Abstract: Disclosed in some examples are devices, methods, and machine-readable mediums for reliable control of IR LEDs. In some examples, a microcontroller running firmware controls whether the LED is activated or not by use of a disable signal. The microcontroller enables or disables the operation of the LED based upon a user's proximity to the LED, a watchdog timer, and a confirmation that only trusted software is executing.

Abstract: This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.

Abstract: Provided are a system, memory controller, and method for using counters and a table to protect data in a storage device. Upon initiating operations to modify a file in the storage device, a storage write counter is incremented in response to initiating the operations to modify the file. In response to incrementing the storage write counter, write table operations are initiated including setting a table write counter to a storage write counter and setting a table commit counter to the storage commit counter plus a value. The operation to modify the file in response to completing the write table operations. The system commit counter is incremented by the value in response to completing the operation to modify the file.

Abstract: Technologies for end-to-end biometric-based authentication and locality assertion include a computing device with one or more biometric devices. The computing device may securely exchange a key between a driver and a secure enclave. The driver may receive biometric data from the biometric sensor in a virtualization-protected memory buffer and encrypt the biometric data with the shared key. The secure enclave may decrypt the biometric data and perform a biometric authentication operation. The computing device may measure a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to generate attestation information for the VMM. A secure enclave may execute a virtualization report instruction to request the attestation information. The processor may copy the attestation information into the secure enclave memory. The secure enclave may verify the attestation information with a remote attestation server. If verified, the secure enclave may provide a shared secret to the VMM. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a computing device may include a memory device that may be rendered unusable after a certain number of operations are performed on the memory device. The computing device may incorporate one or more techniques for protecting the memory device. Processing logic contained in the computing device may be configured to implement the techniques. The techniques may include, for example, acquiring a request to write or erase information stored in a memory device contained in a first computing device, saving the request for execution after a user visible event has been generated on the first computing device, generating the user visible event on the first computing device, and executing the saved request after the user visible event has been generated. In addition, the techniques may include reporting the request. The request may be reported to, for example, an anti-malware agent.

Abstract: This disclosure pertains to iris recognition including liveness testing. A device may perform iris recognition with testing to check liveness. Sensing circuitry in the device may comprise an IR sensor and IR emitter to generate a uniform IR emission and a pulsed IR emission. Sensor data based on the uniform IR emission may be used for iris recognition, which may be confirmed by at least one test confirming that real eyes are being analyzed and not spoof data. For example, a determination may be made as to whether a light reflection is visible in images captured by the IR sensor, whether the light reflection is aligned and/or synchronized with an eye center and/or iris center, whether a portion of the iris visible in the captured images changes from image to image, whether the images show that a pupil of the eye is reactive to the pulsed IR emissions, etc.

Abstract: A hardware platform includes a nonvolatile storage device that can store system firmware as well as code for the primary operating system for the hardware platform. The hardware platform includes a controller that determines the hardware platform lacks functional firmware to boot the primary operating system from the storage device. The controller accesses a firmware image from an external interface that interfaces a device external to the hardware platform, where the external device is a firmware image source. The controller provisions the firmware from the external device to the storage device and initiates a boot sequence from the provisioned firmware.

Abstract: A repair engine for a computing platform is separate from the repeatedly-rewritten storage components for software and firmware. For example, the repair engine may reside in ROM or hardware logic. Through dedicated connections to one or more controllers, the repair engine detects when any of the platform's dual-role ports (e.g., on-the-go USB ports) is connected to a host device. The repair engine responds by opening firmware-independent communication with the host device and supporting the downloading and execution (DnX) of a firmware image from the host. Because the communication is initiated independently of the firmware, even a catastrophic firmware failure is repairable without requiring a user to identify and use a specially modified port.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a system is adapted to: record at least one measurement of a virtual trusted execution environment in a storage of the system and generate a secret sealed to a state of this measurement; create, using the virtual trusted execution environment, an isolated environment including a secure enclave and an application, the virtual trusted execution environment to protect the isolated environment; receive, in the application, a first measurement quote associated with the virtual trusted execution environment and a second measurement quote associated with the secure enclave; and communicate quote information regarding the first and second measurement quotes to a remote attestation service to enable the remote attestation service to verify the virtual trusted execution environment and the secure enclave, and responsive to the verification the secret is to be provided to the virtual trusted execution environment and the isolated environment. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Abstract: Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that includes a distance detector that can determine a distance between the distance detector and an object and a scanner. The scanner is not activated if the distance is less than a predetermined distance. In one example, the object is a user and the scanner is an iris scanner.

Abstract: An apparatus is described herein. The apparatus includes a Universal Serial Bus (USB) component and a controller interface. The controller interface is to allocate register space for interfacing with the USB component and the USB component is virtualized into multiple instantiations. The apparatus also includes a secure environment, and the secure environment further virtualizes the multiple instantiations such that the multiple instantiations are owned by the secure environment.

Abstract: Embodiments of the invention create an underlying infrastructure in a flash memory device (e.g., a serial peripheral interface (SPI) flash memory device) such that it may be protected against user attacks—e.g., replacing the SPI flash memory device or a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to modify the SPI flash memory contents on the fly. In the prior art, monotonic counters cannot be stored in SPI flash memory devices because said devices do not provide replay protection for the counters. A user may also remove the flash memory device and reprogram it. Host platforms alone cannot protect against such hardware attacks. Embodiments of the invention enable secure standard storage flash memory devices such as SPI flash memory devices to achieve replay protection for securely stored data. Embodiments of the invention utilize flash memory controllers, flash memory devices, unique device keys and HMAC key logic to create secure execution environments for various components.

Abstract: Embodiments of the invention create an underlying infrastructure in a flash memory device (e.g., a serial peripheral interface (SPI) flash memory device) such that it may be protected against user attacks—e.g., replacing the SPI flash memory device or a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to modify the SPI flash memory contents on the fly. In the prior art, monotonic counters cannot be stored in SPI flash memory devices because said devices do not provide replay protection for the counters. A user may also remove the flash memory device and reprogram it. Host platforms alone cannot protect against such hardware attacks. Embodiments of the invention enable secure standard storage flash memory devices such as SPI flash memory devices to achieve replay protection for securely stored data. Embodiments of the invention utilize flash memory controllers, flash memory devices, unique device keys and HMAC key logic to create secure execution environments for various components.

Abstract: A package with a processing device and integrated cryptographic firmware is described. The package includes a processing device including a processing module to execute a system management mode and a non-volatile memory storing cryptographic firmware to execute one or more cryptographic functions in the system management mode.

Abstract: Provided are a system, memory controller, and method for using counters and a table to protect data in a storage device. Upon initiating operations to modify a file in the storage device, a storage write counter is incremented in response to initiating the operations to modify the file. In response to incrementing the storage write counter, write table operations are initiated including setting a table write counter to a storage write counter and setting a table commit counter to the storage commit counter plus a value. The operation to modify the file in response to completing the write table operations. The system commit counter is incremented by the value in response to completing the operation to modify the file.

Abstract: This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.

Abstract: A hardware platform includes a nonvolatile storage device that can store system firmware as well as code for the primary operating system for the hardware platform. The hardware platform includes a controller that determines the hardware platform lacks functional firmware to boot the primary operating system from the storage device. The controller accesses a firmware image from an external interface that interfaces a device external to the hardware platform, where the external device is a firmware image source. The controller provisions the firmware from the external device to the storage device and initiates a boot sequence from the provisioned firmware.

Abstract: In an embodiment, a computing device may include a memory device that may be rendered unusable after a certain number of operations are performed on the memory device. The computing device may incorporate one or more techniques for protecting the memory device. Processing logic contained in the computing device may be configured to implement the techniques. The techniques may include, for example, acquiring a request to write or erase information stored in a memory device contained in a first computing device, saving the request for execution after a user visible event has been generated on the first computing device, generating the user visible event on the first computing device, and executing the saved request after the user visible event has been generated. In addition, the techniques may include reporting the request. The request may be reported to, for example, an anti-malware agent.

Abstract: Systems and methods of managing keystroke data in embedded keyboard environments may involve transferring a mode request from a management controller to an embedded controller of a keyboard via a dedicated communication channel. Keystroke activity can be detected at the keyboard, and keystroke data may be transferred from the embedded controller to the management controller via the dedicated communication channel in response to the keystroke activity and the mode request. In addition, the management controller may be used to encrypt the keystroke data, wherein the encrypted keystroke data can be transmitted from the management controller to an off-platform service via a network controller.