agreements non-interactively between pairs of nodes disposed in a hierarchy of nodes. The scheme is non-interactive so that any two nodes can agree on a shared secret key without interaction. In addition, the scheme is identity-based so that any given node only needs to know the identity of peer nodes to compute the shared secret key. All of the nodes are arranged in a hierarchy where an intermediate node in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for each of its children from its own secret key and the identity of the child. Accordingly, the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of any number of leaves in the hierarchy and of a threshold number of nodes in the upper levels of the hierarchy. The scheme is well-suited for environments such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), which are very dynamic, have acute bandwidth-constraints and have many nodes are vulnerable to compromise.

Abstract: A random number generator (RNG) resistant to side channel attacks includes an activation pseudo random number generator (APRNG) having an activation output connected to an activation seed input to provide a next seed to the activation seed input. A second random number generator includes a second seed input, which receives the next seed and a random data output, which outputs random data in accordance with the next seed. An input seed memory is connected to the activation seed input and a feedback connection from the activation output so that the next seed is stored in the input seed memory to be used by the APRNG as the activation seed input at a next startup cycle.

Abstract: A random number generator (RNG) resistant to side channel attacks includes an activation pseudo random number generator (APRNG) having an activation output connected to an activation seed input to provide a next seed to the activation seed input. A second random number generator includes a second seed input, which receives the next seed and a random data output, which outputs random data in accordance with the next seed. An input seed memory is connected to the activation seed input and a feedback connection from the activation output so that the next seed is stored in the input seed memory to be used by the APRNG as the activation seed input at a next startup cycle.

Abstract: A random number generator (RNG) resistant to side channel attacks includes an activation pseudo random number generator (APRNG) having an activation output connected to an activation seed input to provide a next seed to the activation seed input. A second random number generator includes a second seed input, which receives the next seed and a random data output, which outputs random data in accordance with the next seed. An input seed memory is connected to the activation seed input and a feedback connection from the activation output so that the next seed is stored in the input seed memory to be used by the APRNG as the activation seed input at a next startup cycle.

Abstract: This invention is a method and apparatus which provide a solution to the problem of constructing efficient and secure digital signature schemes. It presents a signature scheme that can be proven to be existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack, assuming a variant of the RSA conjecture. This scheme is not based on “signature trees”, but instead it uses a “hash-and-sign” paradigm, while maintaining provable security. The security proof is based on well-defined and reasonable assumptions made on the cryptographic hash function in use. In particular, it does not model this function as a random oracle. The signature scheme which is described in this invention is efficient. Further, it is “stateless”, in the sense that the signer does not need to keep any state, other than the secret key, for the purpose of generating signatures.

Abstract: A method of performing biometric authentication of a person's identity including a biometric template prior to storing it in a biometric database. The encryption algorithm encrypts the biometric template using a pass-phrase, known only to the individual, to generate the cryptographic key used to store and retrieve the biometric template. When an individual wishes to access a secured resource, he must be authenticated by providing an identifier which is used to retrieve the appropriate record. He must also provide the correct password to allow the system to decrypt the model.