Abstract: A method for providing device connectivity to a radio access network, wherein at least two devices are connectable or connected to the radio access network and wherein the at least two devices are members of a group of devices within a wireless local network, the members of the group of devices having the capability to establish a direct connection with other members of the group of devices, includes providing connection information used for a connection between a first device of the at least two devices and the radio access network to a second device of the at least two devices. The connection information enables the second device to connect to the radio access network.

Abstract: A method may include annealing a material including iron and nitrogen in the presence of an applied magnetic field to form at least one Fe16N2 phase domain. The applied magnetic field may have a strength of at least about 0.2 Tesla (T).

Abstract: Each of a group of MTC UEs (10—1 to 10_n) is configured with a first group key (Kgr) for a group GW (20) to authenticate each of the MTC UEs (10—1 to 10_n) as a member of the group. The group GW (20) is also configured with the first group key (Kgr) for authenticating each of the MTC UEs (10—1 to 10_n) as the member of the group. The group GW (20) can be configured with a second group key (Kgw) for an MME (30) to determine whether or not to allow the group GW (20) to broadcast a message to the MTC UEs (10—1 to 10_n).

Abstract: There is provided a new IWF SMC procedure for establishing security association between an MTC UE (10) and an MTC-IWF (20). The MTC-IWF (20) sends to the UE (10) at least an algorithm identifier which instructs the UE (10) to select one of algorithms for deriving a root key (K_iwf). The UE (10) derives the root key (K_iwf) in accordance with the selected algorithm, and derives at least a subkey for checking the integrity of messages transferred between the UE (10) and the MTC-IWF (20) by using the derived root key (K_iwf). The UE (10) protects uplink messages transmitted to the MTC-IWF (20) with the derived subkey. The MTC-IWF (20) protects downlink messages transmitted to the UE (10) with the same subkey derived at a core network.

Abstract: An SCS (60) sends out a trigger message for activating a group of MTC devices (10—1 to 10—n) through a network. An HSS (40) verifies whether or not to transfer the trigger message to the given MTC devices (10—1 to 10—n) based on subscription information of the group. A group GW (20) broadcasts the trigger message. Further, An MME (30) concatenates DL (downlink) messages addressed to the MTC devices (10—1 to 10—n). The group GW (20) distributes, to the MTC devices (10—1 to 10—n), the DL messages included in the concatenated message. Furthermore, the group GW (20) concatenates UL (uplink) messages received from the MTC devices (10—1 to 10—n). The MME (30) processes the UL messages included in the concatenated message.

Abstract: A root key (K_iwf) is derived at a network and sent to MTC UE (10). The K_iwf is used for deriving subkeys for protecting communication between MTC UE (10) and MTC-IWF (20). In a case where HSS (30) derives the K_iwf, HSS (30) send to MTC-IWF (20) the K_iwf in a new message (Update Subscriber Information). In a case where MME (40) derives the K_iwf, MME (40) sends the K_iwf through HSS (30) or directly to MTC-IWF (20). MTC-IWF (20) can derive the K_iwf itself. The K_iwf is sent through MME (40) to MTC UE (10) by use of a NAS SMC or Attach Accept message, or sent from MTC-IWF (20) directly to MTC UE (10). In a case where the K_iwf is sent from MME (40), MME (40) receives the K_iwf from HSS (30) in an Authentication Data Response message, or from MTC-IWF (20) directly.

Abstract: A MTC device (10) and a MTC interworking function, MTC-IWF, (20) form a communication system and conduct communication with each other. In this communication system, a root key (K_iwf) is securely shared between the MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20). The MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20) use the root key (K_iwf) to respectively derive temporary keys (K_di (K_di_conf, K_di_int)) for protecting the communication. The temporary keys provide integrity protection and confidentiality. The root key can be derived by the HSS or MME/SGSN/MSC and provided to the MTC-IWF. The root key can also be derived by the MTC-IWF based on received key derivation material. The described system is useful for the security of small data transmission in MTC system.

Abstract: A network node (21), which is placed within a core network, receives a message from a transmission source (30) placed outside the core network. The message includes an indicator indicating whether or not the message is addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices attached to the core network. The network node (21) determines to authorize the transmission source (30), when the indicator indicates that the message is addressed to the group. Further, the message includes an ID for identifying whether or not the message is addressed to the group. The MTC device determines to discard the message, when the ID does not coincide with an ID allocated for the MTC device itself. Furthermore, the MTC device communicates with the transmission source (30) by use of a pair of group keys shared therewith.

Abstract: If the related secure communication method is applied to the system which includes a plurality of the MTC devices, traffic in a network would increase in proportion to the number of MTC devices. A disclosed communication apparatus is connected to a network and a plurality of communication terminals, and includes: a group information sending unit for sending group information, which is received from the network; an access control unit for 1) receiving a reply from the communication terminal(s) which responded to the group information and 2) sending the reply to the network; and a temporary identifier and group key sending unit for sending a temporary identifier and a group key to the communication terminal which responded to the group information, when the communication apparatus received the temporary identifier and the group key from the network.

Abstract: A network node (21), which is placed within a core network, stores a list of network elements (24) capable of forwarding a trigger message to a MTC device (10). The network node (21) receives the trigger message from a transmission source (30, 40) placed outside the core network, and then selects, based on the list, one of the network elements to forward the trigger message to the MTC device (10). The MTC device (10) validates the received trigger message, and then transmits, when the trigger message is not validated, to the network node (21) a reject message indicating that the trigger message is not accepted by the MTC device (10). Upon receiving the reject message, the network node (21) forwards the trigger message through a different one of the network elements, or forwards the reject message to transmission source (30, 40) to send the trigger message through user plane.

Abstract: A gateway (GW) is optimized for security management, when a group member of MTC device changes group. The gateway performs access control to determine if MTC device can move to the target group. When the change is successfully completed, the gateway allocates group key of the target group to MTC devices.

Abstract: The method is used in the AP, including: the AP suspending a high-speed bus directly when the terminal enters a standby state; the AP resuming the high-speed bus and inquiring a network connection state of the BP when the terminal is wakened; and if connection, the AP continuing to use a wireless data link, otherwise, the BP re-establishing a wireless data link. The method is used in the BP, including: the BP entering a standby state directly when the BP detects that a high-speed bus is suspended; the BP entering a wakening state after detecting that the high-speed bus is resumed, inquiring and feeding back a network connection state of the BP to the AP after receiving an instruction of inquiring the networking state of the AP; re-establishing a wireless data link or maintaining a wireless data link of a current networking after receiving a networking instruction of the AP.

Abstract: When a UE (10) transits from a home MNO (20) to another network (visited network) (30), the visited network (30) or the UE (10) notifies the home MNO (20) of UE's location. The home MNO (20) validates the UE's authenticity and its location, and sends an assertion to the SP (40) via the visited network (30) or the UE (10). The SP (40) checks the validity of the assertion and starts providing service to the UE (10) via the visited network (30).

Abstract: Upon transmitting privacy information to an MTC server (20) via a network (30, 40), an MTC device (10) includes in a message a field to indicate whether the message contains the privacy information, such that the network (30, 40) can perform authorization for the MTC device (10) and server (20). When the MTC device (10) needs to keep connection with the network (30, 40), the MTC device (10) switches off the functionality of provisioning the privacy information, such that the MTC device (10) still can communicate with the network (30, 40). Upon the transmission of privacy information in an emergency case, the MTC device (10) further includes in the message a content to indicate that the MTC device (10) is an emergency device, such that the network (30, 40) verifies whether the MTC device (10) can be used or activated in the emergency case. Optionally, a USIM for emergency-use is deployed in the MTC device (10).

Abstract: Upon receiving a triggering message from a MTC server (20), a network (10) verifies if the MTC server (20) is authorized to trigger a target MTC device (30) and also if the MTC device (30) is authorized to respond the triggering message, by comparing an MTC device ID and MTC server ID (and optionally information on subscription) which are include in the triggering message with authorized ones. Upon succeeding in the verification, the network (10) checks a trigger type included in the triggering message to verify if the triggering message is authorized to be sent to the MTC device (30). Upon succeeding in the check, the network (10) forwards the triggering message to the MTC device (30). The network (10) also validates a response from the MTC device (30), by checking whether the MTC device (30) is allowed to communicate with the addressed MTC server (20).

Abstract: SGSNs in the same pool-arca share their resource information by using O&M messages or GTP-C messages. At least one of the SGSNs (Sleeping SGSN) decides to sleep (shut down or run in a low power state), based on the resource information. Then the Sleeping SGSN sends a power down notification to the connected RNC/BSC and SGSNs, thereby preventing the RNC/BSC from selecting the Sleeping SGSN for new connection and handovers, and transferring the load on the Sleeping SGSN to other SGSNs.

Abstract: An isolated steroidogenesis modified cell comprising one or more steroid biosynthesis knock down nucleic acid operatively linked to a promoter, wherein the steroid biosynthesis knock down nucleic acid reduces the expression of a gene selected from the group CYP21A2, CYP11A1, CYP17A1, CYP19A1, 3-?HSD1, 3-?HSD2, 17-?HSD1, StAR, HMGR, CYP11B2, CYP11B1, 5?-Reductase 2, SULT1E1, CYP3A4 and UTG1A1, wherein the cell comprises reduced expression of one or more of said genes. The cells are useful for identifying endocrine disruptors. Accordingly, the disclosure includes in a further aspect a screening assay for identifying an endocrine disruptor comprising: a) contacting a cell described herein with a test substance; b) determining a level of at least one steroid or steroidogenic gene mRNA or enzyme activity; wherein a modulation in the level of the at least one steroid or steroidogenic gene mRNA or enzyme activity compared to a control is indicative that the test substance is an endocrine disruptor.

Abstract: A solution of relay node authentication is proposed. The solution includes mutual authentication of relay node and relay UICC, mutual authentication of relay node and network, secure channel establishment between relay UICC and relay node. AKA procedure in TS 33.401 is re-used so that no extra NAS message is needed. IMEI is sent to network in the initial NAS message, according to which MME-RN can retrieve RN's public key from HSS, and perform access control for DeNB. MME-RN will generate a session key based on IMSI, IMEI and Kasme, and encrypt it by RN's public key and send it to RN. UICC will also generate the same key and thus RN can authenticate both UICC and network. When the key or other parameters sent between UICC and RN do not match, UICC or RN will send Authentication Reject message with a new cause to inform network.

Abstract: When MME receives Handover required from source eNB/HeNB which contains CSG ID, it verifies whether the CSG subscription data it stores is fresh or expired. If it is expired, or if MME does not have any association data for UE, MME retrieves the latest CSG subscription data from HSS. MME rewrites its stored CSG subscription data with the one retrieved from HSS, if they are different. MME performs access control for the UE according to the CSG ID received from Handover required message and its CSG subscription data. When the access control is failed, a new message List Update Indication is proposed to be sent from source eNB/HeNB to UE. In order to indicate what caused the failure, an appropriate cause in the message is proposed. Upon receiving the message, UE updates its stored CSG whitelist, such that the CSG subscription data in UE and MME are synchronized.

Abstract: In order to save energy in EPS network, some of the MMEs and/or S-GWs are allowed to sleep (power down), when network's traffic load is decreased. When the traffic load becomes heavier, the network can power up some of the formerly sleeping MMEs and/or S-GWs.