Abstract: A microprocessor is provided with a method for decrypting encrypted instruction data into plain text instruction data and securely executing the same. The microprocessor includes a master key register file comprising a plurality of master keys. Selection logic circuitry in the microprocessor selects a combination of at least two of the plurality of master keys. Key expansion circuitry in the microprocessor performs mathematical operations on the selected master keys to generate a decryption key having a long effective key length. Instruction decryption circuitry performs an efficient mathematical operation on the encrypted instruction data and the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted instruction data into plain text instruction data.

Abstract: According to some embodiments, an electronic file security management platform may receive a request from a user to access a first electronic file associated with a first application, such as a word processing document. A security characteristic associated with the user may be determined, and an encrypted version of the first electronic file may be decrypted in accordance with the security characteristic. The electronic file security management platform may then arrange for the user to access the first electronic file via the first application such that: (i) a first portion of the first electronic file is available to the user based on a first security requirement associated with the first portion and the security characteristic, and (ii) a second portion of the first electronic file is not available to the user based on a second security requirement associated with the second portion and the security characteristic.

Abstract: A method of maintaining a version counter indicative of a version of memory content stored in a processing device. The method comprises selectively operating the device in a first or second mode. Access to the first mode is limited to authorized users and controlled separately from access to the second mode. In the first mode at least an initial integrity protection value is generated for cryptographically protecting an initial counter value of said version counter during operation of the processing device in the second mode; wherein the initial counter value is selected from a sequence of counter values, and the initial integrity protection value is stored as a current integrity protection value in a storage medium. In the second mode, a current counter value is incremented to a subsequent counter value; wherein incrementing includes removing the current integrity protection value from said storage medium.

Abstract: An improved secure programming technique involves reducing the size of bits programmed in on-chip secret non-volatile memory, at the same time enabling the typical secure applications supported by secure devices. A technique for secure programming involves de-coupling chip manufacture from the later process of connecting to ticket servers to obtain tickets. A method according to the technique may involve sending a (manufacturing) server signed certificate from the device prior to any communication to receive tickets. A device according to the technique may include chip-internal non-volatile memory to store the certificate along with the private key, in the manufacturing process.

Abstract: A device generating specific information of a semiconductor device includes a bit generation unit including a glitch generation circuit and a bit conversion circuit for converting a shape of the glitch into an information bit. The glitch generation circuit includes a plurality of combinational circuits mounted thereon to output a plurality of different glitches. The bit generation unit further includes a selector for selecting one glitch from among the plurality of different glitches in response to a selection signal to output the selected one glitch to the bit conversion circuit. The device further includes a performance evaluation/control unit for outputting the selection signal to obtain a piece of bit information corresponding to each of the plurality of different glitches and specifying a glitch satisfying a desired performance based on the respective pieces of bit information.

Abstract: The present application is directed towards systems and methods for aggressively probing a client side connection to determine and counteract a malicious window size attack or similar behavior from a malfunctioning client. The solution described herein detects when a connection may be under malicious attach via improper or unusual window size settings. Responsive to the detection, the solution described herein will setup probes that determine whether or not the client is malicious and does so within an aggressive time period to avoid the tying up of processing cycles, transport layer sockets and buffers, and other resources of the sender.

Abstract: A method in one example implementation includes intercepting a request associated with an execution of an object (e.g., a kernel module or a binary) in a computer configured to operate in a virtual machine environment. The request is associated with a privileged domain of the computer that operates logically below one or more operating systems. The method also includes verifying an authorization of the object by computing a checksum for the object and comparing the checksum to a plurality of stored checksums in a memory element. The execution of the object is denied if it is not authorized. In other embodiments, the method can include evaluating a plurality of entries within the memory element of the computer, wherein the entries include authorized binaries and kernel modules. In other embodiments, the method can include intercepting an attempt from a remote computer to execute code from a previously authorized binary.

Abstract: An object is to solve all of the following problems caused when a volatile register and a non-volatile register are used as registers in a processor: degradation of the integrity of data stored in the non-volatile register; loss of data security due to the processor and a non-volatile memory device that are provided apart from each other; and slow data processing speed due to wiring delay or the like caused by these devices provided apart from each other. When data maintained in the volatile register is stored in the non-volatile register before supply of power supply voltage is stopped, the data is encrypted by an encryption circuit and stored in a non-volatile memory device that is provided separately from the processor. Then, the data stored in the non-volatile register is compared with the compressed and encrypted data stored in the non-volatile memory device.

Abstract: A method in one embodiment includes detecting an event for a transaction on an on-board unit (OBU) of a vehicle, where the event has a trigger associated with an agent. The method also includes determining whether the transaction is authorized, identifying network credentials in an identity profile that corresponds to the agent, providing network credentials to a transaction application corresponding to the transaction, and accessing a remote network using the network credentials. Certain embodiments include selecting the network credentials from a plurality of available network credentials corresponding to the agent. In more specific embodiments, the network credentials include one or more virtual subscriber identity modules (VSIMs) of a plurality of VSIMs provisioned on the OBU. In specific embodiments, the network credentials are mapped to a combination of two or more of the agent, the transaction application, and a predefined current location of the vehicle.

Abstract: Methods of authenticating a combination of a programmable IC and a non-volatile memory device, where the non-volatile memory device stores a configuration data stream implementing a user design in the programmable IC. A first identifier unique to the programmable IC is stored in non-volatile memory in the programmable IC. A second identifier unique to the non-volatile memory device is stored in the non-volatile memory device. As part of the process in which the configuration data stream is used to program the programmable IC with the user design, a function is performed on the two identifiers, producing a key specific to the programmable IC/non-volatile memory device combination. The key is then compared to an expected value. When the key matches the expected value, the user design is enabled. When the key does not match the expected value, at least a portion of the user design is disabled.

Abstract: Systems and methods for preventing the unauthorized access to data stored on removable media, such as software, include storing a predetermined signature in the area of non-volatile memory in a computer system. Upon initialization of the computer system, a check is made to verify the signature. Only if the signature is verified will decoding software operate.

Abstract: A computer processor and a security enhancing chip may be provided. In one aspect, the computer processor may comprise a storage for storing an encryption key, a central processing unit (CPU) configured to execute one or more software programs, and a circuit configured to calculate a hash function to generate a hash value for data loaded into the computer processor and generate an authentication token for a request initiated by a software program running on the CPU. In another aspect, the security enhancing chip may comprise a first storage for storing an encryption key, a second storage for storing a certificate, a hash storage and circuit components configured to validate, using the first certificate, command(s) adding the encryption key to the first storage and storing a first hash to the hash storage, and to process a request if a second hash in the request is equal to the first hash.

Abstract: This document describes tools capable of enabling cloud-based movable-component binding. The tools, in some embodiments, bind protected media content to a movable component in a mobile computing device in a cryptographically secure manner without requiring the movable component to perform a complex cryptographic function. By so doing the mobile computing device may request access to content and receive permission to use the content quickly and in a cryptographically robust way.

Abstract: An apparatus for generating a decryption key for use to decrypt a block of encrypted instruction data being fetched from an instruction cache in a microprocessor at a fetch address includes a first multiplexer that selects a first key value from a plurality of key values based on a first portion of the fetch address. A second multiplexer selects a second key value from the plurality of key values based on the first portion of the fetch address. A rotater rotates the first key value based on a second portion of the fetch address. An arithmetic unit selectively adds or subtracts the rotated first key value to or from the second key value based on a third portion of the fetch address to generate the decryption key.

Abstract: A data encryption device is connected between an HDD and an HDD controller that controls the HDD. The data encryption device encrypts data that is stored from the HDD controller to the HDD, and decrypts data that is read from the HDD. A CPU of the data encryption device receives a command issued from the HDD controller to the HDD, and determines whether the command is executable at the HDD. When it is determined that the command is executable, the command is issued to the HDD. On the other hand, when it is determined that the command is unexecutable, the CPU prohibits issuance of the command to the HDD. Furthermore, when a command issued to the HDD is a specific command, the CPU bypasses data transferred between the HDD controller and the HDD without encryption or decryption.

Abstract: A system and method for non-retained electronic messaging is described. In one embodiment, the system includes a message receiver module, a message storing and identifier generation module, a message retrieval module and an expunging module. The message receiver module receives a message. The message storing and identifier generation module stores the message in a non-transitory, non-persistent memory of one or more computing devices, generates a message identifier and sends the message identifier to a recipient device. The message retrieval module receives a selection of the message identifier from the recipient device, retrieves the message from the non-transitory, non-persistent memory, and sends the message to the recipient device for presentation. The expunging module expunges the message from the one or more devices responsive to sending the message to the recipient device for presentation.

Abstract: A processing module operating method includes using a processing module physically connected to a wireless communications device, requesting that the wireless communications device retrieve encrypted code from a web site and receiving the encrypted code from the wireless communications device. The wireless communications device is unable to decrypt the encrypted code. The method further includes using the processing module, decrypting the encrypted code, executing the decrypted code, and preventing the wireless communications device from accessing the decrypted code.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: Embodiments of information processing systems and associated components can include logic operable to perform operations in a virtualized system including a plurality of guest operating systems using descriptors. The descriptors specify a set of commands defining the operations in a plurality of security domains and specify permission to a plurality of resources selectively for the plurality of guest operating systems.

Abstract: A device that includes a first processor, a second processor, and an encryption module in communication with the first processor and the second processor may be used to accept conditions for access to the network. The first processor may receive condition data, and in response, may send an acceptance signal via the encryption module to the second processor. The second processor may receive the acceptance signal and, in response, may send acceptance data to a gatekeeper. The encryption module may block unencrypted data other than the acceptance signal from being communicated from the first processor to the second processor. The encryption module may support type 1 encryption.

Abstract: A processor-based system, including systems without keyboards, may receive user inputs prior to booting. This may done using the graphics controller to generate a window which allows the user to input information. The system firmware may then compare any user inputs, such as passwords, and may determine whether or not to actually initiate system booting.

Abstract: A method and structure in a computer system, including a mechanism supporting a Secure Object that includes code and data that is cryptographically protected from other software on the computer system.

Abstract: A method and circuit for implementing conductive microcapsule rupture to generate a tamper event for data theft prevention, and a design structure on which the subject circuit resides are provided. A polymeric resin containing microcapsules surrounds a security card and a tamper sensor device provided with the securing card. Each microcapsule contains a conductive material. The conductive material of the microcapsule disperses onto the tamper sensor device on the security card responsive to the microcapsule being ruptured to create a change in resistance, reducing the resistance of a security mesh of the tamper sensor device. The microcapsules are more sensitive to pressure than a tamper mesh of the tamper sensor device and therefore rupture first, creating the change in resistance when dispersed onto the tamper sensor device. The resistance change is detected by the tamper sensor device and the security card is disabled to prevent data theft.

Abstract: An instance of a vulnerability risk management (VRM) module and a vulnerability management expert decision system (VMEDS) module are instantiated in a cloud. The VMEDS module imports scan results from a VRM vulnerability database and saves them as vulnerabilities to be reviewed in a VMEDS database. The VMEDS module converts vulnerabilities into facts. The VMEDS module builds a rule set in the knowledge base to verify whether certain vulnerabilities are false positives. Rules related to a vulnerability are received in plain English from a web-based front-end application. The VMEDS module tests each rule against all of the facts using the Rete algorithm. The VMEDS module executes the action associated with the rule derived from the Rete algorithm. The VMEDS module stores the results associated with the executing of the action in the VMEDS database and forwards the results to the VRM module.

Abstract: The invention provides a method, a hardware circuit and a hardware device for enabling a software application to be executed on a hardware device in dependence of the hardware circuit, while preventing the execution of a binary copy of the application in another hardware device. Challenge data originating from the software application is input to a hardware circuit of the hardware device, wherein the hardware circuit is configured to perform a deterministic function. Response data is generated by the hardware device, which is used to manipulate at least a part of the software application to thereby enable the software application to be executed.

Abstract: Automatically classifying security vulnerabilities in computer software applications by identifying candidate security vulnerabilities in a learning set including at least a first computer software application, classifying each of the candidate security vulnerabilities using predefined classifications, determining, for each of the candidate security vulnerabilities, values for predefined properties, creating a set of correlations between the property values and the classifications of the candidate security vulnerabilities, identifying a candidate security vulnerability in a second computer software application, determining, for the candidate security vulnerability in the second computer software application, values for the predefined properties, and using the set of correlations to classify the candidate security vulnerability in the second computer software application with a classification from the predefined classifications that best correlates with the property values of the candidate security vulnerabili

Abstract: Systems, methods, computer programs, and devices are disclosed herein for deploying a local trusted service manager within a secure element of a contactless smart card device. The secure element is a component of a contactless smart card incorporated into a contactless smart card device. An asymmetric cryptography algorithm is used to generate public-private key pairs. The private keys are stored in the secure element and are accessible by a trusted service manager (TSM) software application or a control software application in the secure element. A non-TSM computer with access to the public key encrypts and then transmits encrypted application data or software applications to the secure element, where the TSM software application decrypts and installs the software application to the secure element for transaction purposes.

Abstract: A method for handling an encrypted message received on an electronic device that has not been encrypted using a current public key. The portable electronic device automatically generates a reply message to the sender in response to determining that the message has not been encrypted with the current public key. The reply message may contain the current public key of the recipient device, and may request the sender to resend the message encrypted with the current public key.

Abstract: A router is placed between a protected computer and devices with which the computer communicates, including peripherals and other computers. The router includes a list of authorized devices that are permitted to send data to the protected computer, against which requests to send data are checked. The router also communicates with a remote authentication service to authenticate devices requesting such permission. The authentication service may be a cloud-based identity service.

Abstract: A method of an aspect includes receiving an instruction. The instruction indicates a first source of a first packed data including state data elements ai, bi, ei, and fi for a current round (i) of a secure hash algorithm 2 (SHA2) hash algorithm. The instruction indicates a second source of a second packed data. The first packed data has a width in bits that is less than a combined width in bits of eight state data elements ai, bi, ci, di, ei, fi, gi, hi of the SHA2 hash algorithm. The method also includes storing a result in a destination indicated by the instruction in response to the instruction. The result includes updated state data elements ai+, bi+, ei+, and fi+ that have been updated from the corresponding state data elements ai, bi, ei, and fi by at least one round of the SHA2 hash algorithm.

Abstract: According to an example embodiment, a device provides cryptographic processing functions using secret data. The device can include protection from differential power analysis (DPA). The encryption processing circuit and its memory can be decoupled from external power source(s) during encryption-related computations. A local power storage element, such as a capacitive element, can provide power while the encryption processing circuit is decoupled from the external power source(s). The local power storage element can then be reconnected and charged once the encryption-related computations are completed or paused.

Abstract: Anonymous information sharing systems and methods enable communication of information to parties in a privacy-preserving manner such that no one other than the designated parties can know the source, recipient, and content of the information. Furthermore, the communication can be accomplished without requiring trial decryption, and protection can be provided against of sharing of privileges.

Abstract: An information processing system has a power supply section which detects a predetermined potential applied to a USB terminal and supplying the potential as a source potential, an information detection section which detects the predetermined information supplied to the USB terminal, and a processing section which executes, subsequent to the detection of the predetermined potential, the encoding process or the decoding process in accordance with at least the operating information supplied from the operation key arranged on the body and in accordance with the predetermined information supplied to the USB terminal after detection of the predetermined information. The recording and reproducing operation can be performed with the operating key on the body with power supplied only from the USB terminal.

Abstract: A method for protecting software of a mobile terminal is provided in the disclosure, wherein an encryption chip is mounted in the mobile terminal. The method includes: when the mobile terminal is turned on, whether or not the encryption chip is invalid is detected; when it is not invalid, the encryption chip authenticates the software of the mobile terminal through interaction with a main chip; when the authentication is not passed, the encryption chip controls a functional module of the mobile terminal through a hardware protection circuit. An apparatus for protecting software of a mobile terminal is also provided in the present disclosure. The solution of the disclosure can prevent the software of the mobile terminal from being cracked and protect the functions of the mobile terminal from illegal usage, thus the security of the mobile terminal is greatly improved and the interests of operators and manufacturers are protected.

Abstract: A system and method of providing universal digital rights management system protection is described. One feature of the invention concerns systems and methods for repackaging and securing data packaged under any file format type, compression technique, or digital rights management system. Another feature of the invention is directed to systems and methods for securing data by providing scalability through the use of modular data manipulation software objects.

Abstract: A data storage device that can be reversibly associated with one or more of a plurality of hosts. A “trusted” host on which the device is mounted is allowed access to a secure data area of the device automatically, without the user having to enter a password. Ways in which a host is designated as “trusted” include storing the host's ID in a trusted host list of the device, storing a representation of the host's ID that was encrypted using a trust key of the device in a cookie in the host, or storing a storage password of the device in a password list of the host. Alternatively, an untrusted host is allowed access to the secure data area if a user enters a correct user password.

Abstract: Systems and methods are described which utilize a recursive security protocol for the protection of digital data. These may include encrypting a bit stream with a first encryption algorithm and associating a first decryption algorithm with the encrypted bit stream. The resulting bit stream may then be encrypted with a second encryption algorithm to yield a second bit stream. This second bit stream is then associated with a second decryption algorithm. This second bit stream can then be decrypted by an intended recipient using associated keys.

Abstract: Technologies are generally described for data filtering for communication devices. In one example, a method of receiving data from a data source on a communication device is disclosed. The method includes determining, at the communication device, a domain name of the data source. The method also includes determining, at the communication device, one or more communication networks the communication device is connected to. The method further includes processing, at the communication device, the domain name for acceptance based on the one or more connected communication networks. The method also includes receiving the data from the data source, at the communication device, if the domain name is accepted.

Abstract: This document describes techniques for detection of code-based malware. According to some embodiments, the techniques utilize a collection of known malicious code and know benign code and determine which features of each type of code can be used to determine whether unclassified code is malicious or benign. The features can then be used to train a classifier (e.g., a Bayesian classifier) to characterize unclassified code as malicious or benign. In at least some embodiments, the techniques can be used as part of and/or in cooperation with a web browser to inspect web content (e.g., a web page) to determine if the content includes code-based malware.

Abstract: Techniques for providing storage for electronic records are described herein. According to one embodiment, a command is received from a client through an interface of a storage system. An approval is received from an authorization agent associated with the storage system for the received command. In response to the approval received from the authorization agent for the received command, an operation associated with the received command is performed. Other methods and apparatuses are also described.

Abstract: The invention relates to a method for identifying compromised nodes in a ZigBee network comprising a general trust center, divided in at least two security domains, each security domain corresponding to a spatial or temporal area, and being associated with a different root keying material, and each node being identified by an identifier, the method comprising: upon detection of a node (U1) entering into a security domain (SD), the general trust center (TC) distributing to the node at least one keying material share corresponding to the entered security domain, and upon detecting corruption of at least two security domains, determining, for each security domain, based on information registered by the base station (BTS), a respective set of nodes having received keying material corresponding to said security domain,—comparing the respective sets of nodes and identifying the common nodes as being compromised.

Abstract: A fetch unit fetches a sequence of blocks of encrypted instructions of an encrypted program from an instruction cache at a corresponding sequence of fetch address values. While fetching each block of the sequence, the fetch unit generates a decryption key as a function of key values and the corresponding fetch address value, and decrypts the encrypted instructions using the generated decryption key by XORing them together. A switch key instruction instructs the microprocessor to update the key values in the fetch unit while the fetch unit is fetching the sequence of blocks. The fetch unit inherently provides an effective decryption key length that depends upon the function and amount of key values used. Including one or more switch key instructions within the encrypted program increases the effective decryption key length up to the encrypted program length.

Abstract: A method, article of manufacture, and apparatus for efficiently processing information are disclosed. In some embodiments, a first signature index is received. The first signature index is compared to a second signature index. A negative signature match is based on the comparison. A file is flagged based on the negative match.

Abstract: An SOC implements a security enclave processor (SEP). The SEP may include a processor and one or more security peripherals. The SEP may be isolated from the rest of the SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application processors (APs) in the SOC). Access to the SEP may be strictly controlled by hardware. For example, a mechanism in which the CPUs/APs can only access a mailbox location in the SEP is described. The CPU/AP may write a message to the mailbox, which the SEP may read and respond to. The SEP may include one or more of the following in some embodiments: secure key management using wrapping keys, SEP control of boot and/or power management, and separate trust zones in memory.

Abstract: Testing a Web-based application for security vulnerabilities. At least one client request including a payload having a unique identifier can be communicated to the Web-based application. Response HTML and an associated Document Object Model (DOM) object can be received from the Web-based application. Content corresponding to the payload can be identified in the DOM object via the unique identifier. A section of the DOM object including the payload can be identified as un-trusted.

Abstract: A system and method for modifying material related to computer software. The system receives an original disclosure for a software system. A masquerading algorithm is applied to the original disclosure to generate a new disclosure. The subject matter of the new disclosure is different from the original disclosure but has the same functionality. The system also receives original source code for the software system and applies a camouflaging algorithm to the original source code to generate modified source code and conversion data for converting between the modified source code and the original source code.

Abstract: A fetch unit (a) fetches a block of instruction data from an instruction cache of the microprocessor; (b) performs an XOR on the block with a data entity to generate plain text instruction data; and (c) provides the plain text instruction data to an instruction decode unit. In a first instance the block comprises encrypted instruction data and the data entity is a decryption key. In a second instance the block comprises unencrypted instruction data and the data entity is Boolean zeroes. The time required to perform (a), (b), and (c) is the same in the first and second instances regardless of whether the block is encrypted or unencrypted. A decryption key generator selects first and second keys from a plurality of keys, rotates the first key, and adds/subtracts the rotated first key to/from the second key, all based on portions of the fetch address, to generate the decryption key.

Abstract: A method for implementing a mandatory access control model in operating systems which natively use a discretionary access control scheme. A method for implementing mandatory access control for a plurality of computers, the system comprising information assets, stored as files on the computers, and a network communicatively connecting the computers, wherein each of the computers includes an operating system that uses a discretionary access control policy, and wherein each of a subset of computers includes a software agent component operable to intercept a request for a file operation on a file from a user of one of the computers including the software agent, determining whether the file is protected, if the file is protected, altering ownership of the file from the user to another owner, and providing access based on a mandatory access control policy.

Abstract: A hardware TPM has a plurality of registers, and performs data protection by encryption of data associated with the value of one of the plurality of registers. A register number manager manages, for each application, a register number used for the data protection. During execution of an application, an application executor issues a data protection request that designates a register number preset in the application. A software TPM transfers, to the hardware TPM, the data protection request in which the register number designated in the data protection request has been replaced with the register number managed by the register number manager.

Abstract: In accordance with some embodiments, a single trusted platform module per platform may be used to handle conventional trusted platform tasks as well as those that would arise prior to the existence of a primary trusted platform module in conventional systems. Thus one single trusted platform module may handle measurements of all aspects of the platform including the baseboard management controller. In some embodiments, a management engine image is validated using a read only memory embedded in a chipset such as a platform controller hub, as the root of trust. Before the baseboard management controller (BMC) is allowed to boot, it must validate the integrity of its flash memory. But the BMC image may be stored in a memory coupled to a platform controller hub (PCH) in a way that it can be validated by the PCH.