Abstract: Embodiments detect cyberattack campaigns against multiple cloud tenants by analyzing activity data to find sharing anomalies. Data that appears benign in a single tenant's activities may indicate an attack when the same or similar data is also found for additional tenants. Attack detection may depend on activity time frames, on how similar certain activities of different tenants are to one another, on how unusual it is for different tenants to share an activity, and on other factors. Sharing anomaly analysis may utilize hypergeometric probabilities or other statistical measures. Detection avoidance attempts using digital entity randomization are revealed and thwarted. Authorized vendors may be recognized, mooting anomalousness. Although data from multiple tenants is analyzed together for sharing anomalies while monitoring for attacks, tenant confidentiality and privacy are respected through technical and legal mechanisms. Mitigation is performed in response to an attack indication.

Abstract: Embodiments detect cyberattack campaigns against multiple cloud tenants by analyzing activity data to find sharing anomalies. Data that appears benign in a single tenant's activities may indicate an attack when the same or similar data is also found for additional tenants. Attack detection may depend on activity time frames, on how similar certain activities of different tenants are to one another, on how unusual it is for different tenants to share an activity, and on other factors. Sharing anomaly analysis may utilize hypergeometric probabilities or other statistical measures. Detection avoidance attempts using entity randomization are revealed and thwarted. Authorized vendors may be recognized, mooting anomalousness. Although data from multiple tenants is analyzed together for sharing anomalies while monitoring for attacks, tenant confidentiality and privacy are respected through technical and legal mechanisms. Mitigation is performed in response to an attack indication.

Abstract: Embodiments detect cyberattack campaigns against multiple cloud tenants by analyzing activity data to find sharing anomalies. Data that appears benign in a single tenant's activities may indicate an attack when the same or similar data is also found for additional tenants. Attack detection may depend on activity time frames, on how similar certain activities of different tenants are to one another, on how unusual it is for different tenants to share an activity, and on other factors. Sharing anomaly analysis may utilize hypergeometric probabilities or other statistical measures. Detection avoidance attempts using entity randomization are revealed and thwarted. Authorized vendors may be recognized, mooting anomalousness. Although data from multiple tenants is analyzed together for sharing anomalies while monitoring for attacks, tenant confidentiality and privacy are respected through technical and legal mechanisms. Mitigation is performed in response to an attack indication.

Abstract: Various technologies described herein pertain to enforcing control flow integrity by adding instrumentation when source code is compiled or binary code is rewritten. An indirect call to a control transfer target (e.g., in the source code, in the binary code, etc.) can be identified. Moreover, the instrumentation can be inserted prior to the indirect call. The instrumentation can use a bit from a bitmap maintained by a runtime to verify whether the control transfer target is valid. When an executable image that includes the inserted instrumentation runs, execution can be terminated and/or other appropriate actions can be taken when the control transfer target is determined to be invalid; alternatively, execution can continue when the control transfer target is determined to be valid.

Abstract: Various technologies described herein pertain to enforcing control flow integrity by adding instrumentation when source code is compiled or binary code is rewritten. An indirect call to a control transfer target (e.g., in the source code, in the binary code, etc.) can be identified. Moreover, the instrumentation can be inserted prior to the indirect call. The instrumentation can use a bit from a bitmap maintained by a runtime to verify whether the control transfer target is valid. When an executable image that includes the inserted instrumentation runs, execution can be terminated and/or other appropriate actions can be taken when the control transfer target is determined to be invalid; alternatively, execution can continue when the control transfer target is determined to be valid.

Abstract: A drive train system includes a source of rotational energy, a viscous coupling and power take off assembly that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy, and a rotatably driven device that is rotatably driven by the viscous coupling and power take off assembly. The viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a power take off that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy and a viscous coupling that is rotatably driven by the power take off. Alternatively, the viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a viscous coupling that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy and a power take off that is rotatably driven by the viscous coupling. Lastly, the viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a combined viscous coupling and power take off assembly that is integrated into a single housing.

Abstract: Graph-based detection systems and techniques are provided to identify potential malicious lateral movement paths. System and security events may be used to generate a network connection graph and detect remote file executions and/or other detections, for use in tracking malicious lateral movement across a computer network, such as a compromised computer network. Lateral movement determination across a computer network may be divided into two subproblems: forensic analysis and general detection. With forensic analysis, given a malicious node, possible lateral movement leading into or out of the node is identified. General detection identifies previously unknown malicious lateral movement on a network using a remote file execution detector, and/or other detectors, and a rare path anomaly detection algorithm.

Abstract: A power take-off unit includes a housing, an input mechanism mounted at least partially within the housing and configured for attachment to a source of rotational energy, and an output mechanism is configured for attachment to a driven accessory. The power take-off unit also includes a clutch assembly configured to selectively connect the output mechanism to the input mechanism. A pneumatic valve manifold is attached to the housing and is configured to provide pressurized air to the clutch assembly.

Abstract: A drive train system includes a source of rotational energy, a viscous coupling and power take off assembly that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy, and a rotatably driven device that is rotatably driven by the viscous coupling and power take off assembly. The viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a power take off that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy and a viscous coupling that is rotatably driven by the power take off. Alternatively, the viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a viscous coupling that is rotatably driven by the source of rotational energy and a power take off that is rotatably driven by the viscous coupling. Lastly, the viscous coupling and power take off assembly may include a combined viscous coupling and power take off assembly that is integrated into a single housing.

Abstract: Graph-based detection systems and techniques are provided to identify potential malicious lateral movement paths. System and security events may be used to generate a network connection graph and detect remote file executions and/or other detections, for use in tracking malicious lateral movement across a computer network, such as a compromised computer network. Lateral movement determination across a computer network may be divided into two subproblems: forensic analysis and general detection. With forensic analysis, given a malicious node, possible lateral movement leading into or out of the node is identified. General detection identifies previously unknown malicious lateral movement on a network using a remote file execution detector, and/or other detectors, and a rare path anomaly detection algorithm.

Abstract: A power take-off unit includes a housing portion, an input mechanism mounted at least partially within the housing and configured for attachment to a source of rotational energy, and an output mechanism is configured for attachment to a driven accessory. The power take-off unit also includes a clutch assembly configured to selectively connect the output mechanism to the input mechanism. A pneumatic valve manifold is attached to the housing portion and is configured to provide pressurized air to the clutch assembly.

Abstract: A power take-off that significantly reduces the amount of undesirable noise that is transmitted therethrough during operation includes a housing, an input mechanism, and an output mechanism. The input mechanism is disposed within the housing and is adapted to be connected to a source of rotational energy. The output mechanism is also disposed within the housing and is adapted to be connected to a driven device. The output mechanism is adapted to be rotatably driven by the input mechanism. At least one of the input mechanism and the output mechanism includes a shaft having at least one portion that is supported on the housing by a vibration damping material.

Abstract: A power take-off that significantly reduces the amount of undesirable noise that is transmitted therethrough during operation includes a housing, an input mechanism, and an output mechanism. The input mechanism is disposed within the housing and is adapted to be connected to a source of rotational energy. The output mechanism is also disposed within the housing and is adapted to be connected to a driven device. The output mechanism is adapted to be rotatably driven by the input mechanism. At least one of the input mechanism and the output mechanism includes a shaft having at least one portion that is supported on the housing by a vibration damping material.

Abstract: The subject disclosure is directed towards preventing the exploitation by malicious code of object state corruption vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free vulnerabilities. An object class is configured with a secret cookie in a virtual function table of the object, e.g., inserted at compile time. An instrumentation check inserted in the program code evaluates the secret cookie to determine whether the object state has been corrupted before object access (e.g., a call to one of the object's methods) is allowed. If corrupted, access to the object is prevented by the instrumentation check. Another instrumentation check may be used to determine whether the object's virtual table pointer points to a location outside of the module that contains the legitimate virtual function table; if so, object access is prevented.

Abstract: Various technologies described herein pertain to enforcing control flow integrity by adding instrumentation when source code is compiled or binary code is rewritten. An indirect call to a control transfer target (e.g., in the source code, in the binary code, etc.) can be identified. Moreover, the instrumentation can be inserted prior to the indirect call. The instrumentation can use a bit from a bitmap maintained by a runtime to verify whether the control transfer target is valid. When an executable image that includes the inserted instrumentation runs, execution can be terminated and/or other appropriate actions can be taken when the control transfer target is determined to be invalid; alternatively, execution can continue when the control transfer target is determined to be valid.

Abstract: A method disclosed herein includes acts of receiving code at a Just-in-Time compiler executing in an application on a computing device and compiling the code to generate machine code and causing the machine code to be placed on at least one page that is accessible by at least one processor on the computing device, wherein the Just-in-Time compiler compiles the code utilizing at least one technique for preventing a Just-in-Time spraying attack.

Abstract: A hand held tube squeezer facilitates emptying a tube of its contents. The squeezer has a gripping action on the tube to which it is applied, thus preventing rearward slipping of the squeezer. Top and bottom plates of the squeezer are connected by a loop which has a slot through which a tube extends when it is being emptied. Portions of the loop at opposite ends of the slot function as a line hinge between the top and bottom plates. The squeezer and a roller are packaged in a clear plastic wrap film.

Abstract: A voxel transfer circuit that implements high-speed voxel transfer operations. When implemented in a 2D or 3D texture mapping circuit of a graphics system, or in a graphics card adapter of a workstation, the voxel transfer circuit provides a comprehensive, accelerated volume rendering capability to the existing imaging pipeline. For each voxel in a volume data set, the voxel transfer circuit generates a texel having an opacity value and a color value based on one or more properties of the voxel including the local gradient magnitude and a lighting model. The relationship between these values is referred to herein as a classification or transfer function. In the present invention, the voxel transfer circuit implements a transfer function that employs a gradient-influenced classification. Such a transfer function generates opacity and color values of structures with excellent edge and surface discrimination.

Abstract: Apparatus for distributing radio frequency (RF) modulated broadcast television signals from a broadcast signal source to networked appliances connected to the source through a plurality of single conductor coaxial cables, simultaneously with distributing unmodulated digital signals and RF modulated video signals exchanged between the networked appliances over the same network coaxial cables.