Abstract: Systems and methods for zero trust authentication. In certain embodiments, a method may comprise providing, from a client computing system to an identity provider (IdP) authority, an authentication nonce value generated by hashing a random value and a public key of the client computing system, and receiving, at the client computing system from the IdP authority, an authorization token including the authentication nonce value, where the authorization token is signed by a private key of the IdP authority. The method may further comprise providing a message including the authorization token from the client computing system to a target computing system via an intermediary co-signer (ICS) configured to authenticate the message.

Abstract: Systems and methods are disclosed for zero trust authentication. In certain embodiments, a method may comprise providing, from a client computing system to an identity provider (IdP) authority, an authentication nonce value generated by hashing a random value hashed along with a public key of the client computing system, and receiving, at the client computing system from the IdP authority, an authorization token including the authentication nonce value signed by a secret key of the IdP authority. The method may further comprise providing a message including the authorization token from the client computing system to a target computing system via an intermediary co-signer (ICS) configured to authenticate the message.

Abstract: Systems and methods are disclosed for performing multi-party, split-key authentication in cryptography. In certain embodiments, a system may comprise a key broker configured to receive a request for a root certificate, generate a secret key based on the request, generate the root certificate based on the secret key, split the secret key into a plurality of shards, provide a first shard of the plurality of shards to an agent, and delete the first shard at the key broker. The key broker may further receive a partially signed client certificate signed with the first shard, generate a fully signed client certificate based on the partially signed client certificate and a second shard of the plurality of shards, and issue the fully signed client certificate.

Abstract: Systems and methods are disclosed for zero trust authentication. In certain embodiments, a method may comprise providing, from a client computing system to an identity provider (IdP) authority, an authentication nonce value generated by hashing a random value hashed along with a public key of the client computing system, and receiving, at the client computing system from the IdP authority, an authorization token including the authentication nonce value signed by a secret key of the IdP authority. The method may further comprise providing a message including the authorization token from the client computing system to a target computing system via an intermediary co-signer (ICS) configured to authenticate the message.