Abstract: A prospective component for use in a vehicle stores a first cryptographic key and utilizes the first cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the vehicle. The vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification associating a second cryptographic key with an authentic component. The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key in cryptographic communication and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic communication is successful.

Abstract: A component for use in a prospective vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic vehicle. The component utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle, and determines whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle, the component may allow the prospective vehicle to operate the component.

Abstract: A configured component of a vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic component, and may be implemented, for example, with a digital certificate obtained from a certificate authority. The configured component utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the prospective component is the authentic component, the configured component may allow the prospective vehicle to operate the component.

Abstract: A vehicle subassembly obtains a prospective component for use in the vehicle subassembly. The vehicle subassembly also obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic component. The vehicle subassembly utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

Abstract: A vehicle authenticates a prospective component for use in the vehicle by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic component. The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

Abstract: A vehicle obtains a prospective subassembly for use in the vehicle. The vehicle also obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic subassembly is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic subassembly. The certification may also include a digital signature of the certification authority. The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective subassembly, and determines whether the prospective subassembly is the authentic subassembly based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the prospective subassembly is the authentic subassembly, the vehicle may allow the prospective subassembly to become operative within the vehicle.

Abstract: A vehicle accesses a configuration database to determine whether a reconfiguration function is authorized. The reconfiguration function may involve, for example, installing the component in the vehicle, removing the component from the vehicle, replacing the component with another component in the vehicle, replacing another component in the vehicle with the component, modifying the component, upgrading the component and rendering the component operable. Upon determining that the reconfiguration function is authorized, the vehicle allows the reconfiguration function to be performed. The reconfiguration function may be authorized based on a type of the vehicle, a type of the component or a combination of configuration elements in a current configuration of the vehicle.

Abstract: The service technician accesses the prospective vehicle and obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The service technician utilizes the cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle via a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by the service technician. The service technician determines whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle.

Abstract: A vehicle authenticates a service technician and accesses a technician database to determine whether the service technician is indicated as authorized to perform the service operation. If the service technician is indicated as authorized to perform the service operation, the vehicle allows the service technician to perform the service operation.

Abstract: A vehicle accesses a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by a service technician. The secure device stores a first cryptographic key associated with the service technician. The vehicle also obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic technician is associated with a second cryptographic key corresponding to the first cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the second cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic technician. The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the secure device, and determines whether the service technician is the authentic technician based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the service technician is the authentic technician, the vehicle may allow the prospective component to become operative within the vehicle.

Abstract: A vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic device is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic device. The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the remote access device, and determines whether the remote access device is the authentic device based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the remote access device is the authentic device, the vehicle may communicate further with the remote access device.

Abstract: A first vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic vehicle, and may be implemented. The first vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with a second vehicle, and determines whether the second vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the second vehicle is the authentic vehicle, the first vehicle may communicate further with the second vehicle.

Abstract: An automatic power window system (10) includes a motor module (12) and a controller (14) physically remotely located from the motor module. The motor module and the controller are coupled by a first signal link (16) and a second signal link (18). The first signal link is arranged to carry a limited number of high priority communication data at high speed, while the second signal link is arranged to carry virtually any number of low priority communication data at low speed. The high priority communication data may represent an operating condition of the motor during automatic operation. The operating condition is preferably simply and reliably indicated by the presence, absence or transition of a signal on the first signal link. The low speed communication data represents a plurality of operating data each of which are indicated by a plurality of time-multiplexed signals.