Abstract: A computer-implemented method for preventing fault injection attacks through a back side of a die can include providing a stacked silicon die. The method can also include providing an oxide layer on a back side of the stacked silicon die. The method can further include permanently attaching a selective glass carrier to the oxide layer in a position that restricts voltage glitches from reaching a power subsystem of the stacked silicon die. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Abstract: A chip package includes a package substrate and an integrated circuit (IC) die disposed on the package substrate. The IC dies includes a security asset. The chip package also includes a glass based shield selectively disposed on the IC die and above the security asset. The glass based shield is configured to block access to the security asset. In some embodiments, the chip package includes an oxide layer disposed between the glass based shield and the IC die. In some embodiments, the chip package includes a detection module and a wire connecting the detection module to the glass based shield. The detection module is configured to generate and send a serial bit stream to the glass based shield. The detection module is also configured to monitor for changes in the serial bit stream returning from the glass based shield. Changes detected in the serial bit stream indicates the glass based shield has been tampered.