Abstract: Disclosed are methods, systems, and articles of manufacture for implementing deadlock detection with formal verification techniques in an electronic design. These techniques identify one or more inputs that include at least an initial state of an electronic design and identify at least one deadlock candidate by sweeping at least a portion of a state space of the electronic design with formal verification techniques. These techniques then determine whether the at least one deadlock candidate is a real deadlock by using a second formal search with the formal verification techniques.

Abstract: A formal verification approach verifies data access and data propagation paths in a circuit design by proving the unreachability of path cover properties of the circuit design. A security path verification system receives an original circuit model of a circuit design, along with parameters identifying a first location within the circuit design that is a source of tainted data and a second location within the circuit design that is coupled to the first location. The security path verification system also receives a selection of portions of the circuit design to be excluded from the verification analysis. Using an abstracted version of the exclude portions, the security verification system generates a second circuit model of the circuit design for use in determining whether the tainted data can reach the second location from the first location within the circuit design.

Abstract: A formal verification approach verifies data access and data propagation paths in a circuit design by proving the unreachability of path cover properties of the circuit design. A security path verification system receives an original circuit model of a circuit design, along with parameters identifying a first location within the circuit design that is a source of tainted data and a second location within the circuit design that is coupled to the first location. The security path verification system also receives a selection of portions of the circuit design to be excluded from the verification analysis. Using an abstracted version of the exclude portions, the security verification system generates a second circuit model of the circuit design for use in determining whether the tainted data can reach the second location from the first location within the circuit design.

Abstract: Disclosed are techniques for implementing electronic designs with automatic connectivity information extraction. These techniques traverse at least a portion of an electronic design, classify or categorize circuit component designs encountered during traversal into multiple categories, extract connectivity information for the at least the portion of the electronic design based in part or in whole upon one or more criteria, and devising the at least the portion of the electronic design with at least the connectivity information. A connectivity data structure may be constructed with the extracted connectivity information. A plurality of circuit component designs categorized into the same category may be grouped into a single element in the connectivity data structure.

Abstract: A formal verification approach verifies data access and data propagation paths in a circuit design by proving the unreachability of path cover properties of the circuit design. A security path verification system receives an original circuit model of a circuit design, along with parameters identifying a first location within the circuit design that is a source of tainted data and a second location within the circuit design that is coupled to the first location. The security path verification system also receives a selection of portions of the circuit design to be excluded from the verification analysis. Using an abstracted version of the exclude portions, the security verification system generates a second circuit model of the circuit design for use in determining whether the tainted data can reach the second location from the first location within the circuit design.