Abstract: A data processing method for a data processing system having a first communications node and a second communications node where the first communications node corresponds to a first blockchain node and the second communications node corresponds to a second blockchain node that maintains a same block chain as the first blockchain node, the method including obtaining, by the first communications node, to-be-verified data when a terminal camps on a target cell, where the to-be-verified data is obtained based on camping information of the terminal, and the target cell is a cell within signal coverage of the first communications node sending, by the first communications node, the to-be-verified data to the second communications node, so that the second communications node verifies the to-be-verified data based on the second blockchain node, and obtaining, by the first communications node, a target block if the verification succeeds.

Abstract: This application discloses a NB-IoT-based communication method and an apparatus, to evolve a NB-IoT communication technology into an NTN. The method is as follows: A terminal device generates an uplink signal, including a superframe which includes a synchronization sequence located in first duration of the superframe and a data frame located in second duration which is after the first duration, the synchronization sequence successively includes a first sequence repeated Ni times and a second sequence repeated N2 times, the second sequence is obtained by multiplying the first sequence by ?1, a part of consecutive sequences of the synchronization sequence are used as a first synchronization reference sequence that is obtained based on the second sequence repeated N2 times and one or more first sequences that are sorted from back to front in the first sequence repeated N1 times. The terminal device sends the uplink signal to a network device.

Abstract: The present application provides a continuous preparation system and method for vinylidene chloride. In the present application, by coupling two stages of high gravity reactors, the product vinylidene chloride and water vapor are distilled from a reaction system in form of an azeotrope by adopting a water vapor steam stripping method, and the product obtained using the method has high purity. In addition, by combining steam stripping and high gravity, trichloroethane and alkali solution are rapidly mixed for mass transfer, and the product vinylidene chloride is rapidly distilled from the reaction system in form of the azeotrope (based on rapid diffusion of water vapor), such that the reaction proceeds continuously towards the direction of producing vinylidene chloride, thus significantly improving the conversion rate.

Abstract: A control flow attacks based on return address signatures comprises: using a return address as a push return address when a response is given to an interrupt service routine; generating an encrypted push return address by an XOR encryption circuit by means of an n-bit binary key generated by a pseudo random number generator; then, generating a push_address signature value by an MD algorithm signature circuit; when the response to the interrupt service routine is over, reading an n-bit binary address out of a stack to serve as a pop return address; generating an encrypted pop return address by the XOR encryption circuit; generating a pop address signature value by the MD algorithm signature circuit; comparing the push_address signature value with the pop address signature value; and determining whether or not a data processor is under a control flow attack according to a comparison result.

Abstract: The disclosure discloses a method for defending control flow attacks. When a data processor gives a response to an interrupt routine, a return address and a binary key are input to an encryption circuit to be encrypted to obtain an encrypted return address, and the obtained encrypted return address is synchronously written into a stack of the data processor and an built-in register bank; when the response given to the interrupt routine by the data processor is finished, the encrypted return address is read from the tack of the data processor and the built-in register bank; afterwards, the two encrypted return addresses are decrypted by first and second decryption circuits respectively to obtain two decrypted return addresses; and the two decrypted return addresses are compared to draw a conclusion whether the data process suffers from a control flow attack, and data processor determines to continue or terminate the routine accordingly.

Abstract: A control flow attacks based on return address signatures comprises: using a return address as a push return address when a response is given to an interrupt service routine; generating an encrypted push return address by an XOR encryption circuit by means of an n-bit binary key generated by a pseudo random number generator; then, generating a push_address signature value by an MD algorithm signature circuit; when the response to the interrupt service routine is over, reading an n-bit binary address out of a stack to serve as a pop return address; generating an encrypted pop return address by the XOR encryption circuit; generating a pop address signature value by the MD algorithm signature circuit; comparing the push_address signature value with the pop address signature value; and determining whether or not a data processor is under a control flow attack according to a comparison result.

Abstract: The disclosure discloses a method for defending control flow attacks. When a data processor gives a response to an interrupt routine, a return address and a binary key are input to an encryption circuit to be encrypted to obtain an encrypted return address, and the obtained encrypted return address is synchronously written into a stack of the data processor and an built-in register bank; when the response given to the interrupt routine by the data processor is finished, the encrypted return address is read from the tack of the data processor and the built-in register bank; afterwards, the two encrypted return addresses are decrypted by first and second decryption circuits respectively to obtain two decrypted return addresses; and the two decrypted return addresses are compared to draw a conclusion whether the data process suffers from a control flow attack, and data processor determines to continue or terminate the routine accordingly.