Abstract: Systems and methods for secure modular hardware binding in a Data Center Modular Hardware System (DC-SCM) environment are described herein. According to one embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), and computer-executable logic to, for each of the CPLDs: store an encrypted secret key in a platform Root-of-Trust (RoT) and the CPLD, and receive, by the platform RoT, a request to authenticate a firmware stack installed on the CPLD. The logic may then present, by the CPLD, an encrypted secret key to the platform RoT, authenticate, by the platform RoT, the firmware stack by comparing the encrypted secret key received from the CPLD with its stored version of the encrypted secret key, and allow operation of the CPLD based on the authentication.

Abstract: Systems and methods include Information Handling Systems (IHSs) that include one or more HPMs (Host Processor Modules), each comprising one or more CPLDs (Complex Programmable Logic Devices). Each CPLD is operated through execution of firmware, and is identified by unique hardware identifiers, and is operated using configurable settings. Each of the CPLDs is configured to transmit a bitstream of the firmware to a DC-SCM while loading the firmware for execution. The DC-SCM (Data Center Secure Control Module) determines whether the signed bitstream transmitted by each of the CPLDs matches a golden firmware measurement maintained for each respective CPLD. The DC-SCM also determines whether the unique identifiers of each of the CPLDs matches a golden hardware identity measurement maintained for each respective CPLD. The DC-SCM also determines whether the configurable settings in use by each of the CPLDs matches a golden configuration settings measurement maintained for each respective CPLD.

Abstract: Systems and methods for mutual trust establishment among components of an Information Handling System (IHS) are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an IHS may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory coupled to the processor, wherein the at least one memory comprises program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to: obtain a plurality of identifiers for a respective plurality of CPLDs or FPGAs, including an identifier for a first CPLD or FPGA; and provide to a second CPLD or FPGA an expected handshake token for the first CPLD or FPGA, wherein the expected handshake token is based, at least in part, on the identifier for the first CPLD or FPGA, and wherein the second CPLD or FPGA uses the expected handshake token to establish trust for communication with the first CPLD or FPGA.

Abstract: Systems and methods include Information Handling Systems (IHSs) that include one or more HPMs (Host Processor Modules), each comprising one or more CPLDs (Complex Programmable Logic Devices). Each CPLD is operated through execution of firmware, and is identified by unique hardware identifiers, and is operated using configurable settings. Each of the CPLDs is configured to transmit a bitstream of the firmware to a DC-SCM while loading the firmware for execution. The DC-SCM (Data Center Secure Control Module) determines whether the signed bitstream transmitted by each of the CPLDs matches a golden firmware measurement maintained for each respective CPLD. The DC-SCM also determines whether the unique identifiers of each of the CPLDs matches a golden hardware identity measurement maintained for each respective CPLD. The DC-SCM also determines whether the configurable settings in use by each of the CPLDs matches a golden configuration settings measurement maintained for each respective CPLD.

Abstract: Systems and methods for mutual trust establishment among components of an Information Handling System (IHS) are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an IHS may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory coupled to the processor, wherein the at least one memory comprises program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to: obtain a plurality of identifiers for a respective plurality of CPLDs or FPGAs, including an identifier for a first CPLD or FPGA; and provide to a second CPLD or FPGA an expected handshake token for the first CPLD or FPGA, wherein the expected handshake token is based, at least in part, on the identifier for the first CPLD or FPGA, and wherein the second CPLD or FPGA uses the expected handshake token to establish trust for communication with the first CPLD or FPGA.

Abstract: Systems and methods for secure modular hardware binding in a Data Center Modular Hardware System (DC-SCM) environment are described herein. According to one embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), and computer-executable logic to, for each of the CPLDs: store an encrypted secret key in a platform Root-of-Trust (ROT) and the CPLD, and receive, by the platform ROT, a request to authenticate a firmware stack installed on the CPLD. The logic may then present, by the CPLD, an encrypted secret key to the platform ROT, authenticate, by the platform ROT, the firmware stack by comparing the encrypted secret key received from the CPLD with its stored version of the encrypted secret key, and allow operation of the CPLD based on the authentication.

Abstract: A vehicle theft prevention device detachably connected to a vehicle, the vehicle theft prevention device including a switch assembly, and an ignition disabler assembly connected to the switch assembly and the vehicle to complete a circuit between an ignition switch and an electronics system of the vehicle in response to depressing the switch assembly, and prevent start of the vehicle using a vehicle key while the circuit between the ignition switch and the electronics system is incomplete.

Abstract: A vehicle theft prevention device detachably connected to a vehicle, the vehicle theft prevention device including a switch assembly, and an ignition disabler assembly connected to the switch assembly and the vehicle to complete a circuit between an ignition switch and an electronics system of the vehicle in response to depressing the switch assembly, and prevent start of the vehicle using a vehicle key while the circuit between the ignition switch and the electronics system is incomplete.

Abstract: A system, method, and computer-readable medium for performing an encoded geometry fabrication operation. In various embodiments, the encoded geometry fabrication operation comprises: identifying data to be encoded within the encoded geometry, the data to be encoded within the encoded geometry comprising a unique code to be associated with the encoded geometry; converting the data to be encoded to the encoded geometry; fabricating a part with the encoded geometry, the encoded geometry passively representing the unique code with a physical code; and, performing a computer vision operation to read the physical code of the encoded geometry, the computer vision operation confirming the unique code of the encoded geometry corresponds to the physical code of the encoded geometry.

Abstract: A system, method, and computer-readable medium for performing an encoded geometry fabrication operation. In various embodiments, the encoded geometry fabrication operation comprises: identifying data to be encoded within the encoded geometry, the data to be encoded within the encoded geometry comprising a unique code to be associated with the encoded geometry; converting the data to be encoded to the encoded geometry; fabricating a part with the encoded geometry, the encoded geometry passively representing the unique code with a physical code; and, performing a computer vision operation to read the physical code of the encoded geometry, the computer vision operation confirming the unique code of the encoded geometry corresponds to the physical code of the encoded geometry.