Abstract: The present invention relates to a method of secure generation by a client device A and a server device B of at least a RSA current signature and a RSA next signature with a private exponent component d of an RSA key, comprising: •a handshake phase (P1) comprising: a. receiving (S1) a handshake request comprising a hash of the next client value (pvA_next), b.

Abstract: The present invention relates to a method of secure generation by a client device and a server device of an RSA signature of a message to be signed with a private exponent component d of an RSA key (p, q, N, d, e), wherein said client device stores a client device private exponent component dA, a client value, and a client dynamic offset, and said server device stores a server device private exponent component dB, where dB=d?dA modulo phi(N), a server value, a server dynamic offset and a failure counter, comprising: a. receiving from the client device a client part of said RSA signature (HS1) of said message to be signed, after incrementing its client value (pvA) by a first predetermined step E, from the client device private exponent component and from an updated client dynamic offset function of said client dynamic offset and of said client value, b. setting said failure counter to a first default value, c. incrementing said server value (pvB) by a second predetermined step (E?), d.

Abstract: The present invention relates to a method of secure generation by a client device A and a server device B of at least a RSA current signature and a RSA next signature with a private exponent component d of an RSA key, comprising: •a handshake phase (P1) comprising: a. receiving (S1) a handshake request comprising a hash of the next client value (pvA_next), b.

Abstract: The present invention relates to a method of secure generation by a client device and a server device of an RSA signature of a message to be signed with a private exponent component d of an RSA key (p, q, N, d, e), wherein said client device stores a client device private exponent component dA, a client value, and a client dynamic offset, and said server device stores a server device private exponent component dB, where dB=d?dA modulo phi(N), a server value, a server dynamic offset and a failure counter, comprising: a. receiving from the client device a client part of said RSA signature (HS1) of said message to be signed, after incrementing its client value (pvA) by a first predetermined step E, from the client device private exponent component and from an updated client dynamic offset function of said client dynamic offset and of said client value, b. setting said failure counter to a first default value, c. incrementing said server value (pvB) by a second predetermined step (E?), d.