Abstract: An obfuscation circuit relies on a tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory which encodes a trusted Boolean function. The Boolean function is used to enable several operations relating to circuit obfuscation, including obfuscation of logic circuitry, obfuscation of operand data, and release of IP blocks. The tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory is part of a trusted integrated circuit structure, i.e., one fabricated by a trusted foundry, separate from another integrated circuit structure which contains the various operational logic circuits of the design and is fabricated by an untrusted foundry. The Boolean function is encoded based on a look-up table implemented as a cascaded multiplexer circuit. Multiple obfuscation functions can be so encoded. The obfuscation functions may be reprogrammed using a protocol that relies on symmetric keys, one of which is stored in the tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory.

Abstract: A microfluidic device that reads a colloidal mixture and separates the colloids based upon size and shape. and in the case of polymer colloids such as DNA, it reads patterns of markers attached to DNA. The combination of different separated fractions and DNA markers (it mapping) constitutes the physical code.

Abstract: A tamper-resistant memory is formed by placing a solid-state memory array between metal wiring layers in the upper portion of an integrated circuit (back-end of the line). The metal layers form a mesh that surrounds the memory array to protect it from picosecond imaging circuit analysis, side channel attacks, and delayering with electrical measurement. Interconnections between a memory cell and its measurement circuit are designed to protect each layer below, i.e., an interconnecting metal portion in a particular metal layer is no smaller than the interconnecting metal portion in the next lower layer. The measurement circuits are shrouded by the metal mesh. The substrate, metal layers and memory array are part of a single monolithic structure. In an embodiment adapted for a chip identification protocol, the memory array contains a physical unclonable function identifier that uniquely identifies the tamper-resistant integrated circuit, a symmetric encryption key and a release key.

Abstract: Methods and systems for locating a filament in a resistive memory device are described. In an example, a device can acquire an image indicating an occurrence of photoemission from the resistive memory device. The device can determine a location of the filament in a switching medium of the resistive memory device using the acquired image.

Abstract: Mechanisms are provided for optimizing an integrated circuit device design to obfuscate emissions corresponding to internal logic states of the integrated circuit device design. A first integrated circuit (IC) device design data structure is received and parsed to identify at least one instance of an obfuscation indicator in the data of the IC device design data structure. At least one IC logic element is marked, in the IC device design, which is associated with the at least one instance of the obfuscation indicator. At least one emission obfuscation optimization is applied to the marked at least one IC logic element to obfuscate emissions from the marked at least one IC logic element and generate an emissions obfuscated IC device design data structure. The emissions obfuscated IC device design data structure is output for fabrication of an IC device in accordance with the emissions obfuscated IC device design data structure.

Abstract: A technique relates to biasing, using a control system, a crossbar array of resistive processing units (RPUs) under a midrange condition, the midrange condition causing resistances of the RPUs to result in a random output of low values and high values in about equal proportions. The control system reinforces the low values and the high values of the random output by setting the resistances of the RPUs to a state that forces the low values and the high values having resulted from the midrange condition. Reinforcing the low values and the high values makes the random output permanent even when the crossbar array of the RPUs is not biased under the midrange condition. The control system records a sequence of the low values and the high values of the random output responsive to reinforcing the low values and the high values of the random output.

Abstract: An approach to creating a tamper-resistant field programmable gate array (FPGA) and remotely reprogramming the tamper-resistant FPGA. In one aspect, determining if an encryption key is stored in a physical unclonable function (PUF) of the FPGA. Further, responsive to the encryption key not being stored in a PUF, writing an encryption key in tamper resistant memory associated with a back end of the line (BEOL) of the FPGA. In another aspect, writing a program key and a look-up table (LUT) in the tamper resistant memory.

Abstract: A tamper-resistant memory is formed by placing a solid-state memory array between metal wiring layers in the upper portion of an integrated circuit (back-end of the line). The metal layers form a mesh that surrounds the memory array to protect it from picosecond imaging circuit analysis, side channel attacks, and delayering with electrical measurement. Interconnections between a memory cell and its measurement circuit are designed to protect each layer below, i.e., an interconnecting metal portion in a particular metal layer is no smaller than the interconnecting metal portion in the next lower layer. The measurement circuits are shrouded by the metal mesh. The substrate, metal layers and memory array are part of a single monolithic structure. In an embodiment adapted for a chip identification protocol, the memory array contains a physical unclonable function identifier that uniquely identifies the tamper-resistant integrated circuit, a symmetric encryption key and a release key.

Abstract: An obfuscation circuit relies on a tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory which encodes a trusted Boolean function. The Boolean function is used to enable several operations relating to circuit obfuscation, including obfuscation of logic circuitry, obfuscation of operand data, and release of IP blocks. The tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory is part of a trusted integrated circuit structure, i.e., one fabricated by a trusted foundry, separate from another integrated circuit structure which contains the various operational logic circuits of the design and is fabricated by an untrusted foundry. The Boolean function is encoded based on a look-up table implemented as a cascaded multiplexer circuit. Multiple obfuscation functions can be so encoded. The obfuscation functions may be reprogrammed using a protocol that relies on symmetric keys, one of which is stored in the tamper-resistant nonvolatile memory.

Abstract: A private key of a public-private key pair with a corresponding identity is written to an integrated circuit including a processor, a non-volatile memory, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the processor and the non-volatile memory. The private key is written to the non-volatile memory. The integrated circuit is implemented in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 14 nm or smaller technology. The integrated circuit is permanently modified, subsequent to the writing, such that further writing to the non-volatile memory is disabled and such that the private key can be read only by the cryptographic engine and not off-chip. Corresponding integrated circuits and wafers are also disclosed.

Abstract: A technique relates to biasing, using a control system, a crossbar array of resistive processing units (RPUs) under a midrange condition, the midrange condition causing resistances of the RPUs to result in a random output of low values and high values in about equal proportions. The control system reinforces the low values and the high values of the random output by setting the resistances of the RPUs to a state that forces the low values and the high values having resulted from the midrange condition. Reinforcing the low values and the high values makes the random output permanent even when the crossbar array of the RPUs is not biased under the midrange condition. The control system records a sequence of the low values and the high values of the random output responsive to reinforcing the low values and the high values of the random output.

Abstract: A composition system which is a mixture of colloids forming a physical code is implanted into a product and later extracted and read to authenticate the product thus providing secure means to check the authenticity of the product against counterfeiting.

Abstract: A method of preparing a complex microscopic colloidal mixture formulation and a method of authenticating a product containing a code attached thereto which code is a mixture of different hard bodied colloidal particles and polymeric particles having different properties, which are present in set ratios. The code is extracted from the product and is checked with data that was originally applied to the product to determine its authenticity.

Abstract: A private key of a public-private key pair with a corresponding identity is written to an integrated circuit including a processor, a non-volatile memory, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the processor and the non-volatile memory. The private key is written to the non-volatile memory. The integrated circuit is implemented in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 14 nm or smaller technology. The integrated circuit is permanently modified, subsequent to the writing, such that further writing to the non-volatile memory is disabled and such that the private key can be read only by the cryptographic engine and not off-chip. Corresponding integrated circuits and wafers are also disclosed.

Abstract: Methods and systems for generating an identifier includes testing an operational characteristic for each device in an array of pairs of devices. Each pair of devices includes a first device and a second device. The first device of each pair has a higher inter-device uniformity for the operational characteristic than the second device of the pair. The operational characteristic between the first device and the second device is compared for each pair of devices to generate a respective identifier bit for each pair of devices. An identifier is generated from the identifier bits.

Abstract: Methods and systems for generating an identifier include detecting emissions from a phosphor pattern with a sensor grid comprising one or more sensors when the phosphor pattern is stimulated with radiation. An output signal of each sensor in the sensor grid is compared to a threshold value to generate respective identifier bits. An identifier is generated from the identifier bits.

Abstract: A method of preparing a complex microscopic colloidal mixture formulation and a method of authenticating a product containing a code attached thereto which code is a mixture of different hard bodied colloidal particles and polymeric particles having different properties, which are present in set ratios. The code is extracted from the product and is checked with data that was originally applied to the product to determine its authenticity.

Abstract: A composition system which is a mixture of colloids forming a physical code is implanted into a product and later extracted and read to authenticate the product thus providing secure means to check the authenticity of the product against counterfeiting.

Abstract: A microfluidic device that reads a colloidal mixture and separates the colloids based upon size and shape. and in the case of polymer colloids such as DNA, it reads patterns of markers attached to DNA. The combination of different separated fractions and DNA markers (it mapping) constitutes the physical code.

Abstract: A private key of a public-private key pair with a corresponding identity is written to an integrated circuit including a processor, a non-volatile memory, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the processor and the non-volatile memory. The private key is written to the non-volatile memory. The integrated circuit is implemented in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 14 nm or smaller technology. The integrated circuit is permanently modified, subsequent to the writing, such that further writing to the non-volatile memory is disabled and such that the private key can be read only by the cryptographic engine and not off-chip. Corresponding integrated circuits and wafers are also disclosed.