Abstract: Methods for gaining profit of a sponsored keyword auctioneer are described herein. The method begins with holding a local keyword auction, and receiving bids for it, wherein each bid is for the right to display one advertisement associated with the bid in response to the bid being allocated along with one keyword. Bid for the same keyword at other auctions are placed. Once the bidders of the local keyword auction to adjust bids, the bid at the external auction is changed by utilizing a forward looking Nash equilibrium response function.

Abstract: Systems and methods for facilitating more efficient bidding in an ad-words auction are described herein. An auctioning component can employ a forward-looking Nash equilibrium to facilitate an ad-words auction. A bidding component can enable bidding agents to place bids in the ad-words auction as a function of dynamically considering at least existing strategies of other bidding agents and future responses of the other bidding agents. Bidding agents associated with bids comprising higher true private values can obtain advertisement slots within the ad-words auction that are associated with a higher order of attractiveness to viewers—a bidding agent's true private value can be based on, at least in part, the bidding agent's estimate of value that at least one user interested in a particular keyword places on the bidding agent's product(s) and/or service(s).

Abstract: Systems and methods for facilitating more efficient bidding in an ad-words auction are described herein. An auctioning component can employ a forward-looking Nash equilibrium to facilitate an ad-words auction. A bidding component can enable bidding agents to place bids in the ad-words auction as a function of dynamically considering at least existing strategies of other bidding agents and future responses of the other bidding agents. Bidding agents associated with bids comprising higher true private values can obtain advertisement slots within the ad-words auction that are associated with a higher order of attractiveness to viewers—a bidding agent's true private value can be based on, at least in part, the bidding agent's estimate of value that at least one user interested in a particular keyword places on the bidding agent's product(s) and/or service(s).

Abstract: Methods for gaining profit of a sponsored keyword auctioneer are described herein. The method begins with holding a local keyword auction, and receiving bids for it, wherein each bid is for the right to display one advertisement associated with the bid in response to the bid being allocated along with one keyword. Bid for the same keyword at other auctions are placed. Once the bidders of the local keyword auction to adjust bids, the bid at the external auction is changed by utilizing a forward looking Nash equilibrium response function.