Abstract: A check computation circuit executes a computation corresponding to a computation for generating confidential CRC data, with respect to confidential data read from a non-volatile device. A comparison circuit compares the result of the computation in the check computation circuit with confidential CRC data read from the non-volatile device. When the result of the comparison indicates a mismatch, i.e., an error is detected, an encryption circuit encrypts the confidential data and the confidential CRC data using a secret key registered in a secret key register, and outputs the encrypted confidential data and confidential CRC data to the outside of a semiconductor integrated circuit.

Abstract: A system including a secure LSI 1 establishes a communication path to/from a server 3 (UD1), and receives a common key-encrypted program generated by encryption with a common key and transmitted from the server 3 (UD6 and UD7). The received common key-encrypted program is decrypted to generate a raw program, and the raw program is re-encrypted with an inherent key to newly generate an inherent key-encrypted program, which is stored in an external memory.

Abstract: A Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) which is an intermediate representation obtained by analyzing a behavioral-level circuit description of hardware, is subjected to a process of changing a shape of the CDFG by adding an operation before or after scheduling, so as to conceal design information. A CDFG to which a hardware resource has been allocated may be subjected to a process of changing the allocation of the hardware resource.

Abstract: A communication card comprised of: an interface unit which communicates with the host; a first communication unit which communicates with an external device other than the host; an encryption unit which performs encryption processing onto data transferred between the host device and the external device via the interface unit and the first communication unit; a storage unit which stores: list information indicating a list of identifiers of unauthorized communication cards; and communication key information used for encryption; and a control unit which performs authentication processing, and only when the authentication processing has been completed normally, allows the host to control the first communication unit, causes said encryption unit to encrypt the data by using the communication key information after the authentication processing, and transfers the encrypted data to the host via the interface unit, in which the authentication processing includes processing of revoking an unauthorized communication car

Abstract: In the key installation system for improving the confidentiality and concealment of the key, a first decrypting circuit decrypts an encrypted key EKEY1(EDK(MK1)) using an encrypted key EDK1(MK1) as the key. A second decrypting circuit decrypts an encrypted key EMK1(KEY1) using the output of the second decrypting circuit, that is, an internal key KEY1 as the key. A third decrypting circuit decrypts the encrypted key EDK1(MK1) using the output of the second decrypting circuit, that is, an internal key MK1 as the key, to generate a final secret key DK1.

Abstract: A DMA controller is connected by a bus to a plurality of master devices and a plurality of slave devices, and performs a data transfer between slave devices which are specified as a source and a destination of the data transfer by a transfer condition received from any of the plurality of master devices. Each of the plurality of master devices and the plurality of slave devices has a rank used for judging data transfer permissibility. The DMA controller enables the data transfer if the data transfer is judged to be permitted as a result of a comparison between a rank of the master device and a rank of any of the specified slave devices, and disables the data transfer if the data transfer is judged to be prohibited.

Abstract: In a target apparatus which stores at least one piece of domain key information in a first area and a plurality of pieces of content key information each associated with any one of the domain key information in a second area, a method for generating data for detecting tampering of the content key information. The method comprises the steps of encrypting the content key information associated with one of the domain key information using a chain encryption technique, extracting data at predetermined positions in the encrypted content key information, concatenating the pieces of data extracted at the predetermined positions in the encrypted content key information to obtain concatenated data, performing a hash calculation with respect to the concatenated data to obtain a hash value, storing check values corresponding to the data at the predetermined positions in plain text, in the target apparatus, and storing the hash value in the target apparatus.

Abstract: An encryption circuit of a secret key cryptosystem which inputs a plain text and a secret key 4A, inputs R partial keys Kn obtained from the secret key 4A and applies repeatedly R times of round operations to the plain text so that the plain text is encrypted including: registers 4G and 4H which store the values after the round operations of the plain text; a fault detection circuit 1A which decides whether a degenerate fault exists or not by the values of the registers 4G and 4H; and a circuit 1B which invalidates the secret key 4A when the degenerate fault exists in the detection result. The invention provides an encryption circuit which can appropriately respond to a new element of causing occurrence of the degenerate fault, suppress the cost of the hardware, and has a measure against the fault analysis while suppressing an increase in an encryption processing time.

Abstract: To make the strict management of the security information possible, in a security information packaging system 120 which comprises a storing portion 120a for storing first encrypted security information EDK(MK)/address obtained by encrypting final security information DK by using internal security information MK and second encrypted security information EMK(CK)/address obtained by encrypting the internal security information MK by using converted security information CK, and an LSI 120b, the LSI 120b includes a seed generating portion 131 for storing a first constant IDfuse/address containing address information and serving as a generation source of a conversion seed and a second constant IDtst serving as a generation source of a conversion seed for testing and a third constant Const and then outputting either the conversion seed or the conversion seed for testing in response to a test signal.

Abstract: In a system which processes confidential information, use of a confidential information processing LSI due to unauthorized tampering of software, spoofing or the like is prevented and data on a bus are protected against analysis using a probe, etc. Within the confidential information processing LSI, software which controls the LSI 1002 is subjected to tampering detection which is executed by a comparator 1008 and authentication processing which is executed by a comparator 1020,thereby confirming the validity of the software and preventing use of the confidential information processing LSI by unauthorized software. The LSI and the software share session keys 1035 and 1038 which are based on a random number used for authentication processing and encrypted communications are attained using the session keys, which protects data on the bus.

Abstract: A CPU (Central Processing Unit) sets an unrewritable area in a nonvolatile memory in accordance with a program for system initialization stored in a boot ROM (Read Only Memory). An access control circuit controls permission/prohibition of rewriting based on a written flag set in the unrewritable area. This allows a system creator to freely write information which needs protection against tampering and also ensures protection against tampering of the information.

Abstract: An development environment of a high security level is provided for a key-installed system. Development of a program for a system having an LSI device which includes a secure memory is performed by providing another LSI device having the same structure and setting the provided LSI device to a development mode which is different from a product operation mode. Alternatively, the provided LSI device is set to an administrator mode to perform development and encryption of a key-generation program. The LSI device is set to a key-generation mode to execute the encrypted key-generation program, thereby generating various keys.

Abstract: A system including a secure LSI 1 establishes a communication path to/from a server 3 (UD1), and receives a common key-encrypted program generated by encryption with a common key and transmitted from the server 3 (UD6 and UD7). The received common key-encrypted program is decrypted to generate a raw program, and the raw program is re-encrypted with an inherent key to newly generate an inherent key-encrypted program, which is stored in an external memory.

Abstract: A removing member which rotates while being in contact with the periphery of a rotating member for conveying a sheet of paper that rotates while being in contact with a printed side of a sheet of paper is provided. When undried ink on the printed side is transferred to the periphery of the rotating member at the time of conveying the printed sheet, the undried ink is thinly spread in a part where the periphery of the rotating member and the periphery of the removing member come into contact with each other and therefore dried quicker. The removing member removes a part of the ink from the periphery of the rotating member. Consequently, the printed sheet is prevented from being smudged by the re-transfer. Since double-side printing or multicolor printing can be started before the ink on the printed side of the printed sheet of paper is completely dried, the work efficiency of the double-side printing or multicolor printing is improved.

Abstract: A secure LSI device 1 includes an encryption section 2 for encrypting a program, and an external I/F 50 for inputting/outputting a program or data from/to an external memory 100. In the encryption section 2, the operation of a private key arithmetic processing section 20 is prohibited with respect to a sequence whose execution is determined by a key-generation/update sequencer 30 to be impermissible. In the external I/F 50, a program processing section 51 and a data processing section 55 are structured independently from each other.

Abstract: A removing member which rotates while being in contact with the periphery of a rotating member for conveying a sheet of paper that rotates while being in contact with a printed side of a sheet of paper is provided. When undried ink on the printed side is transferred to the periphery of the rotating member at the time of conveying the printed sheet, the undried ink is thinly spread in a part where the periphery of the rotating member and the periphery of the removing member come into contact with each other and therefore dried quicker. The removing member removes a part of the ink from the periphery of the rotating member. Consequently, the printed sheet is prevented from being smudged by the re-transfer. Since double-side printing or multicolor printing can be started before the ink on the printed side of the printed sheet of paper is completely dried, the work efficiency of the double-side printing or multicolor printing is improved.

Abstract: In the key installation system for improving the confidentiality and concealment of the key, a first decrypting circuit decrypts an encrypted key EKEY1(EDK(MK1)) using an encrypted key EDK1(MK1) as the key. A second decrypting circuit decrypts an encrypted key EMK1(KEY1) using the output of the second decrypting circuit, that is, an internal key KEY1 as the key. A third decrypting circuit decrypts the encrypted key EDK1(MK1) using the output of the second decrypting circuit, that is, an internal key MK1 as the key, to generate a final secret key DK1.