Abstract: A secret sharing scheme with yes and no shares and having a hidden access structure. The secret sharing scheme may include share generation in which yes shares and no shares are generated for, and distributed to, each party in the secret sharing scheme. In turn, upon an attempt to reconstruct the secret, participants in the reconstruction each provide a share, which is unknown to be a yes share or a no share to the other participants. The secret is only reconstructable if the shares used in the reconstruction include yes shares of a minimal authorized subset of the parties. However, prior to secret reconstruction, the access structure remains hidden and the participants in a reconstruction are unaware of the character of the shares provided by other participants in the reconstruction attempt.

Abstract: Key rotation verification without decryption is provided. Two ciphertext inputs encrypted from a plaintext input by an encryption function using different cryptographic keys are input, wherein the encryption function is selected from a function family having an output space of one or more convex sets. A divergence between the two ciphertext inputs is computed. A membership oracle is executed on the two ciphertext inputs, wherein the two ciphertext inputs are determined to be members of the same convex set of the one or more convex sets if the computed divergence satisfies a separation condition. The two ciphertext inputs are validated to both correspond to the same plaintext input, responsive to determining that the two ciphertext inputs are members of the same convex set, wherein the two ciphertext inputs do not correspond to the same plaintext input if the two ciphertext inputs are not members of the same convex set.

Abstract: A function is decomposed into a plurality of function shares. The function returns a Boolean result based on whether an input y satisfies a query on a data set. The function shares hide the function from non-collaborating entities that separately execute the function shares. Each of the functions shares are sent to one of a plurality of servers having a same data set. The function shares are executed on the data set at the servers to obtain a respective plurality of shares. A conditional disclosure of secrets operation is simulated on the shares and the input y. The conditional disclosure of secrets operation uses a secret known to at least one of the servers, and further uses a source of randomness shared between the servers. A Boolean value corresponding to the Boolean result is returned based on the conditional disclosure of secrets operation returning the secret.

Abstract: A function secret sharing (FSS) scheme that facilitates multiple evaluations of a secret function. The FSS scheme includes a function share based on a secret function and at least one key of a key-homomorphic pseudo random function (PRF). At least one key and a function share are provided to each party in the FSS scheme. In turn, each party may generate an output share comprising a function share output evaluated at a function input and a masking component generated based on the at least one key in relation to the key-homomorphic PRF. In turn, the output shares of each participating party may be combined to evaluate the secret function. The FSS scheme facilitates multiple evaluations of the secret function without leaking information regarding the secret function.

Abstract: Key rotation verification without decryption is provided. Two ciphertext inputs encrypted from a plaintext input by an encryption function using different cryptographic keys are input, wherein the encryption function is selected from a function family having an output space of one or more convex sets. A divergence between the two ciphertext inputs is computed. A membership oracle is executed on the two ciphertext inputs, wherein the two ciphertext inputs are determined to be members of the same convex set of the one or more convex sets if the computed divergence satisfies a separation condition. The two ciphertext inputs are validated to both correspond to the same plaintext input, responsive to determining that the two ciphertext inputs are members of the same convex set, wherein the two ciphertext inputs do not correspond to the same plaintext input if the two ciphertext inputs are not members of the same convex set.

Abstract: Generation of randomness (e.g., a random value) using a protocol based on quantum weak coin flipping amongst a plurality of participating parties. The protocol allows computation of the exact initial bias and may include determining a number of rounds of exchange in a quantum weak coin flipping algorithm to achieve a predetermined maximum bias value. In turn, quantum weak coin flipping may be performed in a pair-wise fashion amongst all of the plurality of participating parties. A result of each pair-wise quantum weak coin flipping instance may be shared with another of the plurality of participating parties other than the parties participating in generating the result. In turn, the results of each pair-wise quantum weak coin flipping instance may be combined to provide a random value that may be used as a cryptographic key or as a seed to some cryptographic function.

Abstract: In at least one implementation, technology disclosed herein provides a method including generating a plurality of shares of an encryption key such that a combination of shares having a cardinality above a threshold cardinality is sufficient to retrieve data encrypted with the encryption key, distributing the plurality of shares among a plurality of devices, the plurality of devices including one or more disc drive cartridges and one or more printed circuit board assemblies (PCBAs) configured to host one or more of the disc drive cartridges, receiving one or more of the plurality of shares from the plurality of devices, and in response to determining that cardinality of the received one or more of the plurality of shares is above the threshold cardinality, retrieving the data encrypted with the key.

Abstract: A method includes receiving, in a data storage device, a request from a client computer for a portion of ciphertext stored in the data storage device, and providing, by a controller of the data storage device, the portion of the ciphertext to the client computer. The method also includes receiving, in the data storage device, an update token generated by the client computer from the portion of the ciphertext. The method further includes performing, by the controller of the data storage device, re-encryption of the ciphertext using the update token.

Abstract: In one implementation, the disclosure provides systems and methods for a multi-party secret sharing protocol that is device specific in that the secret matrix used herein is tied to individual computing devices.

Abstract: A method for distributed and private symmetric searchable encryption includes receiving encrypted data, creating a search index for one or more servers based on the encrypted data using a distributed point function (DPF), splitting the encrypted data into a number of portions based on the number of servers, and partitioning the servers into two or more groups. The method also includes updating the search index based on the splitting and the partitioning, transmitting the split encrypted data to the servers based on the updated search index, verifying the transmitted data using data not transmitted to the server, and determining, based on the verifying, whether any server deviated from an assigned protocol.

Abstract: Polynomial function secret sharing provides for computation of reconstruction share results for a polynomial function on an input. An allocatable share of the polynomial function is received at a computing system of the share result computation systems. The allocatable share is generated from the polynomial function. Each of the allocatable shares is distributed to a unique share result computation system of the share result computation systems. Each allocatable share includes a share element for each coefficient in the polynomial function, wherein the share elements for a coefficient across the share result computation systems summing to the coefficient. A reconstruction share result is generated at the computing system by computing a dot product of the input and the allocatable share received by the computing system. A combination of the reconstruction share results generated by the share result computation systems yields a reconstructed result of the polynomial function on the input.

Abstract: A function secret sharing (FSS) scheme that facilitates multiple evaluations of a secret function. The FSS scheme includes a function share based on a secret function and at least one key of a key-homomorphic pseudo random function (PRF). At least one key and a function share are provided to each party in the FSS scheme. In turn, each party may generate an output share comprising a function share output evaluated at a function input and a masking component generated based on the at least one key in relation to the key-homomorphic PRF. In turn, the output shares of each participating party may be combined to evaluate the secret function. The FSS scheme facilitates multiple evaluations of the secret function without leaking information regarding the secret function.

Abstract: Tokenized assets with associated value are transferred from a designated server to a mobile device. The associated value is removed from the designated server. The tokenized assets are transferred to a first trusted electronic device. The first trusted electronic device is associated with the mobile device. At least a portion of the tokenized assets are transferred to a second trusted electronic device such that the portion of the tokenized assets are only stored on the second trusted electronic device after the transfer. The second electronic device is associated with a second mobile device. The transfer occurs at a time when both the mobile device and the electronic device are offline.

Abstract: A homomorphic encryption system evaluates homomorphically encrypted data, including receiving ciphertext input homomorphically encrypted from a plaintext input using a set-system including sets having an intersection property. An arithmetic function is evaluated on the ciphertext input to generate a ciphertext output, the arithmetic function including one or more additive gates and one or more multiplicative gates, wherein the evaluating operation generates errors during evaluation of the arithmetic function and the intersection property of the sets cancel out the errors during the evaluating operation. The ciphertext output is transmitted for homomorphic decryption to generate a plaintext result.

Abstract: A homomorphic encryption system receives a ciphertext output of an arithmetic evaluation function. The arithmetic evaluation function is performed on a ciphertext input homomorphically encrypted from a plaintext input using a set-system including sets having an intersection property. The ciphertext output is decrypted using a summation of two or more noise-canceling party identifiers of two or more authorized parties, wherein the intersection property of the sets cancels out errors generated during the decrypting operation for the two or more authorized parties.

Abstract: A function is decomposed into a plurality of function shares. The function returns a Boolean result based on whether an input y satisfies a query on a data set. The function shares hide the function from non-collaborating entities that separately execute the function shares. Each of the functions shares are sent to one of a plurality of servers having a same data set. The function shares are executed on the data set at the servers to obtain a respective plurality of shares. A conditional disclosure of secrets operation is simulated on the shares and the input y. The conditional disclosure of secrets operation uses a secret known to at least one of the servers, and further uses a source of randomness shared between the servers. A Boolean value corresponding to the Boolean result is returned based on the conditional disclosure of secrets operation returning the secret.

Abstract: In at least one implementation, technology disclosed herein provides a method including generating a plurality of shares of an encryption key such that a combination of shares having a cardinality above a threshold cardinality is sufficient to retrieve data encrypted with the encryption key, distributing the plurality of shares among a plurality of devices, the plurality of devices including one or more disc drive cartridges and one or more printed circuit board assemblies (PCBAs) configured to host one or more of the disc drive cartridges, receiving one or more of the plurality of shares from the plurality of devices, and in response to determining that cardinality of the received one or more of the plurality of shares is above the threshold cardinality, retrieving the data encrypted with the key.

Abstract: A method of improving data security or privacy in a computing environment includes providing a group identifier value to at least a first user of one or more users and associating a first pseudonym with the first user. The method further includes encrypting a first data set according to a private key and marking the encrypted first data set according to the group identifier and the first pseudonym. The method also includes performing a first operation on the encrypted first data set and transforming the encrypted first data set into an encrypted second data set according to the first operation performed and the first pseudonym, decrypting the encrypted second data set using the private key, and analyzing the decrypted second data set.

Abstract: A secret sharing scheme with yes and no shares and having a hidden access structure. The secret sharing scheme may include share generation in which yes shares and no shares are generated for, and distributed to, each party in the secret sharing scheme. In turn, upon an attempt to reconstruct the secret, participants in the reconstruction each provide a share, which is unknown to be a yes share or a no share to the other participants. The secret is only reconstructable if the shares used in the reconstruction include yes shares of a minimal authorized subset of the parties. However, prior to secret reconstruction, the access structure remains hidden and the participants in a reconstruction are unaware of the character of the shares provided by other participants in the reconstruction attempt.

Abstract: A computer-implemented method receives at least two unique versions of program code of a program, generates a code-based key for each unique version of the program code, generates a code-based signature for each unique version of the program using a bi-homomorphic pseudorandom function selected from a family of bi-homomorphic pseudorandom functions. Each code-based signature is generated by the selected bi-homomorphic pseudorandom function based on the corresponding code-based key. Each generated code-based signature for each unique version of the program code is incorporated into the program code of the corresponding unique version of the program.