Abstract: A method for protecting, against laser attacks, an integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including in the upper portion of the substrate an active portion in which are formed components, this method including the steps of: forming in the substrate a gettering area extending under the active portion, the upper limit of the area being at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 ?m from the upper surface of the substrate; and introducing diffusing metal impurities into the substrate.

Abstract: An integrated circuit including a substrate of a semiconductor material and first metal portions of a first metallization level or of a first via level defining pixels of an image. The pixels are distributed in first pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is connected to the substrate, and in second pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is separated from the substrate by at least one insulating portion.

Abstract: An integrated circuit including a substrate of a semiconductor material and first metal portions of a first metallization level or of a first via level defining pixels of an image. The pixels are distributed in first pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is connected to the substrate, and in second pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is separated from the substrate by at least one insulating portion.

Abstract: The generation of a chip identifier supporting at least one integrated circuit, which includes providing a cutout of at least one conductive path by cutting the chip, the position of the cutting line relative to the chip conditioning the identifier.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a method of fabricating an integrated circuit on a semiconductor chip, the method comprising: designing an architecture of the integrated circuit comprising at least first and second standard cells implementing a same basic function; designing for the standard cell at least first and second cell layouts presenting random differences; designing an integrated circuit layout corresponding to the integrated circuit architecture; fabricating the integrated circuit according to the integrated circuit layout; using the first cell layout to implement the first standard cell in the integrated circuit layout; and using the second cell layout to implement the second standard cell in the integrated circuit layout. The method can be used for protection of an integrated circuit against reverse engineering.

Abstract: A method of extraction of a key from a physical unclonable function exploiting the states of cells of a volatile memory after a powering on, wherein: cells are read according to addresses stored in a non-volatile memory; an error-correction code corrects the read states; and, in case an error has been corrected, the address of the cell providing an erroneous state is replaced in the non-volatile memory with that of another cell providing the non-erroneous state.

Abstract: A random signal generator uses a folded MOS transistor, whose drain-source current includes a random component, as an electronic noise source. The random signal generator generates a random binary signal from the random component. The invention may be applied, in particular, to smart cards.

Abstract: The disclosure relates to a method for detecting an attack in an electronic microcircuit, comprising: forming the microcircuit in a substrate, forming in the substrate a first well electrically isolated from the substrate, by a second well and an embedded well, forming in the first and second wells a data processing circuit comprising a ground terminal formed in the first well and a power supply terminal formed in the second well, and activating a detection signal when a voltage at the ground or power supply terminal of the data processing circuit crosses a threshold voltage.

Abstract: A method for protecting a key implemented, by an electronic circuit, in a symmetrical algorithm for ciphering or deciphering a message, including the steps of: selecting in non-deterministic fashion a pair of different masks from a set of at least four different masks, the masks having the property of representing different bit combinations, at least by pairs of bits; executing the algorithm twice by applying, to the key or to the message, one of the masks of the selected pair at each execution; checking the consistency between the two executions.

Abstract: The component comprises a first memory (MM) comprising a first portion (P1) having a content modified with a first modification entity (K1) and a second portion (P2) having a content modified with a second entity (K2), a storage means (MS) configured to store the first entity (K1) secretly, a non-volatile memory (NVM) storing an item of entity information representative of the second entity (K2) in a location (END) designated by a first indication (INDK2) contained in the said first portion of the first memory.

Abstract: A method for protecting a key used, by an electronic circuit, in a symmetrical algorithm for ciphering or deciphering a message, including the steps of complementing to one the key and the message; executing the algorithm twice, respectively with the key and the message and with the key and the message complemented to one, the selection between that of the executions which processes the key and the message and that which processes the key and the message complemented to one being random; and checking the consistency between the two executions.

Abstract: An integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including: in the upper portion of the substrate, an active portion in which components are formed; and under the active portion and at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 ?m from the upper surface of the substrate, an area comprising sites for gettering metal impurities and containing metal atoms at a concentration ranging between 1017 and 1018 atoms/cm3.

Abstract: A method for protecting, against laser attacks, an integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including in the upper portion of the substrate an active portion in which are formed components, this method including the steps of: forming in the substrate a gettering area extending under the active portion, the upper limit of the area being at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 ?m from the upper surface of the substrate; and introducing diffusing metal impurities into the substrate.

Abstract: The generation of an identification number of a chip supporting at least one integrated circuit, including the step of causing a cutting of at least one conductive section by cutting of the chip among several first conductive sections parallel to one another and perpendicular to at least one edge of the chip, the first sections being individually connected, by at least one of their ends, to the chip, and exhibiting different lengths, the position of the cutting line with respect to the chip edge conditioning the identification number.

Abstract: The generation of a chip identifier supporting at least one integrated circuit, which includes providing a cutout of at least one conductive path by cutting the chip, the position of the cutting line relative to the chip conditioning the identifier.

Abstract: A circuit for detecting attacks by contacting an integrated circuit chip comprising means for applying a random signal to a first terminal of at least one conductive path formed in at least one first metallization level of the chip, means for comparing the applied signal with a signal present on a second terminal of the path, and means for delaying the comparison time with respect to the application time, of a duration longer than or equal to the propagation delay through the first path.

Abstract: The generation of a chip identifier supporting at least one integrated circuit, which includes providing a cutout of least one conductive path by cutting the chip, the position of the cutting line relative to the chip conditioning the identifier.

Abstract: A random signal generator uses a folded MOS transistor, whose drain-source current includes a random component, as an electronic noise source. The random signal generator generates a random binary signal from the random component. The invention may be applied, in particular, to smart cards.

Abstract: A random signal generator uses a folded MOS transistor, whose drain-source current includes a random component, as an electronic noise source. The random signal generator generates a random binary signal from the random component. The invention may be applied, in particular, to smart cards.

Abstract: An integrated circuit including a substrate of a semiconductor material and first metal portions of a first metallization level or of a first via level defining pixels of an image. The pixels are distributed in first pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is connected to the substrate, and in second pixels, for each of which the first metal portion is separated from the substrate by at least one insulating portion.