Abstract: A computing system for tampering detection for digital images is disclosed. The computing system uses a LTI filter to filter time series data representing images in one or both of two videos and/or a still image of a live photo captured by a camera. A causal relationship in time existed between the images in the two videos and the still image when they were captured by the camera. The computing system determines whether the filtered output data representing an image by using the LTI filter is causal. If the computing system determines that the filtered output data representing the image is non-causal, it asserts a signal indicating that the image has been modified after it was captured.

Abstract: An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.

Abstract: A method of fabricating a printed circuit board (PCB) is presented. The PCB includes a glass security layer. The method includes forming the glass security layer upon a PCB wiring layer. The method includes optically attaching an optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter upon the glass security layer. The method includes optically attaching an optical EM receiver upon the glass security layer. The method further includes electrically connecting an optical monitor device to the optical EM receiver.

Abstract: In an example, a polymeric material is disclosed. The polymeric material includes a polymer substrate and a plurality of graphene traces arranged to form a tamper detection circuit on the polymer substrate.

Abstract: In an example, an article of manufacture includes a composite material. The composite material includes hollow glass filaments that are encapsulated within a polymeric matrix material. The hollow glass filaments are at least partially filled with the polymeric matrix material.

Abstract: A cryptographic printed circuit board (PCB) includes a patch antenna threat event detection layer and a resonant frequency monitoring component. The patch antenna threat event detection layer is embedded within a PCB layer stack of the cryptographic PCB and includes at least one antenna. The resonant frequency monitoring component is configured to monitor a resonant frequency associated with the at least one antenna and to trigger one or more tamper response operations responsive to detecting a resonant frequency shift.

Abstract: Embodiments of the present disclosure provide methods and apparatus for providing feed forward equalization to a communication line by providing a resistance and a capacitance to the communication line. The method includes determining the resistance based on a desired value of feed forward equalization to provide to a communication line, determining the capacitance based on the desired value of feed forward equalization to provide to the communication line, providing a layer of resistive material between a first conductor and a second conductor of the communication line, wherein a dimension of the layer of resistive material is determined based on the determined resistance and providing a layer of dielectric material between the first conductor and the second conductor, wherein a dimension of the layer of dielectric material is determined based on the determined capacitance.

Abstract: In an example, an article of manufacture includes a composite material. The composite material includes hollow glass filaments that are encapsulated within a polymeric matrix material. The hollow glass filaments are at least partially filled with the polymeric matrix material.

Abstract: An ophthalmic device is described that includes a frame and an optically active component comprising a bistable dielectric electroactive polymer. The bistable dielectric electroactive polymer changes shape when exposed to a sufficiently strong electric field and does not completely revert to its former shape when the electric field is deactivated. The refractive properties of the ophthalmic devices described herein are adjusted by exposing the devices to electric fields.

Abstract: A process includes utilizing a pin array that includes multiple segmented pins for forming selectively plated through holes. The process includes forming a PCB laminate structure that includes multiple spinel-doped core layers and multiple through holes. Each spinel-doped core layer includes a heat-activated spinel material incorporated into a dielectric material. The process includes aligning individual segmented pins of a pin array with corresponding through holes of the PCB laminate structure, where each segmented pin includes heated segment(s) and insulating segment(s). The process includes inserting the segmented pins of the pin array into the corresponding through holes and generating heat within each heated pin segment that is sufficient to form metal nuclei sites in selected regions of the spinel-doped core layers adjacent to portions of the through holes that contain the heated pin segments. The metal nuclei sites function as seed layers to enable formation of selectively plated through holes.

Abstract: A method and apparatus are provided for implementing customized printed circuit board (PCB) via creation through use of magnetic capture pads. At least one magnetic capture pad is rendered before aqueous seed and plate processing in the PCB manufacture. The magnetic capture pad selectively provides seed material rendering copper in at least one selected region of the via.

Abstract: A method and structure are provided for implementing stub-less printed circuit board (PCB) vias and custom interconnect through laser-excitation conductive track structures. Stub-less printed PCB vias are formed which terminate at desired signal layers by controlled laser excitation without stubs or the need to back-drill to remove such stubs.

Abstract: A method includes printing a first magnetic material onto a substrate. The first magnetic material has a first magnetic characteristic and encodes first information based on the first magnetic characteristic. The method further includes printing a second magnetic material onto the substrate. The second magnetic material encodes second information and has a second magnetic characteristic different from the first magnetic characteristic. The second information is encoded based on the second magnetic characteristic.

Abstract: A method includes transmitting a first magnetic detection signal at a first magnetic frequency and transmitting a second magnetic detection signal at a second magnetic frequency. The method also includes detecting a first response from a first magnetic material to the first magnetic detection signal and detecting a second response from the second magnetic material to the second magnetic detection signal. Each of the first magnetic material and the second magnetic material is associated with a substrate of the coded tag. The method further includes determining that the coded tag encodes first information based on detecting the first response and determining that the coded tag encodes second information based on detecting the second response.

Abstract: A security matrix layer between a first and second conductive shorting layers are located within a printed circuit board (PCB) that carries out cryptographic data handling functions. The security matrix layer includes at least two microcapsules each containing one or more reactants. When the security matrix layer is accessed, drilled, or otherwise damaged, the microcapsules rupture and the reactants react to form at least an electrically conductive material. The electrically conductive material contacts and shorts the first and second conductive shorting layers. A monitoring device that monitors whether the first and second conductive shorting layers have shorted detects the short and passes a tamper signal that is received by one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized physical access attempt.

Abstract: A security apparatus that can detect unauthorized alterations of physical arrangement of a computing system or unauthorized movements of a computing system through the use of acoustic signals is designed. Modules of a computing system including the security apparatus are able to generate acoustic measurements from received returned acoustic signals. Also, the modules are able to derive baseline acoustic measurements based on stored acoustic profiles. If, for any module of the computing system, its generated acoustic measurements do not substantially match its baseline acoustic measurements, the mismatch may indicate that there is an unauthorized alteration of physical arrangement of the computing system or an unauthorized movement of the computing system. Thus, the security apparatus in the module may take actions to prevent access to the sensitive data stored in the module.

Abstract: A flexible electronic circuit includes a shape memory material disposed within a flexible dielectric material.

Abstract: A coded tag includes a substrate. The coded tag includes a first magnetic material associated with the substrate. The first magnetic material has a first magnetic characteristic and encodes first information. The coded tag includes a second magnetic material associated with the substrate. The second magnetic material encodes second information and has a second magnetic characteristic that is different from the first magnetic characteristic.

Abstract: An embossed printed circuit board (PCB) for intrusion detection including a first security trace layer comprising a first serpentine trace monitored by a security sense circuit; a second security trace layer comprising a second serpentine trace monitored by the security sense circuit; a protected circuitry layer comprising circuitry protected from intrusion by the first security trace layer and the second security trace layer; and at least one embossed edge, wherein the at least one embossed edge comprises a fixed bend in at least one PCB layer, and wherein the fixed bend displaces at least one point of the at least one PCB layer a distance at least equivalent to a thickness of the at least one PCB layer.

Abstract: A process of utilizing a heat-activated conductive spinel material for PCB via overcurrent protection includes forming a PCB laminate structure that includes a spinel-doped insulator layer having a heat-activated conductive spinel material incorporated into a dielectric material as a spinel-based electrically non-conductive metal oxide. A sensing via is formed in the PCB laminate structure at a location that is proximate to a power via in the PCB laminate structure. The sensing via is electrically isolated from the power via by a region of the spinel-doped insulator layer and is electrically connected to a monitoring component configured to detect current flow through the sensing via that results from an overcurrent event in the power via that generates sufficient heat to cause the spinel-based electrically conductive metal oxide to release metal nuclei into the region to provide a conductive pathway through the region from the power via to the sensing via.