Abstract: Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to the technical field of batteries, and in particular to a battery cell and a battery. The battery cell is formed by winding a first electrode sheet and a second electrode sheet; the first electrode sheet and the second electrode sheet are separated by a separator; a head portion of the second electrode sheet is provided with an empty foil area which is not coated with an active substance; the empty foil area is provided with a first protection adhesive paper and second protection adhesive paper; the first protection adhesive paper and the second protection adhesive paper are located on two sides of an edge of a head portion of the first electrode sheet in a thickness direction of the battery cell.

Abstract: Embodiments of this application provide a private key generation method and system, and a device. The method includes: receiving, by a terminal device, a first response message sent by a first network device, where the first response message includes at least a first sub-private key, and the first sub-private key is generated based on a first parameter set sent by a second network device; receiving, by the terminal device, a second response message sent by the second network device, where the second response message includes at least a second sub-private key, and the second sub-private key is generated based on a second parameter set sent by the first network device; and synthesizing, by the terminal device, a joint private key based on at least the first sub-private key and the second sub-private key.

Abstract: This application discloses a private key generation method and system, and a device. The method includes: sending, by a first network device, a first request to a second network device, where the first request includes a first parameter set; receiving, by the first network device, a first response message returned by the second network device, where the first response message includes a first sub-private key and a second parameter set, the first sub-private key is generated based on the first parameter set, and the first sub-private key is generated for a terminal device; generating, by the first network device, a second sub-private key based on the second parameter set, where the second sub-private key is generated for the terminal device; and synthesizing, by the first network device, the first sub-private key and the second sub-private key into a joint private key according to a synthesis formula.

Abstract: Embodiments of this application provide a private key generation method and system, and a device. The method includes: receiving, by a terminal device, a first response message sent by a first network device, where the first response message includes at least a first sub-private key, and the first sub-private key is generated based on a first parameter set sent by a second network device; receiving, by the terminal device, a second response message sent by the second network device, where the second response message includes at least a second sub-private key, and the second sub-private key is generated based on a second parameter set sent by the first network device; and synthesizing, by the terminal device, a joint private key based on at least the first sub-private key and the second sub-private key.

Abstract: This application discloses a private key generation method and system, and a device. The method includes: sending, by a first network device, a first request to a second network device, where the first request includes a first parameter set; receiving, by the first network device, a first response message returned by the second network device, where the first response message includes a first sub-private key and a second parameter set, the first sub-private key is generated based on the first parameter set, and the first sub-private key is generated for a terminal device; generating, by the first network device, a second sub-private key based on the second parameter set, where the second sub-private key is generated for the terminal device; and synthesizing, by the first network device, the first sub-private key and the second sub-private key into a joint private key according to a synthesis formula.

Abstract: A method for generating an identifier of a key includes that: when a user equipment (UE) transfers from an evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (EUTRAN) to a universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) or a global system for mobile communications (GSM), or an enhanced data rate for GSM evolved radio access network (GERAN), an identifier of a system key after transfer is generated by mapping an identifier KSIASME for an access security management entity, and a mobile management entity generates an identifier of a ciphering key (CK) and an integrity key (IK) by mapping the KSIASME, and then sends the generated identifier to a serving GPRS support node (SGSN), when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, the SGSN stores the ciphering key, the integrity key and the identifier thereof, and when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the GERAN, the SGSN assigns the value of the identifier of the ciphering key and the integrity key to an identifier of a ciphering key of the GERAN.

Abstract: Various disclosed embodiments include methods and systems for provisioning traversal using relays around network address translation (TURN) credentials and servers for network address translation/firewall (NAT/FW) traversal via a Voice-over-Internet-protocol/Web Real-Time Communication (VoIP/WebRTC) signaling channel. The method comprises receiving, at a signaling gateway, a signaling message from a first electronic device (ED) when the first electronic device registers with the signaling gateway or sends other signaling messages for requesting a TURN credential. The signaling message comprises one or more signaling message parameters. The signaling message further comprises a request that the signaling gateway generate a TURN credential for the first electronic device, the TURN credential associated with the one or more signaling message parameters. The method comprises sending, from the signaling gateway, the TURN credential to the first electronic device.

Abstract: A method for generating an identifier of a key includes that: when a user equipment (UE) transfers from an evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (EUTRAN) to a universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) or a global system for mobile communications (GSM), or an enhanced data rate for GSM evolved radio access network (GERAN), an identifier of a system key after transfer is generated by mapping an identifier KSIASME for an access security management entity, and a mobile management entity generates an identifier of a ciphering key (CK) and an integrity key (IK) by mapping the KSIASME, and then sends the generated identifier to a serving GPRS support node (SGSN), when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, the SGSN stores the ciphering key, the integrity key and the identifier thereof, and when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the GERAN, the SGSN assigns the value of the identifier of the ciphering key and the integrity key to an identifier of a ciphering key of the GERAN.

Abstract: A method for generating an identifier of a key, comprises that: when a user equipment (UE) transfers from an evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (EUTRAN) to a universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) or a global system for mobile communications (GSM), or an enhanced data rate for GSM evolved radio access network (GERAN), an identifier of a system key after transfer is generated by mapping an identifier KSIASME for an access security management entity, and a mobile management entity generates an identifier of a ciphering key (CK) and an integrity key (IK) by mapping the KSIASME, and then sends the generated identifier to a serving GPRS support node (SGSN), when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, the SGSN stores the ciphering key, the integrity key and the identifier thereof, and when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the GERAN, the SGSN assigns the value of the identifier of the ciphering key and the integrity key to an identifier of a ciphering key of the GERAN.

Abstract: A method and a system for generating a key in a handover process, wherein the method comprises the following steps of: according to an evolved Node-B (eNB) (102) of a User Equipment (UE) (101), i.e. a source eNB, a mobility management entity (MME) (103) learning all adjacent eNBs of the source eNB (S130), and generating keys for the source eNB and each of the adjacent eNBs respectively (S140), encrypting the keys with a corresponding eNB public key respectively to obtain cipher texts (S150), and sending all cipher texts, keys and eNB identifiers to the UE (S160); in a handover process of the UE, a target eNB obtaining a cipher text corresponding to the target eNB from the UE and decrypting the cipher text with its own private key to obtain the key (S260).

Abstract: A method and a system for generating a key in a handover process, wherein the method comprises the following steps of: according to an evolved Node-B (eNB) (102) of a User Equipment (UE) (101), i.e. a source eNB, a mobility management entity (MME) (103) learning all adjacent eNBs of the source eNB (S130), and generating keys for the source eNB and each of the adjacent eNBs respectively (S140), encrypting the keys with a corresponding eNB public key respectively to obtain cipher texts (S150), and sending all cipher texts, keys and eNB identifiers to the UE (S160); in a handover process of the UE, a target eNB obtaining a cipher text corresponding to the target eNB from the UE and decrypting the cipher text with its own private key to obtain the key (S260).

Abstract: An emergency call-based security algorithm negotiation method and apparatus are disclosed. The method comprises the following steps: after receiving an attachment request from a User Equipment (UE) and determining that the attachment request is an emergency attachment request, a network side sets UE security capabilities to support a null algorithm only; or, the network side determines that the UE security capabilities included in the attachment request support the null algorithm only; performing Non-Access Stratum (NAS) and Access Stratum (AS) selection processing taking the null algorithm as a security algorithm for the user equipment. A mobility management entity (MME) and an evolved Node-B (eNB) can perform security negotiation directly on the basis that the user equipment only supports the null algorithm when the NAS and NA security negotiation is performed, so that the access efficiency and the call completing rate of emergency calls are improved.

Abstract: A method for generating a key identity identifier when a user equipment (UE) transfers is disclosed. The method includes the following steps: a mobility management entity (MME) of an evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (EUTRAN) sends an identity identifier of an access security management entity key (KSIASME) to a serving general packet radio service support node (SGSN) of a target system when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the target system, and both the SGSN and the UE map the KSIASME into a key identity identifier of the target system.

Abstract: A method for generating an identifier of a key, comprises that: when a user equipment (UE) transfers from an evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access network (EUTRAN) to a universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) or a global system for mobile communications (GSM), or an enhanced data rate for GSM evolved radio access network (GERAN), an identifier of a system key after transfer is generated by mapping an identifier KSIASME for an access security management entity, and a mobile management entity generates an identifier of a ciphering key (CK) and an integrity key (IK) by mapping the KSIASME, and then sends the generated identifier to a serving GPRS support node (SGSN), when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, the SGSN stores the ciphering key, the integrity key and the identifier thereof, and when the UE transfers from the EUTRAN to the GERAN, the SGSN assigns the value of the identifier of the ciphering key and the integrity key to an identifier of a ciphering key of the GERAN.