DATA OBFUSCATION SYSTEM, METHOD, AND COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA OBFUSCATION FOR SECRET DATABASES

Abstract

A data obfuscation system, method, and computer implementation via software or hardware that allows a legitimate user to gain access via a query to data of sufficient granularity to be useful while maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information about individual records. Output values of a data request are obfuscated in a repeatable manner, via the use of an Obfuscating Function (OF), whilst maintaining the amount of obfuscation within a range so that the transformed values provide to a user information of a prescribed level of granularity. The data obfuscating system and method is particularly applicable to databases. The data obfuscation engine may be implemented in hardware and/or software within a stand alone or distributed environment.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a Continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/049,992, filed 22 Feb. 2016, which is a Continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 12/992,513, filed 30 Mar. 2011, which is a National Stage Application of PCT/NZ2009/000077, filed 12 May 2009, which claims benefit of U.S. Application No. 61/052,613, filed 12 May 2008, and which applications are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties. To the extent appropriate, a claim of priority is made to each of the above disclosed applications.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

A data obfuscation system, method, and computer implementation via software or hardware, are provided that allows a legitimate user to gain access via a query to data of sufficient granularity to be useful while maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information about individual records. The data obfuscating system and method is particularly applicable to databases.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The problem of securing organizational databases so that legitimate users can access data needed for decision making, while limiting disclosure so that confidential or sensitive information about a single record cannot be inferred, has received considerable attention in the statistical literature.

Data are numbers, characters, images or other outputs from devices that convert physical quantities into symbols. Data can be stored on media, as in databases, numbers can be converted into graphs and charts, which again can be stored on media or printed. Most of the decision making, in business or other disciplines, requires useful data. A database that contains sensitive or confidential information stores data and therefore it is secured—by encryption using a public key, by encryption using a changing public key, in which case the data is held secure while the public key is changed, or by restricting access to it by the operating system.

A database (DB) application must protect the confidentiality of sensitive data and also must provide reasonably accurate aggregates that can be used for decision making. One approach to achieve this goal is to use a statistical database system (SDB). An SDB allows users to access aggregates for subsets of records; the database administrator (DBA) sets a minimum threshold rule on the size of the subset for which aggregates can be accessed. As an example, in an SDB, if a query returns less than or equal to 89 records, then no information is provided to the user for such a query.

A database that obfuscates data is conventionally known as a secret database. A secret database is ideally efficient (stores the data in an efficient manner with minimal overhead), provides a query language (e.g., SQL) interface, is repeatable, i.e., it returns identical results for identical queries, and protects the confidentiality of individual records.

A secret database may be implemented in a parallel fashion as in a parallel set of query pre and post filters. These may be implemented as distributed hardware components given this ability for the obfuscation to be built to handle very large databases and run the queries against the database in a distributed way.

There are a number of known techniques to obfuscate data. In controlled rounding, the cell entries of a two-way table are rounded in such a way that the rounded arrays are forced to be additive along rows and columns and to the grand total (Cox and Ernst, 1982; Cox, 1987). In random rounding, cell values are rounded up or down in a random fashion; the rows (or columns) may not add up to the corresponding marginal totals. Salazar-Gonzales and Schoch (2004) developed a controlled rounding procedure for two-way tables based upon the integer linear programming algorithm. Gonzales and Cox (2005) developed software for protecting tabular data in two dimensions; this software is uses the linear programming algorithm and implements several techniques for protection of tabular data: complementary cell suppression, minimum-distance controlled rounding, unbiased controlled rounding, subtotals constrained controlled rounding, and controlled tabular adjustment.

Cox (1980) considered the problem of statistical disclosure control for aggregates or tabulation cells and discussed cell suppression methodology under which all cells containing sensitive information are suppressed from publication. Duncan and Lambert (1986) used Bayesian predictive posterior distributions for the assessment of disclosure of individual information, given aggregate data. Duncan and Mukherjee (2000) considered combining query restriction and data obfuscating to thwart stacks by data snoopers. Chowdhury et al. (1999) have developed two new matrix operators for confidentiality protection.

Franconi and Stander (2002) proposed methods for obfuscating business microdata based upon the method of multiple linear regression (MLR); their method consists of fitting an MLR equation to one variable based upon the values of the other variables in the database, using all of the records in the database.

There are three potential problems with this approach:

• • (1) the fitted MLR equations may provide poor prediction, which in turn will lead to very poor resolution in the obscured values,
  • (2) the amount of obfuscation cannot be controlled, and
  • (3) since databases are typically very large, this method may not be computationally efficient.

Muralidhar et al. (1999) developed a method for obfuscating multivariate data by adding a random noise to value data; their method preserves the relationships among the variables, and the user is given access to perturbed data. One potential problem with this approach is that a query may not be repeatable, i.e., identical queries may produce random outputs, in which case one can get very close to the true values by running identical queries a large number of times.

Thus, it is desirable to provide a system and method for obfuscating data so that a data request or query is repeatable, and access is allowed to users of the data while limiting the disclosure of confidential information on an individual has increased.

EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

There is disclosed a method of obfuscation in which a standard data query may be submitted to a secret database with output data being obfuscated.

According to one exemplary embodiment there is disclosed a method of obfuscating data so that output values of a data request are obfuscated in a repeatable manner, via the use of an Obfuscating Function (OF) whilst maintaining the amount of obfuscation within a range so that the transformed values provide to a user information of a prescribed level of granularity.

There is further disclosed a method of obfuscating data comprising:

running an unconstrained query on data in a secret database to produce output data; and
obfuscating the output data using a repeatable obfuscation function to return obfuscated data in response to the query.

There is also disclosed an obfuscation system comprising: an input interface;

a query engine for receiving input data from the input interface;
memory interfaced to the query engine for storing data and supplying data to the query engine in response to a data request;
an output interface configured to receive output data from the query engine; and
an obfuscation engine for obfuscating data retrieved from memory and obfuscating it in a repeatable manner prior to supplying it to the output interface.

There is further disclosed software for implementing the methods, data produced by the methods, storage media embodying the data produced by the method, hardware for implementing the methods and printed media embodying data produced by the methods.

There is further disclosed an obfuscation system comprising a database, an obfuscation circuit and a user interface wherein the obfuscation circuit operates according to the method and an obfuscation circuit adapted to interface between a database and a user interface which obfuscates data values returned from a database in response to a user query operating in accordance with the method.

There is also disclosed a method of representing data having a first level of granularity at a second level of granularity, coarser than the first level of granularity, wherein the data is converted from the first level of granularity to the second level of granularity according to a rule other than the simple proximity of the data to the nearest value at the second level of granularity.

There is also disclosed a method of distributing the processing of the obfuscation such that it is distributed across multiple hardware or virtual hardware or circuit components. These components enable the obfuscation to be executed on very large databases or very large volumes of queries may be processed.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings which are incorporated in and constitute part of the specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention and, together with the general description of the invention given above, and the detailed description of embodiments given below, serve to explain the principles of the invention.

FIG. 1 shows a system for obfuscating data;

FIG. 2A shows a method for obfuscating data based on addition of random noise to the data values;

FIG. 2B shows a method for obfuscating data based on not adding any random noise to the data values;

FIG. 3 shows a method for obfuscating data using regression;

FIG. 4 shows a histogram of the synthetic data for the regression obfuscating of data in a first example;

FIG. 5 shows a method for obfuscating data according to a third embodiment;

FIGS. 6-11 show plots of the obfuscated values (fitted values computed from the linear model) compared to the true x_i values for i=1, 2, . . . , 6;

FIG. 12 shows a histogram of values in a synthetic database based upon 49 equal intervals;

FIG. 13 shows a histogram of values in a synthetic database based upon 1000 equal intervals. It can be seen from FIG. 2 that even when a large number of equal class intervals is used, the frequency table has very poor resolution (especially for small values) and is not suitable for data obscuring;

FIG. 14 shows a histogram of values in a synthetic database based upon unequal intervals; the x-axis in this figure is not to scale;

FIG. 15 shows a graph of perturbed mid-points (Y) vs. true mid-points (M) of class intervals to which the weighted least squares line is fit;

FIG. 16 shows a histogram of values in the synthetic database with 62 equal class intervals;

FIG. 17 shows a histogram of values in the synthetic database with 1000 equal class intervals;

FIG. 18 shows a histogram of values in the synthetic database with 67 unequal class intervals; and

FIG. 19 shows a system for implementing an obfuscation method.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

The system and method for obfuscating data described is particularly applicable to a database and a query language, and more particularly to a structured query language (SQL) database and it is in this context that the system and method for obfuscating data will be described. It will be appreciated, however, that the system and method for obfuscating data has greater utility since it can be used to obscure any type of data however that data may be stored or generated.

FIG. 1 illustrates a system for obfuscating data wherein the obscured data may be stored in a secret database, such as a well known structured query language (SQL) database. The system may include an obfuscating unit/function that obscures the underlying data 25 in the database. Thus, when a query is made to the database, such as an SQL query as shown, the database can return results that allow a legitimate user to gain access to data of quality sufficient for making business decisions while maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information about individual records. The obfuscation engine 24 may be implemented as one or more lines of computer code (that may or may not be part of a database management system software) that implement the different processes for obfuscating the data as described below in each of the embodiments. However, the obfuscating unit/function also may be implemented as a hardware device/circuit or as a combination of hardware and software and the system and method is not limited to any particular implementation of the obfuscating unit/function.

The software or hardware implementation of the system and method of obfuscation of this invention can be implemented in a desktop environment, or a computer cluster. FIG. 19 shows a computer system in which a query is received by input interface 10 and a communications handler 11 passes the query to an input filter 12 to ensure that the query is ofa permitted type. The input filter 12 may ensure that the granularity of the query matches the granularity of the obfuscation; in general it is necessary to ensure that the boundary conditions on the filters are correct for obfuscation, for example on random rounding the boundaries of filters may be random rounded before the query is processed or on statistical adjustment the input boundaries may be statistically adjusted before the query is executed. This pre-process may be used to limit the final aggregation of the data. In addition this filter may be used to stop repeated queries that may be persistent access attempts to flood the obfuscation method. The query is then executed by query engine 13. Query engine 13 may apply filters on the queries, for example filtering our queries that restrict to very fine ranges or queries that have a very limited subset of data. This filtering may be applied by the individual selection criteria clause or to the whole of the query. Filtering includes methods such as applying joins or other functional criteria, which then retrieve data for the query from database 14. The output data from query engine 13 is then obfuscated by an obfuscation engine 15.

The output of obfuscation engine 15 passes through output filter 16. The output filter 16 may apply a restriction to the output values using a linear function or a measured threshold value. The output filter may count the number of the frequency of the base data being filtered—for example a simple linear filter filtering records which are constructed of less than X records or a filter based on the variation in the data such that the results must be within certain statistical measures of each other, for example the base data can not vary by more than one standard deviation of the mean. Output filter 16 may also perform additional post query filtering such as distributing results based on filtering (e.g. distributing email, storing output data to different storage media etc.), additional filtering (i.e. only delivering results satisfying a data field criteria) etc. Output filter 16 may include a programmable streaming data processor. The output from output filter 16 may be output by output interface 17 for use by a user or other device.

It will be appreciated that components of the system may be implemented in hardware or software. Each of these processes may be run either singularly or in parallel. When the processes are run in parallel the results of the parallel process may be the same or similar independent of which process executed the request. However, it may be advantageous for the obfuscation engine to be implemented as a specific circuit to ensure obfuscation of all output data. Although the obfuscation engine is shown as a single engine it will be appreciated that data obfuscation may be performed by multiple nodes of a clustered computer system. The data may be abstract data and/or data obtained from real world sensors etc. The output data may drive a display, printer, or some real world device (e.g. where a sensitive location cannot be revealed but a vehicle or person or other kind of moveable vessel needs to be inhibited from travelling within a certain range of a sensitive location). In another kind of obfuscation relating to tracking of moveable objects the results of this tracking may be presented in aggregate such that obfuscation can be applied to enable output of information such as the number of vehicles or people or vessels in area without the recipients of said information being able to determine the specific time and or place an event or movement occurred.

Systems and methods of data obfuscation described herein are based upon tools used in mathematical modeling, and include:

• • 1) Obfuscation based on weighted regression, in which (a) the dependent variable is a perturbed version of the true value, and the independent variable is the true value itself, (b) the dependent variable is a the true value and the independent variables are functions of the true value and values of other value columns in the database.
  • 2) Obfuscation based upon a Taylor Series Expansion of a function of values in the database.
  • 3) Obfuscation in which data having a first level of granularity is shown to the user at a second level of granularity, coarser than the first level of granularity, wherein the data is converted from the first level of granularity to the second level of granularity according to a rule other than the simple proximity of the data to the nearest value at the second level of granularity.
  • 4) A method of obfuscating data including random rounding, especially a mapping based method based on the last digit. As an example, if the last digit is x, then it gets mapped to 9-x, where x=0, 1, 2, . . . , 8, 9. This method loses information but retains the consistency of the data. Another example is to map all odd frequencies to round down and even frequencies to round up.
  • 5) A method of obfuscating data that is based upon a (Pseudo) random number seeding function which will seed random number generator with input value(s), with output either shifted up or down a number of granularity factors. The seeding function could be taken from some external measure, such as the last digit of the temperature or the time at any point, if repeatability is required it can be held secret and entered by human.

Several different embodiments of the system and methods for obfuscating data are described to illustrate the system and method for obfuscating data. For example, the data may be obscured based upon random rounding and least squares regression involving one or more predictor variables. As another example, the data may be obscured based upon random rounding of frequency data and simple linear regression of value data. As yet another example, the data may be obscured using principal components regression (PCR) wherein the data may be multivariate data.

Using weighted regression each point may be given equal weight, a weighting inversely proportional to its value or a weighting inversely proportional to the mid-point of the class interval and directly proportional to the frequency of the class interval. The Obfuscation Function (OF) may minimize Total Weighted Error. The Total Weighted Error may be the Sum of Squared Errors, the Sum of Absolute Errors, the Sum of Squared Relative Errors or the Sum of Absolute Relative Errors. The method may be matrix algebra based, based upon computer search or based upon neural networks. Random errors may be added to true values to form a dependent variable y for weighted regression, using the true data value as the independent variable.

Weighted regression may also be based upon using the true data value as the dependent variable, some function of the true data value as the independent variable, and fitting a regression equation. Alternatively, weighted regression may also be based upon using the true data value as the dependent variable, some function of the true data value and values in other columns as the set of independent variables, and fitting a regression equation.

Weighted regression may be applied to a subset of records obtain an obfuscating function. Weighted regression may include selecting a subset of records which is a k-point summary of values, on which weighted regression is performed to get an obfuscating function.

Obfuscation may be implemented in one of many ways as follows:

• • 1. Each value column in the database can be obfuscated, and then the obfuscated values can be stored in another database; a user may be given access to this obfuscated database. Alternatively, value data can be obfuscated in response to a data request or a query from a user.
  • 2. When the information requested by a user is in the form of a graph or chart, visual display is provided using obfuscated data. The obfuscated data may be used in data visualization systems including geographical information systems and classical graphing systems.
  • 3. The calculations for the obfuscation method can be made within a desktop environment, or on a computer cluster. In the case of a distributed database, which is a database that resides on storage devices that are not all attached to a common CPU but to multiple computers, which may or may not be located in the same physical location, calculations for data obfuscation can be performed in various nodes of a clustered computer.
  • 4. The calculation of frequency in a computer program can be performed using integer type, in which the integer type may be stored in 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 62, 128, 256, 512 or 1024 bytes in memory.
  • 5. Data can be obfuscated as anticipated, and then pre-calculated; the obfuscated values can be stored for user access.
  • 6. When a data request consists of multiple logical components, restrictions may be applied on these separately. A query, for example an SQL query, may often restrict the data, typically by using the WHERE clause of the SQL statement. These statements look like “where X<10” OR “where X>1000”. In this case if the database had only one person with X>1000 then the result set would contain several small values which could be filtered.
  • 7. A request for an aggregate can be handled in two ways: (a) the methods of obfuscation can be applied on value data for which the aggregate is requested, and then the aggregate is computed from the obfuscated data, and (b) the aggregate is first computed based on the true values in the database, and then the aggregate is obfuscated before returning an output to the user.
  • 8. Restrictions can be applied to the data relating to the granularity of the frequency data. If the granularity of the result set is 90 records, then it might be necessary to only allow filters in multiples of 90, in other words 90, 180, 270, 360, 450 . . . .
  • 9. The obfuscation amount could be altered in response to a number of factors including security level or frequency of query or granularity of the output data. For example if a query sums all data in the database it will not need obfuscation. This would also be an efficiency application. This would need to be applied to each sub clause in the “Where” statement.
  • 10. The amount of obfuscation can be made to depend upon (a) different use access rights, (b) different levels of frequency of output aggregation. As an example, the output in response to a user with low access rights may have a larger amount of obfuscation than that for a user with high access rights. An example, the output in response to a query with frequency of 110 may have a larger amount of obfuscation than a query with frequency of 505.
  • 11. The obfuscated values may be used in the calculation of an index to the obfuscated data. An index on a database, such as a hash or B-Tree index are pre calculated lookups so queries are faster. The implementation would need to build indexes on the obfuscated values.
  • 12. The original data can be stored in a secured format, for example, in an encrypted database, where the access to the data is restricted by the operating system. The encryption can be done using a public key encryption method, which may be changed in a secure manner. The encryption can be applied to the output data as well.
  • 13. The system and method of this invention produces obfuscated data. The output data can be used for further calculations in many ways and for many purposes: to compute statistical summary of database, to perform some heuristic calculations on values in the database, to prepare graphs in a graphic software package or a geographic information system. The obfuscated data can of course be printed, or stored on any media for further computations, or even encrypted.
  • 14. When data is transmitted between nodes of a clustered computer, there may be errors in the transmission. This transmission can be at any level of the solution stack. These error checks monitor for transmission errors. This is of particular value in the between node communications in a cluster. The integrity check value is implemented with a technology selected from the group consisting of: CRC (cyclic redundancy check), hash, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, HMAC (keyed-hash message authentication code), partial-hash-value and parity checks. If the solution is implemented as a middleware layer the communications between the database cluster and the middleware are integrity checked.

In one embodiment, the obfuscating unit/function may use a least squares regression for obfuscating the base data and random rounding is then applied to output from regression to further reduce resolution. In broad terms, this embodiment uses a method of least squares regression in a computationally efficient way that allows the user to control the amount of obfuscating while maintaining repeatability of a query. The obfuscating unit in this embodiment provides a database application (DBA) such as a database management application with the flexibility of obfuscating data with or without adding a random noise to the values in the database, is easier to implement as it is based on regression which may be applied to all N records in the database in case N is moderate and to a subset of records in the database in case N is extremely large, and will yield identical outputs to identical queries, even if the value data is perturbed by adding a random noise.

In this embodiment, the obfuscating of value data is done by performing weighted regression. Weights for data points used in regression can be chosen in any one of two ways:

• • (1) Weights proportional to some function of value, and
  • (2) Equal weights, in which case the Weighted Least Squares Regression becomes Ordinary Least Square Regression.

In a regression modeling application, a linear model is fitted to a dependent variable Y as a function of predictor variables X₁, X₂, . . . . X_p, where p can equal 1 (in which case obfuscating is done on one column) or p can be greater than 1 (in which case several columns need to be obscured at once). The data needed for regression consists of a set of n records {(X_1,i, X_2,i, . . . , X_p,i, Y_i)}, where n is a positive integer, p<n≦N.

The method of weighted regression for the case of one predictor variable (p=1) is briefly described below:

y_i=a+bx_i+e_i

e_i=y_i−(a+bx_i)

• • The unknown parameters a and b are chosen so as to minimize a measure of departure from the model, which we will refer to as the Total Weighted Error=H(a,b).
  • Total Weighted Error can be defined in one of several ways:
  • (1) Weighted Sum of Squared Errors

$H\left(a,b\right)=\sum _{i=1}^ne_i^2=\sum _{i=1}^n{w_i\left(y_i-a-{\mathrm{bx}}_i\right)}^2$

• • (2) Weighted Sum of Absolute Errors

$H\left(a,b\right)=\sum _{i=1}^ne_i=\sum _{i=1}^nw_i\left(y_i-a-{\mathrm{bx}}_i\right)$

• • (3) Weighted Sum of Squared Relative Errors

$H\left(a,b\right)=\sum _{i=1}^ne_i^2=\sum _{i=1}^n{w_i\left(\frac{y_i-a-{\mathrm{bx}}_i}{y_i}\right)}^2$

• • (4) Weighted Sum of Absolute Relative Errors

$H\left(a,b\right)=\sum _{i=1}^ne_i=\sum _{i=1}^nw_i\frac{y_i-a-{\mathrm{bx}}_i}{y_i}$

• • Total Weighted Error as defined in (1) or (3) can be minimized by using matrix algebra, whereas the Total Weighted Error as defined in (2) or (4) need to be minimized using a computer search method, or an artificial neural network.

To apply weighted regression, the variable x_TRUE,i is used as a predictor or as a dependent variable, depending upon the obfuscating method used, where x_TRUE,i is the true value of the data in record i, and the variables (X_1,i, X_2,i, . . . . X_p,i) can be chosen in one of several ways depending upon the following:

(a) p=number of columns of data to be obscured=1

The choice for Y_i depends upon whether a random error will be added to perturb the data or not as follows:

• • 1) A method based upon addition of a random noise to the data values
  • Y, =X_TRUE,i+e_i where e_i is random error with mean 0 and variance σ², as shown in FIG. 2a;
  • or
  • 2) A method based upon not adding any random noise to the data values
  • Calculate X_i=g(X_TRUE,i), where g(X) is some non-linear function of X, as shown in FIG. 2b.
  • Set the dependent variable as Y_i=X_TRUE,i and the predictor as X_i=g(X_TRUE,i) and fit the straight line Y_i=a+bX_i+e_i to the (X_i, Y_i) data.
  • This fitted line is used as the output of an SQL query.
  • (b) p=number of columns of data to be obscured>1
  • This case can be handled in one of two ways:
  • (i) Using the univariate method for case p=1 (given above) on each of the m columns of data to be obscured, or
  • (ii) Using the method of least squares to fit a multiple regression model
  • Y_i=β₀+β₁X_1,j+ . . . +β_pX_m,i+e_i to the data {(X_1,i, X_2,i, . . . , X_m,i, Y_i)}, i=1, 2, . . . , n) where m<p and the m predictors X_1,i, X_2,i, . . . , X_m,i, are derived from the true values X_1true,i, X_1true,i, . . . , X_ptrue,i.

As an example, the m predictors can be taken as the first m principal component scores (Johnson and Wichern, 2007) obtained from performing a principal components analysis (PCA) of the subset {(X_1,i, X_2,i, . . . , X_m,i, Y_i), i=1, 2, . . . , n}. This MLR equation is then used as the output of an SQL query.

We will now provide the details of the above three embodiments.

First Embodiment for Obfuscating Data

In the first embodiment, the method uses to denote the true value of a column (variable) in a database corresponding to the i-th record, i=1, 2, . . . N, where N is the total number of records in the database. The method of weighted regression for data obfuscation can of course be applied to all of the N records. In the method for base data obfuscating in this embodiment, however, a representative subset of x_TRUE,i values are selected and then a random error with variance proportional to the magnitude of x_TRUE,i value is added to each of the values in the selected subset to obtain n pairs of data points (x_i, y_i) where x_i=x_TRUE,i and y_i=x_i+e_i, i=1, 2, . . . n. The random errors e_i can be generated by first generating e_i from a normal population with mean 0 and common standard deviation σ, and then multiplying e_i by √{square root over (x_i)}. Since the errors thus generated have variance proportional to x_i, the weighted least squares regression method is used; this involves minimizing the function

$H\left(a,b\right)=\sum _{i=1}^n{w_i\left[y_i-\left(a+{\mathrm{bx}}_i\right)\right]}^2,\mathrm{where}$ $w_i=\frac{1}{{\mathrm{cx}}_i},\mathrm{with}c={\left(\sum _{i=1}^n\frac{1}{x_i}\right)}^{-1}.$

By setting the derivatives of H(a,b) with respect to a and b equal to 0, and solving the resulting system of the two linear equations in two unknowns a and b, we obtain the estimates of a and b:

$\begin{array}{cc}\hat{b}=\frac{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_iy_i-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i\right)}{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i^2-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)}& \left(1\right)\\ \hat{a}=\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i-\hat{b}\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i& \left(2\right)\end{array}$

• • where â=estimate of a, and {circumflex over (b)}=estimate of b.

The subset {x₁, x₂, . . . x_n} can be selected in many ways. We will use the following simple method to select a subset of size n=20 for data obfuscating: For each column x_TRUE in the database, determine its 20-point summary as described below:

$x_1=\underset{1\le i\le N}{\min }x_{\mathrm{TRUE},i}$ $x_p=5p\text{-}\mathrm{th}\mathrm{percentile}\mathrm{of}\mathrm{the}\mathrm{data}\left\{x_{\mathrm{TRUE},i},i=1,2,\dots N\right\},p=1,2,\dots ,18$ $x_{20}=\underset{1\le i\le N}{\max }x_{\mathrm{TRUE},i}$

The method in this embodiment of data obfuscating can now be implemented as follows:

1. Compute the 20-point summary of the data (x_TRUE,i, y_i), i=1, 2, . . . N, and obtain x_i,i=1, 2, . . . 20.

2. Generate e_i from the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ.

3. Calculate y_i=x_i+e_i √{square root over (x_i)}.

4. Calculate weights

$w_i=\frac{1}{{\mathrm{cx}}_i}\mathrm{with}c={\left(\sum _{i=1}^{20}\frac{1}{x_i}\right)}^{-1}.$

5. Calculate the weighted least squares estimates a and b using the equations (1) and (2) given above.

6. If the output of a query includes x_TRUE,i then its obscured version x_OBSCURED,i=â+{circumflex over (b)}X_TRUE,i is used place of x_TRUE,i.

Now, examples of the weighted regression based obfuscating of base data and obfuscating aggregate data using random rounding are described.

Example 1

Linear Regression Based Obfuscating of Value Data

The data for this example was generated from the mixture normal distribution

f(x)=0.5f₁(x)+0.25f₂(x)+0.1f₃(x)+0.1f₄(x)+0.05f₅(x)

where f₁ (x) is normal with mean 5 and sd 1

• • f₂ (x) is normal with mean 50 and sd 5
  • f₃ (x) is normal with mean 1000 and sd 10
  • f₄ (x) is normal with mean 10000 and sd 100

and f₅ (x) is normal with mean 100000 and sd 100.

A total of N=10000 data points were generated; this set of 10000 records is our database {x_TRUE,ii=1, 2, . . . , 10000}. A histogram of this synthetic data is shown in FIG. 4. The 20-point summary of this set was then calculated. The errors e_i,i=1, 2, . . . , 20 were generated from the normal distribution with mean 0 and sd σ=0.5, and then y_i is calculated as follows:

y_i=x_i+e_i,i=1,2, . . . ,20

A straight line is then fitted to the (x_i, y_i) data where x_i=X_TRUE,i, by using the method of weighted least squares, with weights inversely proportional to the variance of the error terms.

The intermediate calculations for this example are shown below.

TABLE 1
Synthetic database of 10,000 records, its 20-point summary and data for regression
Record	X_true		x	e	y	W
1   2   3   4	9969.4260   44.1667  10176.3900    5.4517		1.4008    3.7639    4.1828    4.51	0.6875 −0.7694 −0.7197 −0.681	2.3638    0.868    1.1723    1.4388	0.570184 0.078975 0.063949 0.055007
5	6.3310		4.7924	−0.0909	4.3567	0.048715
6	778.0419		5.043	0.1865	5.9838	0.043994
	.		5.2937	0.1088	5.8697	0.039925
	.		5.554	−0.6906	1.7184	0.036271
	.		5.8887	−0.944	0.33	0.032265
	.		6.3422	−0.0172	6.2328	0.027816
	.		37.2412	−0.0898	33.8954	0.000807
	.		45.8824	1.3668	108.5957	0.000531
	.		48.7086	0.6754	81.6084	0.000472
	.		51.0818	0.7713	90.4796	0.000429
9995	4.8120		54.0595	0.6915	91.4424	0.000383
9996	51.0423		63.5219	−0.3258	42.8245	0.000277
9997	5.5020		1000.758	0.456	1457.117	1.12E−06
9998	100098.3000		9755.701	0.0317	10064.75	1.18E−08
9999	100164.6000		10004.5	−0.2379	7624.596	1.12E−08
10000	4.1408		100300	0.382	138614.9	1.11E−10

The calculations for a and b for the above data are shown below:

$\hat{b}=\frac{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_iy_i-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i\right)}{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i^2-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)}=\frac{23.262-2.985032*2.737711}{22.37678-2.985032*2.985032}=1.1205$ $\hat{a}=\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i-\hat{b}\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i=2.737711-1.1205*2.985032=-0.6071$

We now illustrate the regression based data obfuscating on the results obtained from a query. Suppose a query on our synthetic database produced the 15 records, shown in the first column of Table 1. The second column shows the values of X_obscured=−0.6071+1.1205×X_TRUE computed from the weighted regression line calculated above. The last column shows the values of diff=X_TRUE−X_obscured, which is the amount of obfuscating in the base data.

TABLE 2
The true and obscured values for the sample query
		X_true	X_obscured	diff
		6.673162	6.870178021	−0.19702
		55.20078	61.24537399	−6.04459
		4.921611	4.907565126	0.014046
		100135.7	112201.4448	−12065.7
		3.346527	3.142683504	0.203843
		45.62813	50.51921967	−4.89109
		4.382109	4.303053135	0.079056
		10084.94	11299.56817	−1214.63
		5.707111	5.787717876	−0.08061
		3.530369	3.348678465	0.181691
		990.7026	1109.475163	−118.773
		9920.742	11115.58431	−1194.84
		100024	112076.2849	−12052.3
		1070.893	1199.328507	−128.436
	SUM	222356.4	249141.8103	−26785.4

The percent relative difference is calculated from the formula

$100\times \sum \frac{\left(X_{\mathrm{true}}-X_{\mathrm{obscured}}\right)}{X_{\mathrm{true}}}=12.04\%$

As mentioned earlier, the method may apply random rounding on output from weighted regression to further reduce the resolution, as shown in FIG. 5.

Example 2

Obfuscating the Aggregate

In obfuscating the aggregate, frequency suppression will be used and frequency values below a preset threshold will be suppressed. To illustrate this procedure, an example of random rounding with frequency suppression at 90 is used. In this example, if the frequency of a query is less than 90, then the frequency will be suppressed and the output will be annulled. Also, the random rounding procedure used in this example has base of 10, and rounds up a frequency if the last digit of the frequency is even, and rounds down if it is odd.

	Zip Code	Frequency	Random Rounded Frequency
	89012	93	90
	89013	92	100
	89014	90	100
	89015	89	E

Frequency suppression, however, may not provide sufficient protection against tracker attacks (Duncan and Mukherjee, 2000), since the answer to a query with size less than the specified threshold (90 in the above example) may be computed from a finite sequence of legitimate queries, i.e., queries of sizes above 90 each. A high frequency filter can be configured to hamper such attempts to determine the true values from the obfuscated values.

In the following table, we illustrate the method of random rounding as applied to values; here we use notation rrX for random rounded X, and base equals 5×mean.

Zip Code	Frequency	rrFrequency	Value	Mean	Base	rrValue
89012	109	100	402.1212121	4.021212121	20	400
89013	91	90	299.53	3.32811	20	280

Second Embodiment for Obfuscating Data

In this embodiment, the method and system to obscure data uses a univariate statistical method for obfuscating data in one column of the database, without randomly perturbing the data.

• • (1) Calculate X, =g(X_TRUE,i), where g(X) is some non-linear function of X.
  • (2) Set the dependent variable as Y_i=X_TRUE,i and the predictor as X_i=g(X_TRUE,i) and fit the straight line Y_i=a+bX_i+e_i to the (X_i, Y_i) data.
  • This fitted line is used as the output of an SQL query.

Example 2

Obfuscating of One Column without Adding a Random Error

Suppose a query produces 110 records. The obfuscating approach of the second embodiment can be used on a smaller subset of the data (e.g., a 5-point summary of the data), as demonstrated in Table 3 below. We have used g(x)=x^0.25 in this example.

TABLE 3
Intermediate calculations for data of Example 2.

The obscured values for x are calculated from the above regression line:

x_obscured,i=−2846+688x^0.25

The descriptive statistics of the residual x_i−x_obscured,i are given below:

Variable	Mean	sd	Minimum	Q1	Median	Q3	Maximum
resid	−13.82	12.59	−23.63	−22.55	−18.45	−10.87	30.20

Third Embodiment for Obfuscating Data

In this embodiment, the method and system to obscure data uses a multivariate statistical method of PCR for obfuscating data in one or more columns without randomly perturbing the data.

Obfuscating of Several Columns at Once

The method of this invention can be carried out in steps (a) and (b).

Step (a): Perform Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of Data in Records Produced by a Query in the Following 8 Steps:

• • 1) If several columns need to be obscured at once, then the data in these columns (say p columns) of the database are first read by the computer code.
  • 2) The correlation matrix R of the multivariate data is computed.
  • 3) An eigenanalysis of R is performed, which yields p eigenvalue-eigenvector pairs (λ_i,l_i), λ₁≧λ₂≧ . . . ≧λp≧0 where λ_i is the i-th eigenvalue and l_i is the corresponding eigenvector and p is the number of columns to be obscured.
  • 4) An integer m<p is selected (smaller the value of m, larger the amount of obfuscating).
  • 5) Principal components (PC's) PC₁, PC₂, . . . , PC_m are calculated from the formula

PC_i=l_i^TX=l₁₁X₁+l₂₁X₂+ . . . +l_p1X_p.

• • 6) The PC-scores are the values of the principal components calculated for each record. The PC-scores are computed and saved in the computer code.
  • 7) The first m PC's explain

$100\times \frac{{\lambda }_1+{\lambda }_2+\dots +{\lambda }_m}{{\lambda }_1+{\lambda }_2+\dots +{\lambda }_p}$

percent of variation in the data set. A multiple regression equation is obtained for each of columns X_i. Taken together, the p principal components explain 100% of variation in the data.

• • 8) Save the principal components scores (values of the PC's for the records produced by the query) which will be denoted by PC_1,i, PC_2,i, . . . , PC_p,i

Step (b): Run PCR for Each Column X as a Function of the First m PC-Scores PC_1,i, PC_2,i, . . . PC_m,i:

• • Use the method of least squares to fit the linear model

X_j,i=β_j,0+β_j,1PC_1,j+ . . . +β_j,mPC_m,i+e_i

where

• • X_j,i=true value of the j-th column for the i-th record
  • j=1, 2, . . . , p; i=1, 2, . . . , n
  • p=the number of columns to be obscured
  • n=the number of records produced by the query
  • m=the number of PCs selected for obscuring

Appendix A shows an example of obfuscating multivariate data using the PCR-based approach of this invention.

Obfuscating of One Column Only by the Method of PCR

The method also provides a PCR-based solution even for the case when only one column of the database needs obfuscating. As explained above, the PCR requires a minimum of 2 columns so the invention includes a way to work around this problem. This method is briefly described below:

1) Suppose a query produces n records with values Xr, where X is the column in the database that needs obfuscating. Create p−1 additional columns

g_j(X_i) where g_j(X) is a non-linear function of X

where

X_i=value of the column X for the i-th record

j=1, 2, . . . , p−1; i=1, 2, . . . , n

p−1=the number of additional columns created

n=the number of records produced by the query

2) Perform PCA, save PC—scores, and then use Principal Components Regression (PCR) to obtain an equation for X as a function of the first m PC's.

The PCR based obfuscating of this invention will output aggregates that are computed from random-rounded versions of values predicted by the above MLR equation.

Example 3

PCR Based Obfuscating of Several Columns

We created a small database with N=1000 records and p=6 variables from a multivariate normal distribution. The sample correlation matrix of the data generated is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4
Sample correlation matrix of the generated data
	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5
X2	0.607	0.383	0.205	0.077	−0.024
X3	0.383	0.734	0.556	0.427	0.313
X4	0.205	0.556	0.807	0.641	0.498
X5	0.077	0.427	0.641	0.833	0.695
X6	−0.024	0.313	0.498	0.695	0.876

The results of PCA are shown in Table 5 (eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained) and Table 6 (PC loadings).

TABLE 5
Eigenvalues of the sample correlation matrix and proportion of
total variance in data explained by the PC's.
	Eigenvalue
	3.6905	1.4183	0.4178	0.2563	0.1321	0.0851
Proportion	0.615	0.236	0.07	0.043	0.022	0.014
Cumulative	0.615	0.851	0.921	0.964	0.986	1

TABLE 6
PC loadings
Variable	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6
X1	0.199	0.688	−0.599	0.351	−0.07	0.015
X2	0.389	0.446	0.181	−0.73	0.29	0.03
X3	0.461	0.155	0.522	0.202	−0.655	−0.145
X4	0.478	−0.13	0.23	0.463	0.532	0.453
X5	0.456	−0.328	−0.246	0.04	0.226	−0.756
X6	0.401	−0.424	−0.471	−0.297	−0.385	0.449

The linear models for to X_i (i=1, 2, . . . , 6) using the PC-scores as the predictors, along with their respective R² values, are given in Tables 7-12.

TABLE 7
The regression model for X1
	Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
	Constant	250.012	0.119	2093.61	0.000
	PC1	−14.1732	0.5927	−23.91	0.000
	PC2	17.7975	0.6549	27.18	0.000
	PC3	9.0245	0.1161	77.73	0.000
	Regression equation: X1 = 250 − 14.2 PC1 + 17.8 PC2 + 9.02 PC3 (R2 = 88.4%)

TABLE 8
The regression model for X2
	Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
	Constant	299.818	0.178	1681.44	0.000
	PC1	−3.4900	0.8850	−3.94	0.000
	PC2	9.3266	0.9779	9.54	0.000
	PC3	6.6379	0.1734	38.29	0.000
	Regression equation: X2 = 300 − 3.49 PC1 + 9.33 PC2 + 6.64 PC3 (R2 = 84.1%)

TABLE 9
The regression model for X3 (PC2 and PC3 terms were not significant)
Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	350.354	0.187	1876.70	0.000
PC1	7.04275	0.08787	80.15	0.000
Regression equation: X3 = 350 + 7.04 PC1 (R2 = 86.6%)

TABLE 10
The regression model for X4 (PC2 and PC3 terms were not significant)
Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	400.649	0.241	1664.96	0.000
PC1	7.8820	0.1133	69.59	0.000
Regression equation: X4 = 401 + 7.88 PC1 (R2 = 82.9%)

TABLE 11
The regression model for X5 (PC3 term was not significant)
Predictor	Coef SE	Coef	T	P
Constant	450.938	0.231	1950.19	0.000
PC1	−28.2182	0.9917	−28.46	0.000
PC2	40.308	1.097	36.73	0.000
Regression equation: X5 = 451 − 28.2 PC1 + 40.3 PC2 (R2 = 87.1%)

TABLE 12
The regression model for X6
	Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
	Constant	500.681	0.231	2164.36	0.000
	PC1	−24.631	1.148	−21.45	0.000
	PC2	36.169	1.269	28.51	0.000
	PC3	−7.1788	0.2249	−31.92	0.000
	Regression equation: X6 = 501 − 24.6 PC1 + 36.2 PC2 − 7.18 PC3 (R2 = 89.6%)

FIGS. 6-11 show plots of the obscured values (fitted values computed from the above linear model) vs. the true x_i values for i=1, 2, . . . , 6.

To assess the performance of the proposed data obfuscating method, we calculated descriptive statistics for the N values of

error=x_i,j−{circumflex over (x)}_i,j

and also

relative error=100×|(x_i,j−{circumflex over (x)}_i,j)/x_i,j

Table 13 shows the descriptive statistics of performance measures. The variables Q1 and Q3 in Table 10 are the first and third quartiles of the error and relative error terms.

TABLE 13
Summary statistics of error and relative error in the six variables X1,
X2, . . . , X6
Variable	Mean	Variance	Minimum	Q1	Median	Q3	Maximum
Error in X1	0	14.218	−11.331	−2.585	−0.064	2.401	12.07
Rel_error in X1	1.2036	0.8322	0.0004	0.4972	0.9874	1.7484	4.6153
Error in X2	0	31.699	−19.049	−3.781	0.146	3.815	17.344
Rel_error in X2	1.4981	1.3135	0.0007	0.5786	1.2629	2.1233	6.7796
Error in X3	0	34.817	−19.294	−4.202	−0.228	4.048	19.572
Rel_error in X3	1.3613	1.0146	0.0003	0.5627	1.1838	1.9387	5.8484
Error in X4	0	57.848	−22.5	−5.138	0.121	5.284	21.998
Rel_error in X4	1.5289	1.2876	0.0017	0.6099	1.3057	2.2694	6.2762
Error in X5	0	53.359	−24.871	−4.925	0.12	4.772	23.027
Rel_error in X5	1.2896	0.974	0.0001	0.5124	1.0686	1.8954	5.6318
Error in X6	0	53.353	−32.515	−4.824	0.004	4.79	25.43
Rel_error in X6	1.1544	0.8086	0.0004	0.4446	0.972	1.6568	6.3231

Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics of the ‘true’ data in the simulated database, and Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics of the ‘obscured’ data. The variables Q1 and Q3 in Table 14 are the first and third quartiles of the error and relative error terms.

TABLE 14
Summary statistics of the generated data
Variable	Count	Mean	Variance	Minimum	Q1	Median	Q3	Maximum
X1	1000	250.01	122.89	216.87	242.87	249.68	257.07	288.31
X2	1000	299.82	199.53	259.03	290.79	299.99	309.57	351.35
X3	1000	350.35	258.95	297.3	339.54	351.07	361.09	401.4
X4	1000	400.65	338.58	339.32	387.57	400.37	413.32	452.79
X5	1000	450.94	413.92	390.41	437.01	451.01	464.4	526.81
X6	1000	500.68	513.03	440.36	484.96	500.55	516.78	578.5

TABLE 15
Summary statistics of the obscured data
Variable	Count	Mean	Variance	Minimum	Q1	Median	Q3	Maximum
X1_hat	1000	250.01	108.67	218.29	242.94	250.05	257.17	285.7
X2_hat	1000	299.82	167.83	259.14	291.3	300.27	308.91	346.92
X3_hat	1000	350.35	224.14	297.89	340.28	351.22	359.86	395.3
X4_hat	1000	400.65	280.74	341.94	389.38	401.62	411.28	450.96
X5_hat	1000	450.94	360.56	392.39	437.87	451.25	464.21	507.22
X6_hat	1000	500.68	459.67	440.64	486.13	501.6	515.53	578.02

Discussion of Results for Third Embodiment

Table 5 shows that for the generated database, first 3 PC's account for 92.1% of the total variation in the data. We therefore used PC1, PC2, and PC3 as the potential predictors for MLR models for the 6 variables in the database. Table 13 shows the number of PC's used in the selected MLR models and the corresponding R² values. It should be kept in mind that the amount of obfuscating in the variables is controlled by the number of PC's used in the regression models; smaller the number of PC's used, larger will be the error and the relative error terms.

TABLE 16
Number of PC's used in the model and the corresponding R2 values
	Number of
	PC's used in
	the selected
Variable	MLR model	R2
X1	3	88.4%
X2	3	84.1%
X3	1	86.5%
X4	1	86.6%
X5	2	87.1%
X6	3	89.6%

It can be seen from Table 13 that the mean relative error is around 1% and the maximum relative error ranges from approximately 4% to 20%. Tables 14 and 15 show the close agreement between the true and obscured values.

Detailed Description of the Fourth Embodiment

The regression based obfuscating method of embodiments I and 2 requires a representative subset of values in the column of database to be obfuscated so that the amount of obfuscating can be controlled. In this embodiment, the regression will be performed on a frequency table representation or histogram of the data. The values in one column of a secret database typically come not from one homogeneous statistical population but a mixture of several statistical populations, which range from very small to very large values. When a histogram based on equal class width is created for such values, it is quite difficult to get a good resolution without using an extremely large number of class-intervals, which is not practical (see FIGS. 12, 13, and 15). In this embodiment, a frequency table based upon unequal class widths is first calculated, and the regression is performed on the perturbed versions of the mid-points of these class intervals. The details of this embodiment are given below:

• • 1) The range of the data values is divided into k class-intervals (L₁, U₁), (L₂, U₂), . . . , (L_k, U_k) where L₁≦minimum value, U_k≧maximum value, and the width U_j−L_j of the j-th class-interval is proportional to the middle point

M_j=(L_j+U_j)/2.

• • 2) The number of values in the database column falling inside the j-th class-interval is calculated. Let f_j denote this frequency.
  • 3) Random errors e_j (j=1, 2, . . . , k) are generated from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance M_i to make the error proportional to the magnitude of the middle point of the class-interval.
  • 4) The mid-points M_j are perturbed by adding error e_j, j=1, 2, . . . , k. This yields the values of the dependent variable Y_j, j=1, 2, . . . , k.
  • 5) A straight line Y=a+b M is fitted to the k pairs of points (M_j, Y_j) obtained in Step 4 above. The method of weighted least squares is used to fit this straight line to the k pairs of points.
  • 6) The weight W_j assigned to the j-th point (M_j, Y_j) is taken to be directly proportional to the frequency f_j since a class-interval with high frequency should be assigned a higher weight than a class-interval with low frequency.
  • 7) The weight W_j assigned to the j-th point (M_j, Y_j) is taken to be inversely proportional to the mid-point M_j since large values will need a large amount of perturbation.
  • 8) The requirements in steps 6 and 7 above lead to the following weights:

$W_j=c\frac{f_j}{M_j}\mathrm{where}c=\frac{1}{\sum _{j=1}^k\frac{f_j}{M_j}}.$

• • 9) The constants a and b of the straight line of step 5 above are estimated from the following equations (see Cardno and Singh, 2008):

$\begin{array}{cc}\hat{b}=\frac{\sum _{j=1}^kW_jM_jY_j^{-}\left(\sum _{i=1}^kW_jX_j\right)\left(\sum _{i=1}^kW_jY_j\right)}{\sum _{j=1}^kW_jX_j^2-{\left(\sum _{j=1}^kW_jX_j\right)}^2}& \left(1\right)\\ \hat{a}=\left(\sum _{i=1}^kW_jY_j\right)-\hat{b}\sum _{j=1}^kW_jX_j& \left(2\right)\end{array}$

• • where the weights W_j are given in step 8 above, and
  • â=estimate of a, and {circumflex over (b)}=estimate of b.
  • 10) If the result of a query includes the i-th record in the database with true value X_TRUE,i then the query outputs aggregate calculated from the following equation:

X_obfuscated,i=â+{circumflex over (b)}X_TRUE,i.

We next describe two examples of frequency table based obfuscating of values in one column of a database.

Example 4

Weighted Least Squares Obfuscation Based on Frequency Table of Data Generated from a Mixture Normal Distribution

The data for this example was generated from the mixture normal distribution

f(x)=0.5f₁(x)+0.25f₂(x)+0.1f₃(x)+0.1f₄(x)+0.05f₅(x)

where f₁ (x) is normal with mean 5 and sd 1

• • f₂ (x) is normal with mean 50 and sd 5
  • f₃ (x) is normal with mean 1000 and sd 10
  • f₄ (x) is normal with mean 10000 and sd 100

and f₅ (x) is normal with mean 100000 and sd 100.

A total of N=10000 data points were generated; this set of 10000 records constitutes our database {X_TRUE,ii=1, 2, . . . , 10000}.

A histogram based upon equal class-intervals with k=49 is shown in FIG. 12. It can be seen that the resolution is very poor for obfuscating. A histogram based upon equal class-intervals with k=1000 (FIG. 13) does not improve the resolution by much. The method of this invention therefore is based upon a frequency tabulation of the data based upon unequal class intervals (FIG. 14). FIG. 15 shows a graph of perturbed mid-points (Y) vs. true mid-points (M) of class intervals, for Example 4.

Table 17 shows the intermediate calculations for computing the estimates of the intercept a and the slope b of the obfuscating straight line. The obscured values corresponding to each value in the database was the computed from the fitted regression line.

Table 18 shows the descriptive statistics of the amount of obfuscation over the entire synthetic database of 10000 records for varying a values.

Table 19 shows the error

$\sum _{j=1}^{50}\left(X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}-X_{\mathrm{obscured}.j}\right)$

and the percent relative error

$100\times \sum _{j=1}^{50}\left(X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}-X_{\mathrm{obscured}.j}\right)/X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}$

in the aggregate of a random query of size 50 for varying a values.

Example 5

Weighted Least Squares Obfuscating Based on Frequency Table of Data Generated from the Zipf Distribution

The Zipf probability distribution, sometimes referred to as the “zeta distribution” is given by

$f\left(x;\alpha \right)=\frac{1}{ϛ\left(\alpha \right)x^{\alpha }},$

x=1, 2, 3, . . . ; α>1 is a constant where
ç(α)=Riemann zeta-function defined as

$ϛ\left(\alpha \right)=\sum _{x=1}^{\infty }\frac{1}{x^{\alpha }}$

The Zipf distribution can be used to model the probability distribution of rank data in which the probability of the n-th ranked item is given by

$\frac{1}{ϛ\left(\alpha \right)n^a}.$

Gan et al (2006) discuss modeling the probability distribution of city-size by the Zipf distribution.

Hörmann and Derflinger (1996) developed a rejection-inversion method for generating random numbers from monotone discrete probability distributions. For this example, we used the acceptance-rejection method of Devroye (1986) to generate a synthetic database of 10000 records. This method is briefly described below:

1) Generate u₁ and u₂ from the uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1).

2) Set x=u₁^{−1/(α−1)},

$t={\left(1+\frac{1}{x}\right)}^{\alpha -1}$

3) Accept x if

$x\le \frac{t}{t-1}\frac{2^{\alpha -1}-1}{2^{\alpha -1}u_2}.$

The random variable x has the Zipf distribution with parameter a.

For Example 5, a synthetic database of 10000 integer values were generated using the method 5 for generating random numbers from the Zipf distribution with α=2. FIGS. 16 and 17 show histograms of these values for k=62 and k=1000 class intervals of equal width. FIG. 18 shows a histogram with k=67 intervals of increasing widths.

Table 18 shows the intermediate calculations for computing the estimates of the intercept a and the slope b of the obfuscating straight line for data of Example 5. The obscured values corresponding to each value in the database was the computed from the fitted regression line.

Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of the amount of obfuscating over the entire synthetic database of 10000 records for σ=20, 40, 60, 80, 100.

Table 20 shows the error

$\sum _{j=1}^{50}\left(X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}-X_{\mathrm{obscured}.j}\right)$

and the percent relative error

$100\times \sum _{j=1}^{50}\left(X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}-X_{\mathrm{obscured}.j}\right)/X_{\mathrm{TRUE}.j}$

in the aggregate of a random query of size 50 for varying a values.

TABLE 17
Calculations for fitting the obscuring straight line by the weighted least
squares method for data of Example 4
L	U	m	f	wx	wy	wxx	wxy
0	2	1	9	0.008069	−0.26023	0.008069	−0.26023
2	4	3	790	0.708321	−9.37363	2.124962	−28.1209
4	6	5	3363	3.015294	6.762929	15.07647	33.81464
6	8	7	825	0.739702	−2.04455	5.177913	−14.3119
8	10	9	8	0.007173	0.013931	0.064556	0.125379
10	20	15	0	0	0	0	0
20	30	25	0	0	0	0	0
30	40	35	63	0.056486	−0.2904	1.977021	−10.164
40	50	45	1180	1.057998	4.279576	47.6099	192.5809
50	60	55	1189	1.066067	−1.67135	58.6337	−91.9241
60	70	65	62	0.05559	−0.07716	3.613332	−5.01514
70	80	75	0	0	0	0	0
80	90	85	0	0	0	0	0
90	100	95	0	0	0	0	0
100	200	150	0	0	0	0	0
200	300	250	0	0	0	0	0
300	400	350	0	0	0	0	0
400	500	450	0	0	0	0	0
500	600	550	0	0	0	0	0
600	700	650	1	0.000897	−0.00059	0.582795	−0.38348
700	800	750	26	0.023312	0.020081	17.48386	15.0611
800	900	850	140	0.125525	0.355698	106.6964	302.3435
900	1000	950	376	0.337125	0.478472	320.2685	454.5482
1000	2000	1500	512	0.459064	0.73695	688.5952	1105.425
2000	3000	2500	0	0	0	0	0
3000	4000	3500	0	0	0	0	0
4000	5000	4500	0	0	0	0	0
5000	6000	5500	0	0	0	0	0
6000	7000	6500	0	0	0	0	0
7000	8000	7500	0	0	0	0	0
8000	9000	8500	0	0	0	0	0
9000	10000	9500	482	0.432165	0.3616	4105.57	3435.2
10000	11000	10500	493	0.442028	0.337409	4641.293	3542.796
11000	12000	11500	0	0	0	0	0
12000	13000	12500	0	0	0	0	0
13000	14000	13500	0	0	0	0	0
14000	15000	14500	0	0	0	0	0
15000	16000	15500	0	0	0	0	0
16000	17000	16500	0	0	0	0	0
17000	18000	17500	0	0	0	0	0
18000	19000	18500	0	0	0	0	0
19000	20000	19500	0	0	0	0	0
40000	50000	45000	0	0	0	0	0
50000	60000	55000	0	0	0	0	0
60000	70000	65000	0	0	0	0	0
70000	80000	75000	0	0	0	0	0
80000	90000	85000	0	0	0	0	0
90000	100000	95000	234	0.209806	0.219203	19931.6	20824.24
100000	110000	105000	247	0.221462	0.198511	23253.54	20843.68
		TOTAL	10000	8.966084	0.046453	53199.92	50599.63
Class interval = (L, U),
M = middle point of the class interval,
f = frequency of the class interval
wj = weight assigned to the middle point of the j-th class interval
wx = wj × mj,
wy = wj × yj,
wxx = wj × mj × mj,
wxy = wj × mj × yj,

Calculations for the Obscuring Line for Example 4:

Obscuring straight line is
ŷ=x_obscured=â+{circumflex over (b)}x_TRUE
where

$\begin{array}{c}\hat{b}=\frac{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_iy_i-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i\right)}{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i^2-{\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)}^2}\\ =\frac{\mathrm{wxy}-\mathrm{wx}\times \mathrm{wy}}{\mathrm{wxx}-{\left(\mathrm{wx}\right)}^2}\\ =\frac{53199.92-8.966084\times 0.046453}{50599.63-{8.966084}^2}\\ =0.952554\end{array}$ $\hat{a}=\mathrm{wy}-\hat{b}\times \mathrm{wx}=0.046453-0.952554\times 8.966084=-8.49423$

TABLE 18
Descriptive statistics of XTRUE,j − Xobscured,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , 10000) for the
synthetic database for σ = 20, 40, . . . , 120, for data of Example 4.
	σ
	20	40	60	80	100	120
Mini-	8.52	−9161.44	−301.01	−1939.74	−45682	−13.57
mum
Q1	8.73	−76.48	67.4	37.57	−222.7	−12.85
Median	10.15	−5.15	67.6	53.75	135.8	−7.34
Mean	288.67	−559.06	45.37	−69.41	−2576.3	978.91
Q3	44.89	−4.9	67.6	53.81	136.9	−3.32
Maxi-	4766.47	−4.6	67.62	53.88	138.6	16515.7
mum

TABLE 19
Sum of results (true and obscured) and the percent relative error in the
sum of a random query of size 50, for data of Example 4
	σ
	20	40	60	80	100	120
Sum_query	263472.6	436649	173540.3	206721.5	401662.9	215029.4
Sum_obs	250547.2	476738.9	170796.8	208137.1	578206.2	180273.9
% Rel Error	4.91	9.18	1.58	0.68	43.95	16.16

TABLE 20
Calculations for fitting the obscuring straight line by weighted least
squares method for data of Example 4
M	y	w	wx	wy	wxx	wxy
0.6	5.3	0.879457	0.483701	4.62269	0.27	2.54
1.6	−4.9	0.077483	0.123973	−0.37819	0.2	−0.61
2.6	20.8	0.021818	0.056727	0.45458	0.15	1.18
3.6	11.6	0.00893	0.032148	0.10384	0.12	0.37
4.6	−91.1	0.004125	0.018974	−0.37584	0.09	−1.73
5.6	6.3	0.002107	0.011798	0.01334	0.07	0.07
6.6	46.5	0.001445	0.009536	0.06718	0.06	0.44
7.6	−48.5	0.00119	0.009045	−0.05767	0.07	−0.44
8.6	13.2	0.000777	0.006685	0.01023	0.06	0.09
9.6	−24.2	0.000389	0.003736	−0.00942	0.04	−0.09
10.6	76.6	0.000436	0.004621	0.03338	0.05	0.35
11.6	58.7	0.000322	0.003736	0.0189	0.04	0.22
12.6	27.7	0.000187	0.00236	0.00519	0.03	0.07
13.6	35.7	0.000202	0.002753	0.00723	0.04	0.1
14.6	−40.5	0.000175	0.002556	−0.0071	0.04	−0.1
15.6	−52.7	0.000088	0.001376	−0.00465	0.02	−0.07
16.6	17.7	0.000083	0.001376	0.00147	0.02	0.02
17.6	−94	0.000067	0.00118	−0.0063	0.02	−0.11
18.6	−26.2	0.000069	0.001278	−0.0018	0.02	−0.03
19.6	−14.4	0.00008	0.001573	−0.00116	0.03	−0.02
22.6	−76	0.000183	0.004129	−0.01389	0.09	−0.31
27.6	18	0.000103	0.002851	0.00186	0.08	0.05
32.6	−35.5	0.000066	0.002163	−0.00235	0.07	−0.08
37.6	−50.5	0.000039	0.001475	−0.00198	0.06	−0.07
42.6	118.1	0.000014	0.00059	0.00163	0.03	0.07
47.6	−236.5	0.000033	0.001573	−0.00782	0.07	−0.37
52.6	177.8	0.000009	0.000492	0.00166	0.03	0.09
57.6	−157.4	0.00002	0.00118	−0.00322	0.07	−0.19
62.6	27.3	0.000017	0.001081	0.00047	0.07	0.03
67.6	267.4	0.000007	0.000492	0.00194	0.03	0.13
72.6	111.7	0.000003	0.000197	0.0003	0.01	0.02
77.6	55.4	0.000008	0.00059	0.00042	0.05	0.03
82.6	212.8	0.000007	0.00059	0.00152	0.05	0.13
87.6	248.3	0.000008	0.000688	0.00195	0.06	0.17
92.6	83.6	0.000003	0.000295	0.00027	0.03	0.02
97.6	139	0.000003	0.000295	0.00042	0.03	0.04
105.1	49.9	0.000007	0.000688	0.00033	0.07	0.03
115.1	224.1	0.000005	0.00059	0.00115	0.07	0.13
125.1	106.4	0.000007	0.000885	0.00075	0.11	0.09
135.1	−321.4	0.000001	0.000197	−0.00047	0.03	−0.06
145.1	139.8	0.000003	0.000393	0.00038	0.06	0.05
155.1	−82.5	0.000001	0.000197	−0.0001	0.03	−0.02
165.1	141	0.000002	0.000295	0.00025	0.05	0.04
185.1	83.4	0.000001	0.000197	0.00009	0.04	0.02
225.1	187.3	0.000001	0.000295	0.00025	0.07	0.06
275.1	13.4	0.000001	0.000295	0.00001	0.08	0
325.1	387.7	0	0.000098	0.00012	0.03	0.04
375.1	888.1	0.000001	0.000393	0.00093	0.15	0.35
475.1	541.3	0	0.000098	0.00011	0.05	0.05
525.1	−177.7	0	0.000098	−0.00003	0.05	−0.02
575.1	775.2	0	0.000197	0.00027	0.11	0.15
625.1	1324.7	0	0.000098	0.00021	0.06	0.13
975.1	−280.3	0	0.000098	−0.00003	0.1	−0.03
1450.1	988.1	0	0.000098	0.00007	0.14	0.1
1650.1	1413.3	0	0.000098	0.00008	0.16	0.14
3150.1	1162.7	0	0.000098	0.00004	0.31	0.11
4750.1	4381.9	0	0.000098	0.00009	0.47	0.43
14500.1	12592.6	0.000012	0.179717	0.15607	2605.91	2263.1
61000.1	57164.6	0	0.000098	0.00009	6	5.62
TOTAL		1.000000	0.983132	4.63974	2616.42	2272.52

Calculations for the Obscuring Line for Example 5:

Obscuring straight line is
ŷ=x_obscured=â+{circumflex over (b)}x_TRUE
where

$\hat{b}=\frac{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_iy_i-\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_iy_i\right)}{\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i^2-{\left(\sum _{i=1}^nw_ix_i\right)}^2}=\frac{\mathrm{wxy}-\mathrm{wx}\times \mathrm{wy}}{\mathrm{wxx}-{\left(\mathrm{wx}\right)}^2}=0.8671647$ $\hat{a}=\mathrm{wy}-\hat{b}\times \mathrm{wx}=3.787212$

TABLE 21
Descriptive statistics of XTRUE, j − Xobscured, j (j = 1, 2, . . . , 10000)
for the synthetic database of Example 5 for σ = 20, 40, . . . , 100.
	σ
	20	40	60	80	100
Minimum	−3.654	−23232.40	−3202.24	−472.3	26.41
Q1	−3.654	−21.62	47.64	−103.0	26.41
Median	−3.522	−19.35	47.95	−102.9	26.58
Mean	361.909	−1062.94	−98.16	−119.5	514.07
Q3	−2.725	−18.97	48.01	−102.9	27.65
Maximum	8124.938	−18.97	48.01	−102.9	10869.92

TABLE 22
Sum of results (true and obscured) and the percent relative error in
the sum of a random query of size 50 for the synthetic database of
Example 2 for σ = 20, 40, . . . , 100.
	σ
	20	40	60	80	100
Sum_query	180095	120132	90341	105133	180073
Sum_obs	156361.4	166633.2	92736.4	110913.7	146852.3
% Rel Error	16.47298	48.38554	3.314384	6.873101	23.06059

It will thus be seen that the present invention provides a method and system for obfuscating data that is repeatable, computationally efficient, provides a query language interface, can return identical results for identical records and preserves the confidentiality of the secret data. An independent obfuscation engine isolates obfuscation from the query engine and facilitates operation in a distributed computing environment. Dedicated obfuscation hardware reduces the risk of obfuscation being avoided.

While the present invention has been illustrated by the description of the embodiments thereof, and while the embodiments have been described in detail, it is not the intention of the Applicant to restrict or in any way limit the scope of the appended claims to such detail. Additional advantages and modifications will readily appear to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to the specific details, representative apparatus and method, and illustrative examples shown and described. Accordingly, departures may be made from such details without departure from the spirit or scope of the Applicant's general inventive concept.

REFERENCES

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Claims

1. A method of obfuscating data retrieved from a database so that output values of a database request are obfuscated in a repeatable manner, via the use of an Obfuscating Function (OF) whilst maintaining the amount of obfuscation within a range so that the transformed values provide to a user information of a prescribed level of granularity, the repeatable manner comprising generating a same value of obfuscated data for each database request having a same value of input data, wherein the database request is filtered before obfuscation to ensure that the granularity of the database request is within the prescribed level of granularity.

2-35. (canceled)

36. The method of obfuscating data as claimed in claim 1, wherein the obfuscated data is precalculated or cached.

37. The method of obfuscating data as claimed in claim 1 wherein the filter is configured to hamper attempts to determine the true values from the obfuscated values.

38-44. (canceled)

45. The method of obfuscating data as claimed in claim 1 in which restrictions are applied to the data relating to the granularity of the frequency data.

46. The method of obfuscating data as claimed in claim 1 in which the amount of obfuscation is altered in response to an algorithm.

47. The method as claimed in claim 46 where the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different use access rights.

48. The method as claimed in claim 47 where the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different levels of frequency of output aggregation allowing the data to be of sufficient quality to make business decisions.

49-52. (canceled)

53. The method as claimed in C lim 22 claim 1 where the original data is stored in a database where the access to the data is restricted.

54-80. (canceled)

81. An obfuscation circuit adapted to interface between a database and a user interface which obfuscates data values returned from a database in response to a database request from the user interface so that output values of a database request are obfuscated in a repeatable manner, via the use of an Obfuscating Function (OF) whilst maintaining the amount of obfuscation within a range so that the transformed values provide to a user information of a prescribed level of granularity, the repeatable manner comprising generating a same value of obfuscated data for each database request having a same value of input data, wherein the database request is filtered before obfuscation to ensure that the granularity of the database request is within the prescribed level of granularity.

82-83. (canceled)

84. An obfuscation system implemented on an electronic computing device, comprising:

an input interface;

a query engine for receiving input data from the input interface;

memory interfaced to the query engine for storing data in a database and supplying data to the query engine in response to a database request;

an output interface configured to receive output data from the query engine; and

an obfuscation engine for obfuscating data retrieved from memory and obfuscating the data in a repeatable manner prior to supplying the data to the output interface so that output values of the database request are obfuscated in a repeatable manner, via the use of an Obfuscating Function (OF) whilst maintaining the amount of obfuscation within a range so that the transformed values provide to a user information of a prescribed level of granularity, the repeatable manner comprising generating a same value of obfuscated data for each database request having a same value of input data, wherein the database request is filtered by a request filer before obfuscation to ensure that the granularity of the database request is within the prescribed level of granularity.

85-86. (canceled)

87. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 84 wherein the request filter is configured to hamper attempts to determine the true values from the obfuscated values.

88-94. (canceled)

95. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 81, wherein the obfuscated data is precalculated or cached.

96. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 81, wherein the filter is configured to hamper attempts to determine the true values from the obfuscated values.

97. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 81, in which restrictions are applied to the data relating to the granularity of the frequency data.

98. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 81, in which the amount of obfuscation is altered in response to an algorithm.

99. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 98, wherein the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different use access rights.

100. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 99, wherein the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different levels of frequency of output aggregation allowing the data to be of sufficient quality to make business decisions.

101. The obfuscation circuit as claimed in claim 81, wherein the original data is stored in a database where the access to the data is restricted.

102. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 84, wherein the obfuscated data is precalculated or cached.

103. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 84, in which restrictions are applied to the data relating to the granularity of the frequency data.

104. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 84, in which the amount of obfuscation is altered in response to an algorithm.

105. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 104, wherein the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different use access rights.

106. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 105, wherein the alteration of the amount of obfuscation is made in response to different levels of frequency of output aggregation allowing the data to be of sufficient quality to make business decisions.

107. The obfuscation system as claimed in claim 84, wherein access to the original data is restricted.