Abstract: An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.

Abstract: A stub of a via formed in a printed circuit board is backdrilled to a predetermined depth. A capacitance probe is positioned within the via. Then the capacitance probe is used to obtain a test capacitance measurement. The test capacitance measurement is compared to a predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. Residual conductive plating material in the backdrilled stub causes the test capacitance measurement to exceed the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. An indication is made that the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement has been exceeded.

Abstract: A conductor on glass security layer may be located within a printed circuit board (PCB) of a crypto adapter card or within a daughter card upon the crypto adapter card. The conductor on glass security layer includes a glass dielectric layer that remains intact in the absence of point force loading and shatters when a point load punctures or otherwise contacts the glass dielectric layer. The conductor on glass security layer also includes a conductive security trace upon the glass dielectric layer. A physical access attempt shatters a majority of the glass dielectric layer, which in turn fractures the security trace. A monitoring circuit that monitors the resistance of the conductive security trace detects the resultant open circuit or change in security trace resistance and initiates a tamper signal that which may be received by one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized attempt of physical access.

Abstract: Disclosed aspects relate to connector structures and a card. A first connector structure is to join a first subset of a set of electrical connections. A second connector structure is to join a second subset of the set of electrical connections. The card manages the set of electrical connections and is located between the first and second connector structures to connect with the first and second connector structures.

Abstract: A lane within a processor bus that communicatively connects a transmitter and a receiver is dynamically assigned as a clock lane. The clock lane subsequently transmits a reference clock signal to coordinate data communications from the transmitter to the receiver. The clock lane may be assigned by determining signal margins of various lanes of the processor bus. The signal margins are determined by the transmitter sending a test pattern upon the various lanes and analyzing the received test pattern at the receiver. A dynamically assigned clock lane results increased overall signal integrity of communications between the transmitter and receiver. Further, a dynamically assigned clock lane may result in different lanes being assigned as the clock lane at distinct boot up instances, adding to the complexity of the unauthorized user determining the operational logic of the transmitter.

Abstract: A lane within a processor bus that communicatively connects a transmitter and a receiver is dynamically assigned as a clock lane. The clock lane subsequently transmits a reference clock signal to coordinate data communications from the transmitter to the receiver. The clock lane may be assigned by determining signal margins of various lanes of the processor bus. The signal margins are determined by the transmitter sending a test pattern upon the various lanes and analyzing the received test pattern at the receiver. A dynamically assigned clock lane results increased overall signal integrity of communications between the transmitter and receiver. Further, a dynamically assigned clock lane may result in different lanes being assigned as the clock lane at distinct boot up instances, adding to the complexity of the unauthorized user determining the operational logic of the transmitter.

Abstract: Systems and methods to obstruct analysis of a microchip may include an electrical component of a microchip and a photodetector positioned within the microchip. The photodetector may be configured to sense electromagnetic radiation. Circuitry in electrical communication with the photodetector may be configured to initiate an action to obstruct analysis of the electrical component in response to a change in a level of the electromagnetic radiation.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards environmental based location monitoring. Environmental based location monitoring can include collecting, a first set of image data that corresponds to a first set of environmental characteristics existing within a bounded area encompassing a hardware element of the computer and determining an environmental difference based on a difference between a first location corresponding to a geographic position of the hardware element relative to the first set of environmental characteristics and a second location corresponding to an approved geographic position of the hardware element. Environmental based location monitoring can include determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy a threshold and executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Systems and methods to safeguard data and hardware may include a memory configured to store a first image and sensitive data, and an optical sensor configured to capture a second image. A sensor signal comprising the captured second image may be generated. A controller having access to the memory may be configured to receive the sensor signal. The controller may be further configured to compare the stored first image to the captured second image, and based on the comparison, to determine whether the sensitive data is accessed.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards a method of electronic verification of motion data. This includes collecting a first set of motion data that corresponds to a first set of motion characteristics generated from physically moving a hardware element of a computer ending upon inserting the hardware element of the computer into a computer chassis. This can further include determining an approved set of motion data and comparing the first set of motion data to the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining a difference between the first set of motion data and the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining that the difference does not satisfy a threshold. This can further include executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: A bus communicates bits in parallel between a transmitter and receiver. A selected set of bits has its bits scrambled. Scrambling the bits includes assigning two or more bits of the selected set of bits to atypical lanes of the bus. By scrambling the bits, the order in which the bits of the selected set of bits are ready by a processer are obscured. The set of bits is transmitted to the receiver with one or more delays. The delays are on one or more of the lanes of the bus. The delays indicate the order of the bits. The receiver is configured to use the delays to identify the order of the bits and unscramble the set of bits.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards a method of electronic verification of motion data. This includes collecting a first set of motion data that corresponds to a first set of motion characteristics generated from physically moving a hardware element of a computer ending upon inserting the hardware element of the computer into a computer chassis. This can further include determining an approved set of motion data and comparing the first set of motion data to the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining a difference between the first set of motion data and the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining that the difference does not satisfy a threshold. This can further include executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards environmental based location monitoring. Environmental based location monitoring can include collecting, a first set of image data that corresponds to a first set of environmental characteristics existing within a bounded area encompassing a hardware element of the computer and determining an environmental difference based on a difference between a first location corresponding to a geographic position of the hardware element relative to the first set of environmental characteristics and a second location corresponding to an approved geographic position of the hardware element. Environmental based location monitoring can include determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy a threshold and executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards a method of electronic verification of motion data. This includes collecting a first set of motion data that corresponds to a first set of motion characteristics generated from physically moving a hardware element of a computer ending upon inserting the hardware element of the computer into a computer chassis. This can further include determining an approved set of motion data and comparing the first set of motion data to the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining a difference between the first set of motion data and the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining that the difference does not satisfy a threshold. This can further include executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards a method of electronic verification of motion data. This includes collecting a first set of motion data that corresponds to a first set of motion characteristics generated from physically moving a hardware element of a computer ending upon inserting the hardware element of the computer into a computer chassis. This can further include determining an approved set of motion data and comparing the first set of motion data to the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining a difference between the first set of motion data and the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining that the difference does not satisfy a threshold. This can further include executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Disclosed aspects relate to an elastomeric electrical connector structure. A first physical hardware plane has a first group of electrical contacts to establish a first portion of a set of electrical connections. A second physical hardware plane has a second group of electrical contacts to establish a second portion of the set of electrical connections. The elastomeric electrical connector structure is to join the first and second portions of the set of electrical connections. The elastomeric electrical connector structure includes a first state having a first distance between the first and second physical hardware planes, and a second state having a second distance between the first and second physical hardware planes. The first distance exceeds the second distance.

Abstract: A stub of a via formed in a printed circuit board is backdrilled to a predetermined depth. A capacitance probe is positioned within the via. Then the capacitance probe is used to obtain a test capacitance measurement. The test capacitance measurement is compared to a predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. Residual conductive plating material in the backdrilled stub causes the test capacitance measurement to exceed the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. An indication is made that the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement has been exceeded.

Abstract: A stub of a via formed in a printed circuit board is backdrilled to a predetermined depth. A capacitance probe is positioned within the via. Then the capacitance probe is used to obtain a test capacitance measurement. The test capacitance measurement is compared to a predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. Residual conductive plating material in the backdrilled stub causes the test capacitance measurement to exceed the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. An indication is made that the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement has been exceeded.

Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards environmental based location monitoring. Environmental based location monitoring can include collecting, a first set of image data that corresponds to a first set of environmental characteristics existing within a bounded area encompassing a hardware element of the computer and determining an environmental difference based on a difference between a first location corresponding to a geographic position of the hardware element relative to the first set of environmental characteristics and a second location corresponding to an approved geographic position of the hardware element. Environmental based location monitoring can include determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy a threshold and executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the environmental difference does not satisfy the threshold.

Abstract: Systems and methods to safeguard data and hardware may include a memory configured to store a first image and sensitive data, and an optical sensor configured to capture a second image. A sensor signal comprising the captured second image may be generated. A controller having access to the memory may be configured to receive the sensor signal. The controller may be further configured to compare the stored first image to the captured second image, and based on the comparison, to determine whether the sensitive data is accessed.