Abstract: A technique for generating a cryptographic key is provided. The technique is particularly useful for protecting the communication between two entities cooperatively running a distributed security operation. The technique comprises providing at least two parameters, the first parameter comprising or deriving from some cryptographic keys which have been computed by the first entity by running the security operation; and the second parameter comprising or deriving from a token, where the token comprises an exclusive OR of a sequence number (SQN) and an Anonymity Key (AK). A key derivation function is applied to the provided parameters to generate the desired cryptographic key.

Abstract: A Mobile Station (MS), a Base Station System (BSS) and a Mobile Switching Centre (MSC) of a cellular network, such as GSM, are disclosed. According to one embodiment, the MS is arranged to carry out one or more security features in its communication with the network. For example, the MS may be arranged to: by means of information received in a signalling message (0) from the network, discover if the network supports one or more of said security features, exchange information with the network in order to enable the use of one or more of the above-mentioned supported security features in the communication, carry out at least one of the one or more of the supported security features in the communication with the network.

Abstract: A method, arrangement, and first access router in a packet-switched communication network for determining that a first endpoint originating a communication session with a second endpoint is not initiating a malicious man-in-the-middle attack. The first access router provides access for the first endpoint to the network and a second access router provides access for the second endpoint. The first and second access routers facilitate conducting a secure key exchange between the first and second endpoints, wherein a shared secret key is generated. The first access router utilizes a Prefix Reachability Detection (PRD) protocol to determine the first endpoint is topologically legitimate due to being topologically located behind the first access router, and then sends a Prefix Request Test Initialization (PRTI) message to the second access router indicating the first endpoint is topologically legitimate.

Abstract: A tamper-resistant security device, such as a subscriber identity module or equivalent, has an AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) module for performing an AKA process with a security key stored in the device, as well as means for external communication. The tamper-resistant security device includes an application that cooperates with the AKA module and an internal interface for communications between the AKA module and the application. The application cooperating with the AKA module is preferably a security and/or privacy enhancing application. For increased security, the security device may also detect whether it is operated in its normal secure environment or a foreign less secure environment and set access rights to resident files or commands that could expose the AKA process or corresponding parameters accordingly.

Abstract: According to an aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of operating a communication device, the communication device being part of a group comprising two or more communication devices that share a subscription to a communication network. The method comprises receiving a group authentication challenge from the network, at least part of the group authentication challenge having been generated using group authentication information that is associated with the shared subscription. The device then generates a device specific response to the group authentication challenge using the group authentication information and device specific authentication information and sends the device specific response to the network. The device is for example a member of a machine-type communication device group.

Abstract: A method of authorizing a message received at a node in a wireless network is disclosed. The message from a sender device is formed by a plurality of symbols and includes a first message integrity indicator located at a predetermined distance from the start of the message such that further symbols of the message are included after the first message integrity indicator. The position of the first message integrity indicator in the message is determined, and a cryptographic operation is performed on at least some of the symbols of the message before the first message integrity indicator so as to generate a second message integrity indicator before the first message integrity indicator is received. The first and second message integrity indicators are compared, and an indication that the message is not authorized is provided if the second message integrity indicator does not match the first message integrity indicator.

Abstract: A Mobile Station (MS), a Base Station System (BSS) and a Mobile Switching Center (MSC) of a cellular network, such as GSM, are disclosed. According to one embodiment, the MS is arranged to carry out one or more security features in its communication with the network. For example, the MS may be arranged to: • by means of information received in a signalling message (0) from the network, discover if the network supports one or more of said security features, • exchange information with the network in order to enable the use of one or more of the above-mentioned supported security features in the communication, • carry out at least one of the one or more of the supported security features in the communication with the network.

Abstract: When setting up communication from a user equipment UE (1), such as for providing IP access for the UE in order to allow it to use some service, information or an indication of at least one network property relating to a first network, e.g. the current access network (3, 3?), is sent to the UE from a node (13) in a second network such as the home network (5) of the subscriber of the UE. The information or indication can be sent in a first stage of an authentication procedure being part of the setting up of a connection from the UE. In particular, the network property can indicate whether the access network (3, 3?) is trusted or not.

Abstract: A method and an arrangement for providing keys for protecting communication between a terminal (300) and service points in a communication network. A basic key (Ik) is first established with a service control node (304) when the terminal has entered the network. An initial modified key (Ik1) is then created in both the service control node and the terminal, by applying a predetermined first function (f) to at least the basic key and an initial value of a key version parameter (v). The initial modified key is sent to a first service point (302), such that it can be used to protect communication between the terminal and the first service point. When the terminal switches to a second service point (306), the first service point and the terminal both create a second modified key (Ik2) by applying a predetermined second function (g) to the initial modified key, and the first service point sends the second modified key to the second service point.

Abstract: A first data handling node (304) is configured to verify data received in a data distribution network with multiple data handling nodes forming a distribution path of a network topology, by obtaining tag information from a hash server (306). The first data handling node (304) receives data (D3) and a hash tag (H3) from a second data handling node (302). The received data (D3) and hash tag (H3) have been generated by the second node based on a previous hash tag (H1, H2) generated by a preceding third data handling node (300a, 300b). The third node has delivered data (D1, D2) to the second node, and the received data (D3) has been generated by the second node based on the data (D1, D2) delivered by the third data handling node.

Abstract: A method of securing a session between a Network Application Function, NAF, and a User Equipment, UE, connected to a network. The NAF is assigned a NAF identifier, NAF_id, using the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture, GBA, or a similar architecture and a shared secret is established between the UE and the NAF (S7.1). An application request containing a bootstrapping transaction identifier is sent to the NAF from the UE (S7.2) and an authentication request comprising the bootstrapping transaction identifier, the NAF_id, and information derived from the shared secret is sent to a Bootstrapping Server Function, BSF, from the NAF (S7.4). The BSF and the UE determine a NAF key, Ks_NAF, by using a modified parameter in place of or in addition to an original parameter in a key derivation function, the modified parameter being derived from the shared secret and the original parameter of the key derivation function (S7.5). This NAF key is transmitted from the BSF to the NAF (S7.

Abstract: When setting up communication from a user equipment UE (1), such as for providing IP access for the UE in order to allow it to use some service, information or an indication of at least one network property relating to a first network, e.g. the current access network (3, 3?), is sent to the UE from a node (13) in a second network such as the home network (5) of the subscriber of the UE. The information or indication can be sent in a first stage of an authentication procedure being part of the setting up of a connection from the UE. In particular, the network property can indicate whether the access network (3, 3?) is trusted or not.

Abstract: A method and arrangement in a first mobile terminal (600) for determining allocation of radio resources for DMO communication amongst a group of mobile terminals. M the first mobile terminal, a first determining module 600a determines a communication (Sout, Sin) with a second mobile terminal (602) of the group. A second determining module (600b) determines a resource element (RE) for communication by applying a predefined cryptographic function P based on a terminal identification (K)). The cryptographic function has been configured in the mobile terminals of the group to provide terminal-specific resource elements for different mobile terminals within respective radio frames. A communication module (600c) then communicates with the second mobile terminal (602), either by transmission or reception of the data, on the determined resource element (RE).

Abstract: A method and an arrangement for providing keys for protecting communication between a terminal (300) and service points in a communication network. A basic key (Ik) is first established with a service control node (304) when the terminal has entered the network. An initial modified key (Ik1) is then created in both the service control node and the terminal, by applying a predetermined first function (f) to at least the basic key and an initial value of a key version parameter (v). The initial modified key is sent to a first service point (302), such that it can be used to protect communication between the terminal and the first service point. When the terminal switches to a second service point (306), the first service point and the terminal both create a second modified key (Ik2) by applying a predetermined second function (g) to the initial modified key, and the first service point sends the second modified key to the second service point.

Abstract: A method for estimating the strength of a graphicalpassword comprising two or more segments is disclosed. In some embodiments, this advantageous solution is achieved by implementing a multi-step process. In one step, the data processing system applies a first operation on a first segment to produce a transformed segment. In another step, the data processing system performs a comparison operation between the transformed segment and a second segment. In another step, the data processing system performs a penalty operation with respect to the first segment based on an outcome of the comparison operation. The penalty operation includes one or more of (1) calculating a penalty value, wherein the penalty value may be used in calculating a value representing the strength of the graphicalpassword; and (2) disregarding the first or the second segment when calculating the value representing the strength of the graphical password.

Abstract: A module (2) for integrity protection of messages transmitted from a mobile software defined radio (SDR) terminal (1), the module provided with a confined cryptographic key K and arranged to receive loaded SDR-code. The module derives an integrity protecting key Rk from at least said cryptographic key K, and provides a periodic integrity protection on-line of generated messages using said key integrity protecting key Rk, and the integrity of said messages is verified by an integrity checking node (10) of the access network.

Abstract: A method, arrangement, and first access router in a packet-switched communication network for determining that a first endpoint originating a communication session with a second endpoint is not initiating a malicious man-in-the-middle attack. The first access router provides access for the first endpoint to the network and a second access router provides access for the second endpoint. The first and second access routers facilitate conducting a secure key exchange between the first and second endpoints, wherein a shared secret key is generated. The first access router utilizes a Prefix Reachability Detection (PRD) protocol to determine the first endpoint is topologically legitimate due to being topologically located behind the first access router, and then sends a Prefix Request Test Initialization (PRTI) message to the second access router indicating the first endpoint is topologically legitimate.

Abstract: A technique for generating a cryptographic key is provided. The technique is particularly useful for protecting the communication between two entities cooperatively running a distributed security operation. The technique comprises providing at least two parameters, the first parameter comprising or deriving from some cryptographic keys which have been computed by the first entity by running the security operation; and the second parameter comprising or deriving from a token, where the token comprises an exclusive OR of a sequence number (SQN) and an Anonymity Key (AK). A key derivation function is applied to the provided parameters to generate the desired cryptographic key.

Abstract: A method of authenticating a user who is a subscriber of a home network, authenticated in a first network, for accessing a service in a second network. This method includes: authenticating the user in the first network with a first authentication method selected in an authentication server; reserving resources for the service towards a rules enforcement device; requesting control rules for the resources towards a control rules server; submitting towards the control rules server information about the first authentication method; determining at the control rules server whether a further authentication of the user with a further authentication method is required; and instructing from the control rules server towards the authentication server to force the further authentication of the user with the further authentication method.

Abstract: A technique for generating a cryptographic key is provided. The technique is particularly useful for protecting the communication between two entities cooperatively running a distributed security operation. The technique comprises providing at least two parameters, the first parameter comprising or deriving from some cryptographic keys which have been computed by the first entity by running the security operation; and the second parameter comprising or deriving from a token, where the token comprises an exclusive OR of a sequence number (SQN) and an Anonymity Key (AK). A key derivation function is applied to the provided parameters to generate the desired cryptographic key.