Abstract: A method of authenticating a first device to a second device, where the first device stores a first list of data groups, includes the following steps: a) sending, by the second device to the first device, a second list of information relative to data; b) sending, by the first device to the second device, a third list of images, by a first function, of data of said first list of data groups, having as information that of said second list of information relative to data; and c) verifying, by the second device, whether the images of the data of said third list of images comply with the data of a fourth list of data groups corresponding to the image of the first list of data groups by a second function having its information comprised in the second list of information relative to data.

Abstract: The present disclosure relates to a generation method, adapted to be executed by an electronic device, of an first uniformly random vector comprising n first elements, n being an integer equal or greater than two, comprising generating a second uniformly random vector comprising n second elements; generating m third elements, m being an integer equal or greater than one; generating a third uniformly random vectors comprising 1 third elements and n?1 second elements, and having third elements (b0, . . . , bn-1) different from the second elements at the same position in the second uniformly random vector and the other third uniformly random vectors; and calculating the first elements by applying an unmasking function to the second elements and to the m third elements.

Abstract: A device multiplies a first public key by a first scalar value, generating an intermediate result. The first public key corresponds to a point on an elliptic curve of order n, n is an integer, and the first scalar value is equal to n/m where in is a largest prime integer factor of n. The device determines whether the intermediate result is equal to a value corresponding to a point O at infinity on the elliptic curve. In response to the determining indicating the intermediate result is different from the value corresponding to the point O, the device multiplies the intermediate result by a second scalar, generating a shared secret value. The device performs one or more processing operations using the generated shared secret value. Otherwise, the device may initiate error processing without generating the shared secret value.

Abstract: Various examples in accordance with the present disclosure provide example methods, systems, and apparatuses that may compute Hamming weight of a bit string.

Abstract: A method includes performing a cryptographic operation using a processing device. The performing the cryptographic operation includes protecting the performing of the cryptographic operation against side channel attacks by selecting a value amongst two values based on a selection bit. Selecting the value includes concatenating the two values in a register, generating a concatenated word including the two values in two distinct portions of the concatenated word in the register. The concatenated word is rotated according to the value of the selection bit to position the selected value in a determined portion of the concatenated word in the register amongst said two portions. The unselected value in the concatenated word is suppressed. One or more processing operations is performed based on a result of the cryptographic operation.

Abstract: Cryptographic circuitry, in operation, generates N first pairs of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) keys r(i), R(i), with i varying from 1 to N, using K second pairs of ECC keys p(k), P(k), with k varying from 1 to K, wherein K is smaller than N. Each pair r(i), R(i) of the first pairs of keys is a linear combination of pairs of the second pairs of ECC keys according to: ? i ? [ 1 ; N ] ? { r ? ( l ) = ? j = 1 K A ? ( i , j ) * p ? ( j ) R ? ( i ) = ? j = 1 K A ? ( i , j ) * P ? ( j ) , wherein A(i,j) designates a general term of a matrix A of size N*K, and all the sub-matrices of size K*K are invertible. The cryptographic circuitry, in operation, executes cryptographic operations using one or more pairs of the first pairs of ECC keys.

Abstract: A device multiplies a first public key by a first scalar value, generating an intermediate result. The first public key corresponds to a point on an elliptic curve of order n, n is an integer, and the first scalar value is equal to n/m where in is a largest prime integer factor of n. The device determines whether the intermediate result is equal to a value corresponding to a point O at infinity on the elliptic curve. In response to the determining indicating the intermediate result is different from the value corresponding to the point O, the device multiplies the intermediate result by a second scalar, generating a shared secret value. The device performs one or more processing operations using the generated shared secret value. Otherwise, the device may initiate error processing without generating the shared secret value.

Abstract: Cryptographic circuitry, in operation, generates N first pairs of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) keys r(i), R(i), with i varying from 1 to N, using K second pairs of ECC keys p(k), P(k), with k varying from 1 to K, wherein K is smaller than N. Each pair r(i), R(i) of the first pairs of keys is a linear combination of pairs of the second pairs of ECC keys according to: ? ? i ? [ 1 ; N ] ? { r ? ( l ) = ? j = 1 K ? A ? ( i , j ) * p ? ( j ) R ? ( i ) = ? j = 1 K ? A ? ( i , j ) * P ? ( j ) , wherein A(i,j) designates a general term of a matrix A of size N*K, and all the sub-matrices of size K*K are invertible. The cryptographic circuitry, in operation, executes cryptographic operations using one or more pairs of the first pairs of ECC keys.

Abstract: A device can be used for compensating bandwidth mismatches of time interleaved analog to digital converters. A processor of the device determines, for each original sample stream, an estimated difference between the time constant of a low pass filter representative of the corresponding converter and a reference time constant of a reference low pass filter, and uses this estimated difference and a filtered stream to correct the original stream and deliver a corrected stream of corrected samples.

Abstract: A device can be used for compensating bandwith mismatches of time interleaved analog to digital converters. A processor of the device determines, for each original sample stream, an estimated difference between the time constant of a low pass filter representative of the corresponding converter and a reference time constant of a reference low pass filter, and uses this estimated difference and a filtered stream to correct the original stream and deliver a corrected stream of corrected samples.

Abstract: According to one mode of implementation, a method includes an estimation including on the one hand a correlation processing involving at least one part of the sampled signal, at least one part of at least one first signal gleaned from a derived signal representative of a temporal derivative of the sampled signal and at least one part of N partial filtered signals respectively representative of N weighted differences between N pairs of bracketing versions flanking the sampled signal, N being greater than or equal to 1. On the other hand, the estimation includes a matrix processing on the results of this correlation processing. Correction processing of the M?1 trains involves respectively M?1 second signals gleaned from the derived signal and the suite of M?1 shift coefficients.

Abstract: According to one mode of implementation, a method includes an estimation including on the one hand a correlation processing involving at least one part of the sampled signal, at least one part of at least one first signal gleaned from a derived signal representative of a temporal derivative of the sampled signal and at least one part of N partial filtered signals respectively representative of N weighted differences between N pairs of bracketing versions flanking the sampled signal, N being greater than or equal to 1. On the other hand, the estimation includes a matrix processing on the results of this correlation processing. Correction processing of the M?1 trains involves respectively M?1 second signals gleaned from the derived signal and the suite of M?1 shift coefficients.